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Introduction
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is evaluation of an agent’s performance relative
to a peer performance. The agency theory suggests that basing an agent’s compensation
contract on RPE would insulate him from common shocks unrelated to his performance.
Hence, the presence of RPE removes unnecessary risk from the contract and offers a more
informative tool for the agent’s performance evaluation. Due to its risk-sharing benefits
RPE is typically used in executive compensation or in decisions regrading the executive
turnover.
In order to start economic analysis of relative performance evaluation the stage needs
to be set by examining the practice of corporate governance as a "product of decisions in
many dimensions: board structure, security design, incentive schemes and the like" (Her-
malin 2013, p.746). In particular, analysis of corporate governance is to set out the basic
theoretical structure that lies behind the premise of relative performance evaluation – the
agency theory.1 The extensive academic literature has generated numerous definitions of
corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Tirole 2001, Hart 1995, Sun et al. 2011,
Hermalin 2013). These definitions could yet be portioned in two main branches. The first
one takes maximizing the shareholder value as the main goal of the governance system.
For example, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.737) "corporate governance deals
with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of get-
ting a return on their investment". Hermalin (2013) and Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000)
take a similar stand.2 The second branch takes a broader view and considers corporate
governance system as the whole set of regulatory, market, stakeholder and shareholder
(internal) governance. In this view, shareholders are not the only party whose interests
are to be maximized. The good corporate governance system is to act in the interests of
several stakeholder groups, such as banks, suppliers, customers, government, etc. (Tirole
1The evolving literature on relative performance evaluation has been truly interdisciplinary. It spans
organizational and personnel economics, labor economics, accounting, corporate finance, organizational
behavior. However, in the context of relative performance evaluation the agency theory represents a link
between these disciplines. In economic theory, the agency theory is part of the research stream denoted as
contracting theory. The agency theory can be divided into two branches: 1. The adverse selection stream
– This stream assumes that the agent has private information about his "type". This information is not
known to the principal before the contract is written 2. The moral hazard stream – This branch contends
that the agent realizes his "type" after the contract has been written (Salanie 2005). For more details on the
contracting theory see Salanie (2005).
2Hermalin (2013, p.735) is focused on the narrow definition of the corporate governance system as
accounting for all the parties affected by the corporate governance would make the analysis of corporate
governance overcomplicated and complex.
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2001, Hart 1995, John and Senbet 1998, Sun et al. 2011). Both branches of corporate
governance share one common element which merits our attention. That is, the fact that
corporate governance should create a framework where managers serve the interests of
shareholders or stakeholders, and maximize their utility. The central role of corporate
governance system is to mitigate any potential conflict of interest, in particular the one
that might arise between managers and shareholders, and to ensure that the firm’s assets
are used efficiently and in accordance with the shareholders’ interests.
An attempt to define corporate governance reveals two basic conceptual features that
might lead to the failure of a governance system to fulfil its main role (Hart 1995). First,
there is a conflict of interest that arises due to "separation of ownership and control"
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). The first to notice this issue was Adam Smith in 1776.
In his eminent work "Wealth of Nations" he notes: "The directors of such companies,
however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot
well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their
master’s honor, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence
and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the
affairs of such a company" (Smith 1776, p.408). In other words, the interests of the
capital owners, shareholders, and those who are controlling the company, managers, are
divergent. Shareholders delegate tasks to managers expecting that they will maximize
their utility. Yet, managers are not necessarily incentivized to optimally conduct this task,
as they are not the owners of the firm. They are self-interested and want to maximize their
own utility first (Hart 1995). In other words, they tend to take actions that minimize the
effort invested in certain activity.3 Second, in order to undergo this problem, shareholders
would have to write a contract which should specify the "parties’ obligations in all states
of the world to the fullest possible extent" (Hart 1995, p.679). This, however, is not
attainable. Even if it was, it would incur enormous contracting costs to the shareholders.
Hence, shareholders have to accept this imperfection and write contracts that are deemed
to be "incomplete". This setup leaves enough space for manipulation from parties signing
the contract. This makes the study of agency relationship critical (Hart 1995, Hermalin
2013).
In order to avoid undesired manipulation by managers, shareholders need to impose
certain mechanisms. The primary purpose of such mechanisms is to create a framework
which would tackle with the timing preferences of shareholders and management. That is,
managers are often impatient, and therefore focused on the short-term results. Sharehold-
ers, on the other hand, are concerned about the long-term value of the company and would
like their management to be as well. An example of a mechanism that can impose this is
executive incentive scheme or executive compensation. Again, imposing such mechanism
comes at a certain cost for the shareholders. These costs are denoted as "agency costs"
3This issue firstly recognized by Smith (1776) was later on formalized as an "agency problem" com-
prised within the economic "theory of the firm" in the study by Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, the
study by Berle and Means (1932) is the earliest modern work on this problem.
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by Jensen and Meckling (1976).4 Given that the agent in a firm is often self-interested,
his behavior might not always produce a Pareto-efficient outcome for the firm which cre-
ates an incentive problem (Gibbons and Roberts 2013, p.56).5 However, this behavior
might be altered by the means of an appropriate contract. The agency theory suggests that
compensation contracts represent an important tool for structuring agent’s (executive) in-
centives by tying the compensation to the available information about the agent’s effort.
As such, executive compensation contract should attract and retain personnel with skills
necessary to run the company and motivate them to promote the long-term value of the
firm.
The agency theory typically assumes that the agent is risk-averse and that informa-
tion about his effort is imperfect – it contains noise. Hence, when the agent’s contract is
based on such information, which is most commonly proxied by firm performance, the
agent faces unnecessary risk. Tying an agent’s contract more strongly to such informa-
tion increases the risk he bears instead of making his incentives stronger. Hence, such
contract contains a trade-off between appropriately motivating the agent and the agent’s
risk-sharing (Gibbons and Roberts 2013). Put it other way, the manager bears a significant
amount of risk and is not incentivized to invest the level of effort optimal for the sharehold-
ers. This induces costs for them. When information about the agent’s effort is not optimal
the agency theory suggests the "Informativeness Principle" to tackle with this problem
(Holmstrom 1979). This principle has been known as Relative Performance Evaluation
and it reduces the risk borne by the agent and therefore "weakens" the trade-off between
inducing the desired behavior of agent and the agent’s risk-bearing. Relative performance
evaluation suggests that the performance of an agent should be measured relative to other
similar agents in order to remove common risk that are out of his control. This removes
unnecessary risk from the agent’s contract and offers a more informative measure of his
performance.6 Hence, relative performance evaluation has important implications for the
executive contract design. As noted by Prendergast (1999, p.14) theoretical prediction of
RPE allows researchers to investigate whether the agents are evaluated based on how well
they perform in comparison to the peers in the similar environment and whether the use
of relative performance evaluation increases with the correlation between the agent’s and
peers agents’ performances. In order to examine RPE in executive compensation contracts
researchers typically regress executive pay on firm and peer performance variables.7 The
4Jensen and Meckling (1976) denote agency costs as the overall costs of an incomplete contracting. The
agency costs include the monitoring costs, the agents’ bonding costs and the residual cost. The bonding
costs are incurred by the agent and come as a consequence of the agent’s pledge to the contract obligations
which can limit his activity. Monitoring costs are incurred by shareholders. Finally, residual costs are a
result of additional divergences between principal and agent. They occur in addition to the use of monitoring
and bonding (Jensen and Meckling 1976, p.308).
5In reviewing economic theories on incentives in organizations, Gibbons and Roberts (2013, p.59)
note that incentive problems in the principal-agent setting come as a consequence of: 1. the agent’s risk
characteristics coupled with the noisy information about his effort 2. the manageable information about the
agent’s effort 3. the fact that restrains on how much an agent can be paid are exogenous.
6The Holmstrom’s Informativeness Principle is one of the four principles of contract design identified
by Migrom and Roberts (1992). The Incentive-Intensity Principle, the Monitoring Intensity Principle and
the Equal Compensation Principle represent the three remaining principles.
7Alternatively, researchers investigate whether the external shocks are removed from the executive
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negative and statistically significant coefficient on peer performance represents an indica-
tion of the RPE presence. The academic literature makes a distinction between two types
of RPE tests – the weak-form and the strong-form test. The first one investigates if some
of the exogenous shocks are removed from the compensation contract or a CEO turnover
decisions, whereas the latter one examines if all the shocks are filtered out. Alternatively,
researchers also distinguish between the implicit tests of RPE that infer a peer group per-
formance, and explicit tests which use information disclosed in the proxy statements in
order to determine peer performance.
Relative performance evaluation in the context of executive contracts concerns both
the board of directors, shareholders but also managers. Evaluating a manager’s perfor-
mance relative to an appropriate performance benchmark increases the quality and in-
formativeness of performance evaluation. As a consequence, the board has a more so-
phisticated measure of the manager’s performance. From the shareholders’ perspective
a presence of RPE in executive compensation contracts signals that the firm practices a
good governance policy, at least with respect to executive pay. As such it represents one
aspect of the firm’s efforts to be committed to the corporate responsibility practices. The
presence of RPE implies that the manager is insulted from negative shocks on the market.
That is, he is not punished for the events that are out of his control. This, in the same man-
ner, implies that the manager is not rewarded for simply riding a bull market. Hence, the
presence of RPE should limit the manager’s opportunity to enjoy excessive pay.8 From
the ethical point of view, the presence of RPE in executive compensation contracts sug-
gests that firms entertaining it are, at least in the context of executive pay, committed to
the standards of fairness. Against this backdrop, this dissertation examines relative perfor-
mance evaluation hypothesis, which suggests that managers should be evaluated relative
to their peer performance in order to remove the common risk components from their
compensation contract. In particular it investigates the disclosure with regard to relative
performance evaluation in the banking industry and peer performance composition used
in RPE tests.
Given that the research on RPE is spread across different fields, the main goal of the
Chapter 1 is to review empirical literature on RPE and set up a ground for its empir-
ical investigation. Hence, Chapter 1 examines around 50 empirical studies on RPE in
the context of executive pay and executive turnover from 1986 to the present day and
condense its main findings. It represents a state-of-the art literature review on relative
performance evaluation. The literature examining the existence of RPE in executive pay
has produced scarce and inconclusive evidence, often not in accord with the predictions of
the principal-agent theory. Such evidence is often regraded as puzzle worth investigating
by some academics (Murphy 1999, Hall and Liebman 1998, Celentani and Loveira 2006).
As a consequence, many streams of literature have evolved in order to come up with an
explanation for this puzzle. It appears that many studies ignore strategic interactions be-
tween firms and use misspecified peer groups when testing RPE which creates a bias in
the RPE tests. In addition, ignoring executive characteristics such as CEO talent, wealth,
turnover decisions. This is thoroughly discussed in the Chapter 1.
8I, of course, acknowledge that there are other means of limiting the excessive executive pay in addition
to imposing relative performance evaluation in executive pay contracts.
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and age or his power over the board of directors might lead to the failure to detect RPE.
When a manager determines a firm’s strategy and makes investment decisions through
choosing the firm’s exposure to sector performance, his pay should be positively related
to the sector performance. In this case RPE is not optimal. Firm’s decisions to explicitly
use RPE varies with the firm size, the level of growth options, common risk the firm faces,
investment in research & development costs but also with whether the firm belongs to a
concentrated industry or not. Moreover, the amount of equity holdings held by the CEO
and the number of independent directors play a role in determining the RPE use. Further-
more, the presence of compensation consultants also affects RPE tests. Better accounting
regulation seems to induce the accounting-based RPE use due to better accounting infor-
mation and its comparability across countries. Many conditions that influence RPE tests
on the firm-level are more strongly related to the RPE conditions at the compensation plan
level. Hence, before making decisions on whether to implement RPE, firms evaluate both
its benefits and costs. Chapter 1 also examines whether boards use relative performance
measures when deciding whether to retain managers in the firm or not. At the first glance,
the results of the studies seem to be more conclusive than the studies examining the same
hypothesis in executive pay. However, a closer look suggests that academic literature has
mostly relied on the weak-version RPE tests. When the strong-form tests are employed
the evidence with respect to RPE are weaker. Moreover, some piece of evidence indicates
that previous studies have been too conservative when defining a CEO turnover, which
might create bias in the RPE tests. Taken together, Chapter 1 offers an overview of im-
portant factors which affect the inferences drawn on relative performance evaluation in
executive pay and turnover decisions. These factors should be taken into consideration in
the future RPE empirical specifications.
Chapter 2 investigates the existence of RPE in international banking and pays par-
ticular attention to banks that seem to claim its use in executive pay. It also deals with
the potential issue of RPE being a corporate cheap talk. The global banking industry
is particularly suitable for testing RPE due to the fact that banks operate in an inter-
nationally integrated environment with intense competition and are strongly exposed to
common risks. Moreover, the recent financial crisis has raised concerns about the com-
pensation policy in the banking industry which makes the investigation of RPE in the
banking industry particularly compelling. In order to test RPE we collect data on 42
large, non-U.S banks. Hence, we utilize the industry and industry-size method developed
by Albuquerque (2009) in order to construct corresponding peers. We first test RPE use
on the full sample of banks. We find negative and insignificant parameter estimates on
industry measures of peer performance. This lends no support on the use of RPE in our
sample. When we perform tests of RPE on more sophisticated industry-size peers, we
find weak evidence consistent with RPE. We then disentangle between RPE disclosing
and non-disclosing banks and repeat the RPE tests. When we restrict our attention to the
subsample of RPE-disclosing banks, we report strong and more conclusive evidence with
respect to RPE. Strong-form RPE tests dovetails these results. This implies that disclosure
statements with respect to RPE do have some merit. To gain more insight, we investigate
the main drivers of RPE in our novel sample of banks. A logistic regression indicates
that firm size and growth options play a major role in determining the likelihood of RPE
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usage. The results imply that the greater a bank is, the higher the probability that it will
use RPE in its compensation contracts. This comes as no surprise as large banks after
the financial crisis have been under significant pressure to be more committed to a better
compensation policy and, thereafter to the RPE use. On the other hand, the probability of
RPE use in compensation contracts is decreasing with the magnitude of growth options.
This evidence dovetails previous academic literature – high growth option firms might
find it more difficult to identify an appropriate peer group. As a consequence, these firms
are less prone to the RPE compensation practices.
Chapter 3 develops a new approach towards a peer group composition – the so-called
Kernel-based approach. This approach relies on the traditional industry/size method intro-
duced by Albuquerque (2009). Aggregating in this manner accounts for the observation
that industry affiliation and firm size are informative proxies for the common market risks
that RPE-setting firms face. However, our approach is more adjustable in terms of firm
size. Instead of fixed-size peer groups, each firm in the sample is assigned a unique, in-
dividual peer group based on the firm’s size. We argue that this approach is better able
to capture exogenous shocks on the market than the traditional industry/size peer group.
To that end, we test the RPE hypothesis on a large sample of 2806 U.S. firms from 1992-
2011. We aggregate peer performance by using the classical industry and industry/size
approaches and juxtapose them to our novel Kernel-based peer group approach. We doc-
ument the negative and statistically significant parameter estimates on the Kernel-based
peers and the industry/size peers, which is consistent with the RPE use in executive com-
pensation. There are differences in explanatory power, however. The peer coefficients
on the Kernel-based peers are more negative as to the industry/size peer group approach.
This is an indication that the Kernel-based method is better able to filter out exogenous
shocks from the level of executive pay in comparison to the industry/size method. We also
examine if there is an association between firm’s performance and their tendency to use
RPE, proxied by the "predicted excess compensation" variable that arises from the firm
and peer performance. Our evidence suggests that there is no such association. However,
this remans an intriguing question for future research.
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Chapter 1
Relative Performance Evaluation: A
Survey
Chapter Overview
This paper provides a review of the empirical literature on relative performance evalu-
ation (RPE). The RPE theory suggests that a manager’s performance should be evaluated
relative to a peer group. In this manner, not only is the manager insulated from the com-
mon shocks, unrelated to his performance, but the board is also better able to evaluate
manager’s performance. Hence, the RPE theory has important practical implications for
the executive compensation contract design. Against this background, the knowledge
stemming from the academic literature on RPE reveals important insights about executive
contract practices. This paper demonstrates that main findings with respect to the RPE
use in the executive compensation contracts are inconclusive. However, it appears that
many studies ignore strategic interactions between firms which creates a bias in the RPE
tests. In addition, ignoring executive characteristics such as CEO talent, wealth, and age
or his power over the board of directors might lead to the failure to detect RPE. Strategic
flexibility in making decisions about a firm’s strategy may make contracts without RPE
optimal for the shareholders. Inappropriate firm performance measures and misspecified
peer groups also affect inferences drawn on RPE. The academic literature suggests that
firms consider both benefits and costs when implementing RPE. This might be observed
when analysing how different firm characteristics drive the use of RPE. The findings with
regard to RPE in the CEO turnover decisions seem to be more convincing at the first
glance. However, some researchers pinpoint methodological issues of these studies, and
therefore, offer suggestions on how to improve the research design on CEO turnover de-
cisions in the context of RPE.
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Chapter 1. Relative Performance Evaluation: A Survey
1.1 Introduction
The principal-agent theory predicts that basing an agent’s compensation on relative per-
formance offers benefits for both the principal and the agent. Basing an agent’s compen-
sation on absolute firm performance measures induces unnecessary risk into his contract.1
These measures contain common risk components, which are beyond the agent’s control
and unrelated to his effort. Therefore, evaluating a risk-averse agent on such performance
metrics induces uncertainty into his compensation contract. In order to overcome this
problem a theory of relative performance evaluation (RPE) suggests basing agent’s com-
pensation on one additional variable – peer performance. Such compensation contract
does not contain the common risk component (Holmstrom 1979, 1982). Consequently, it
insulates the agent from common uncertainty and also provides a better evaluation of the
agent’s effort.2 However, RPE might also impose certain costs. The presence of RPE in
the compensation contract might alter agent’s incentives whenever he can affect the peer
performance. In particular, as noted by Gibbons and Murphy (1990, p.30-31) he might be
induced to collude and shrink with co-workers or to obstruct the performance of the peer
group members. Moreover, when the performance of the peer group members is difficult
or expensive to measure, the RPE contracts are not advantageous anymore (Gibbons and
Murphy 1990, p.31). The tournament theory also predicts that the heterogeneity among
agents might mitigate the benefits of RPE (Lazear and Rosen 1981). For example, Lazear
and Rosen (1981) show that agent’s risk choices might alter his incentives as soon as the
agent finds out that he has unequal chances to win the "award" in a tournament.
Relative performance evaluation has most widely been tested in executive contracts.
This comes as no surprise as its main features make it a good case for testing RPE hy-
pothesis. The risk-sharing benefits of RPE in these contracts are more likely to outpace
its costs to the shareholders (Gibbons and Murphy 1990, p.31). For example, the stock
performance of the peer firms are easily accessible and available on low-cost daily basis.
In addition, the chief executive officer’s (CEO) linkage with other CEOs on the market is
weaker in comparison to other lower-level employees (Gibbons and Murphy 1990, p.31).
This decreases the chances of diluting the performance of the peer group constituents.
Taking this into consideration, the implementation of RPE in executive compensation
does not seem expensive (Gibbons and Murphy 1990, p.31).3 Hence, CEO pay makes it a
good case for testing RPE. However, the use of RPE has not been limited to this compo-
nent of the compensation contract only. Many studies examine the conditions in which the
CEO is forced or encouraged to leave the firm. Precisely, they examine whether boards
filter out exogenous shocks when deciding to retain a CEO.
Given the obvious benefits the RPE offers in terms of executive contracts, it comes as
no surprise that many researchers have decided to empirically test the theoretical predic-
tion of RPE. Against this background, I argue that the main findings stemming from the
empirical literature on RPE in the context of executive contracts bear important insights
1Jensen and Meckling (1976), Holmstrom (1979), Fama (1980), Shavell (1979) and Ross (1973) con-
tributed to the development of the agency theory.
2The seminal papers by Holmstrom (1979), Holmstrom (1982) have set a theoretical background for
the RPE.
3For more details on the benefits and costs of RPE, see Gibbons and Murphy (1990).
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relevant for both academics and public. First, they offer an explanation for the so-called
RPE puzzle. The RPE puzzle is a phrase often used by academics to denote the scarce
evidence of RPE in the empirical literature on executive compensation. For example,
Murphy (1999, p.2539) notes that "... the paucity of RPE in options and other compo-
nents of executive compensation remains a puzzle worth understanding." Moreover, Hall
and Liebman (1998, p.683) add that "the near complete absence of relative pay seems to
be a puzzle". Some researchers refer to the lack of RPE in the executive pay as a styl-
ized fact (Celentani and Loveira 2006). To that end, over the last two decades several
branches of academic literature have evolved offering potential explanation for this case.
Insights from these studies matter because their findings affect the inferences drawn on
the RPE use. Second, academic literature provides evidence on how the firm’s decision
to explicitly use RPE is related to the firm’s characteristics, suggesting that firms consider
both benefits and costs when deciding to commit to the RPE use. Third, studies exam-
ining whether boards base their decisions to dismiss a CEO on his relative performance,
provide important insight about the governance practices. To that end, I collect around
50 empirical studies on relative performance evaluation from 1986 to the present day and
summarize their main findings. Thus, the aim of this paper is to provide a state-of-the art
literature review on relative performance evalation.
In the first part of the paper I review the main insights from the studies that examine
whether the executive compensation contracts are based on RPE. Following the literature
I differentiate between the weak-and strong-form tests of RPE. The weak tests examine
if some of the exogenous shocks were removed from the compensation contract, while
the strong-form tests indicate if all the shocks are filtered from the compensation. Alter-
natively, researchers also distinguish between the implicit tests of RPE that infer a peer
group performance, and explicit tests which use information disclosed in the firms’ proxy
statements and annual reports in order to proxy for peer performance. I conclude this sec-
tion by outlining that the academic literature provides scarce and inconclusive evidence
with regard to the RPE.
Such evidence has given rise to what has been known as the RPE puzzle. Many
streams of literature have evolved aiming to explain the existence of this puzzle. This is
in the focus of the second section. One branch demonstrates that executive characteris-
tics play a role in drawing inferences with respect to RPE. During the bull markets, the
demand for talented CEOs increases. In the same time peer performance against which
a CEO performance is benchmarked also rises, making RPE contracts less attractive. So,
if a firm wants to keep a talented manager, she might want to offer him a contract with-
out RPE in order to keep him in the firm. In this situation, no RPE is in fact optimal
(Rajgopal et al. 2006). The more wealthy and elderly CEOs are disposed to less RPE as
they find it easier to privately hedge on their account than the young ones (Garvey and
Milbourn 2003). Another branch of the literature suggests that misspecified RPE mod-
els are the reason why we observe so little empirical support for RPE. Namely, many
studies do not use appropriate peer performance benchmarks in examining RPE (Albu-
querque 2009, Black et al. 2015, Gong et al. 2011, Jayaraman et al. 2015, Hoberg and
Phillips 2015, Lewellen 2015). The industry/size, the product market-based peers and the
so-called "self-selected" peer groups seem to be better proxies for peer performance than
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traditional industry or market benchmarks. Other studies argue that firms use inappro-
priate firm performance metrics when testing RPE (Alanis 2015, Angelis and Grinstein
2016). The firms’ strategic interactions in an oligopolistic environment seem to affect
inferences drawn on RPE. In such market, RPE appears to be too costly – it induces man-
agers to collude which undercuts shareholders’ returns (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999a,
Joh 1999, Janakiraman 2004). Furthermore, I review studies that argue that managerial
power over the board of directors leads to the lack of RPE in CEO pay. Namely, man-
agers exert their power to influence the decisions made by the board and therefore affect
the pay-setting process. Hence, we observe asymmetric performance benchmarking in the
CEO pay, which is inconsistent with the RPE theory (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001,
Garvey and Milbourn 2006, Bell and Van Reenen 2016). Finally, a managerial flexibility
in determining the firm’s strategy through the exposure to the sector performance might
make RPE contracts suboptimal (Gopalan et al. 2010).
In the third part of the paper, I discuss studies that examine how the use of RPE in the
CEO pay is related to different firm characteristics. Firm’s decisions to explicitly use RPE
varies with the firm size, the level of growth options, common risk the firm faces, invest-
ment in research&development costs but also with whether the firm belongs to a concen-
trated industry or not. Moreover, the amount of CEO equity holdings and the number of
independent directors play a role in determining the RPE use. Furthermore, the presence
of compensation consultants also affects RPE tests (Kren 2002, Albuquerque 2014, Gong
et al. 2011, Keune 2015, Liu 2008, Jaiswal and Bhattacharyya 2016). Better accounting
regulation, International Financial Reporting Standards in particular, seems to induce the
accounting-based RPE use due to better accounting information and comparability (Wu
and Zhang 2010). Another studies find that many conditions that influence RPE tests on
the firm-level are more strongly related to the RPE conditions at the compensation plan
level (Carter et al. 2009). Hence, before making decisions on whether to implement RPE,
firms evaluate both its benefits and costs (Gibbons and Murphy 1990, Gong et al. 2011).
In the final part of the paper, I examine whether boards evaluate CEOs based on their
relative performance when deciding whether to retain them in the firm or not. At the first
glance, the results of the studies seem to be more conclusive than the studies examining
the same hypothesis in executive pay (Warner et al. 1988, Gibbons and Murphy 1990,
Barro and Barro 1990, Blackwell et al. 1994, Chen et al. 2005). However, a closer look
reveals that academic literature has mostly relied on the weak-version RPE tests. When
the strong-form tests are employed the evidence with respect to RPE are less convincing
(Jenter and Kanaan 2015, Barakova and Palvia 2010). Moreover, some piece of evidence
indicates that previous studies have been too conservative when defining a CEO turnover,
affecting the inferences drawn on RPE (Fee et al. 2015). Taken together, these results
provide insights for the research design of the future studies that intend to address the
issue of CEO turnover in the context of RPE.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews studies inves-
tigating the presence of RPE in executive compensation contracts and acknowledges that
academic literature has offered mixed and inconclusive results with respect to RPE. Such
results have given rise to what has been known as the RPE puzzle in the academic litera-
ture. Hence, Section 1.3 discusses several possible explanations for this case. Section 1.4
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examines how the use of RPE is related to the firm’s characteristics. Section 1.5 discusses
studies examining RPE in the context of CEO turnover. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Are executive compensation contracts based on rela-
tive performance?
The concept of relative performance evaluation has been widely examined in the context
of executive compensation. Therefore, it is the purpose of this section to chronologically
review the main results of these studies.
In order to empirically test whether executives are compensated based on relative
performance, academic studies typically regress the total executive pay, or one component
of executive pay, on firm and peer performance measures.4 A negative and statistically
significant coefficient on peer performance suggests that the systematic component of
firm performance is removed from the compensation, implying the RPE use. The RPE
tests that infer RPE by using some proxy for peer group performance such as market or
industry index are called implicit or indirect. As of 2006 it is possible to conduct the so-
called explicit or direct tests of RPE. Namely, due to the regulation change that took place
in the U.S., researchers are able to observe compensation practices of firms in more detail.
This allows them to collect information on the peers that firms select in performance
benchmarking. Therefore, instead of market and industry indices, researchers use the so-
called "self-selected" peers in order to construct peer performance measures. The weak-
form RPE empirical specification examines if some of the common shocks are removed
from the compensation contract. On the other hand, the strong-form version of RPE
examines whether common shocks are completely removed from executive contract. In
other words, it tests if a performance evaluation of an executive is solely based on the
"unsystematic" component of firm performance.5
The study by Antle and Smith (1986) opened an empirical inquiry of the validity of
the main theoretical prediction of RPE. The study conducts strong-from RPE tests on the
sample of chemical, aerospace and electronics firms in the U.S. from 1947-1977. Sample-
wide the authors find weak evidence of RPE. However, when they conduct regression
analysis on firm-by-firm basis, the RPE support is found in 16 of 39 sample firms. The re-
sults also suggest that RPE tests are sensitive to the firm performance measures. Namely,
Antle and Smith (1986) find weaker evidence of RPE when using return on common stock
as a firm performance measure, while the tests have a stronger power when return on as-
sets is employed. Even though the study did not provide conclusive results on the RPE
use in executive pay, it set foot for the future studies that are to plunge deeper in the topic
of RPE. In contrast to Antle and Smith (1986), Barro and Barro (1990) examine RPE
hypothesis in the banking industry. Precisely, they gather data on 83 U.S. commercial
banks that were ranked highest in terms of firm’s assets in 1986. They first regress the
4Depending on the sample in question additional control variables are included in the empirical speci-
fication.
5The empirical specifications for both weak-form and strong-from tests are presented in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3.
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growth rate of real compensation log( witwit−1 ) on the first difference of accounting returns and
market-based real rate of returns and their corresponding regional returns. In similar man-
ner, the authors regress the same dependent variable on the relative performance variable
written as a function of firm and peer returns. On the basis of data from 1982-1987 the
authors fail to find evidence consistent with RPE. They argue that this result might well
stem from the misspecified peer groups that are based on the geographical region, which
might not be a good proxy for capturing systematic shocks. A seminal study by Jensen
and Murphy (1990) brought important insights about executive pay-performance relation-
ship to the academics, and public in general. Even though the authors do not explicitly
test RPE, they examine pay-performance sensitivity using additional performance mea-
sures – net-of-industry shareholder wealth change, and net-of-market shareholder wealth
change.6 They find that pay changes are not sensitive to these relative performance mea-
sures, indicating no RPE in the sample they examine. In attempt to address the issue
of whether common uncertainties are removed from executive pay, Gibbons and Mur-
phy (1990) employ a sample of 9425 observations which includes 1668 executives from
1049 firms in 1972-1986. Contrary to the previous studies, they find that common risks
are partly filtered from executive pay when using industry and market peer returns. Yet,
results seem to suggest that an executive is more likely to be evaluated relative to the
market than to the industry peers. The robustness checks confirm these results and show
that the explanatory power of the model diminishes as the industry definition becomes
more narrow. This evidence is explained as a consequence of the sample firms not being
employed in one industry only. It is also possible that the SIC industry definitions are not
a satisfying proxy for industry peers (Gibbons and Murphy 1990).
This, however, stands in contrast to the study conducted by Janakiraman et al. (1992).
The authors find weak evidence of RPE in the sample of 609 firms over the period 1970-
1980. Namely, CEO cash compensation (salary+bonuses) is positively related to the ac-
counting return on equity (ROE) and not related to the industry ROE – no evidence of
RPE. The authors use both strong-and weak-form of RPE. The results do not change sig-
nificantly when market-oriented firm performance measures are employed. As argued by
the authors, this might well be the result of RPE not being relevant from the firm’s per-
spective or it might also be perceived as pricey. Another possible explanation brought
up by the authors is that RPE theoretical model is not well adapted to the CEOs. These
results are fortified by the study conducted by Garen (1994). He attempts to evaluate
whether executive pay is consistent with the theoretical predictions of principal-agent
model. Against this background, he uses another means to test the empirical validity of
the predictions – the method of comparative statics. Some of the empirical results re-
main consistent with the predictions of the principal-agent theory. However, this is not
the case for RPE. Its use seems limited in the sample of 415 U.S. firms. He finds that
stock, stock-option based and pay-based incentives are not structured to adjust for mar-
ket risk.7 Crawford (1999) examines the U.S. banking CEO compensation in the light of
banking deregulation that occurred in the industry in the early 1980s. The data gathered
6Jensen and Murphy (1990) gather data on 1660 CEOs in 1049 firms from 1974-1986.
7Garen (1994) defines pay-based incentives as the pay that remains once the salary, bonus and long-term
incentive components are deducted from the total pay.
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from 1976-1988 suggest that CEO banking pay is adjusted for both industry and market
performance. In addition, the study implies the use of RPE become more prevalent after
bank deregulation. The authors propound the view that RPE offers a significant reduc-
tion in the compensation costs, providing incentives for the banking industry to increase
its use. Similar to previous studies, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) test the predictions
of principal-agent theory in the context of executive pay. In particular, the issue under
scrutiny is how sensitivity of pay-performance relation varies with the firm risk proxied
by the variance of the firm’s performance. In addition, they test theoretical predictions
of RPE, and also whether CEOs working in the industries with a low risk, or in the firms
with a high covariance between industry and firm returns are more prone to the RPE. Fol-
lowing theoretical predictions from the principal-agent theory, they expect to find strong
evidence of RPE in executive pay when firms in the industry have a greater tendency to
use RPE or when the covariance with the industry is significant. They test both weak-and
strong-form tests of RPE and modify the standard empirical specification by including
the variance of the idiosyncratic shock to the firm performance.8 Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999b) find weak evidence for their hypothesis, lending no support for RPE.9 The studies
by Murphy (1999) and Bannister and Newman (2003) examine the explicit RPE use in
the CEO compensation contracts and provide a descriptive statistics about executive com-
pensation contracts that entertain the use of RPE. For example, Bannister and Newman
(2003) document that 28% of 160 Fortune firms in 1992 and 1993 report the use of RPE
in some parts of the CEO compensation.
Most of the studies investigating RPE are focused on the U.S market. This comes as
no surprise given the data unavailability in some countries outside the U.S. An exception
to this rule are studies conducted by Liua and Starkb (2009) and Farmera et al. (2011).
They address the issue of RPE on the U.K. market. Liua and Starkb (2009) perform tests
of RPE on cash compensation of the executive board. In an attempt to implicitly test RPE,
the authors gather data on 169 non-financial listed firms from 1971 to 1998. The authors
first run individual firm time series regressions of the change in board cash compensa-
tion against firm and peer group performance. They use annual cash stock market returns
and pre-tax accounting earnings as performance metrics. Consequently, peer group per-
formance is represented by industry value-weighted average stock market returns and
industry value-weighted average pre-tax accounting earnings. The evidence suggests the
presence of RPE only when the accounting-based measures are used. In contrast to these
results, a study conducted by Farmera et al. (2011) finds a more convincing evidence,
corroborating the notion of RPE. Namely, they find that 204 non-financial UK firms use
8In particular, the authors incorporate a variable for firm performance that depends on the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the idiosyncratic variance. The same applies for the industry performance.
Apart from these two variables, they incorporate the interaction between industry performance and CDF of
the idiosyncratic variance, the interaction between industry performance and firm’s stock β, and industry
performance interacted with both firm’s β and CDF function in the empirical specification. For more details
on the empirical model they employ, see p. 95 in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b).
9In another paper, the authors offer a theoretical explanation for the lack of RPE in the academic studies.
The theoretical predictions are followed by the empirical analysis. This paper is discussed in more details
in Section 1.3.3.
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RPE in determining the level of short-term and long-term executive pay.10
Furthermore, De Angelis and Grinstein (2011) examine executive pay contracts of 494
firms that constitute S&P 500 Index in 2007, a year after the new rule with respect to exec-
utive compensation disclosure was enacted in the U.S. They investigate how widespread
the RPE use is as well as what determines it. They find that 34% of the firms report the
RPE use in executive compensation in their proxy statements. The study also reports that
firms committed to the RPE use tie 49% of the estimated value of performance-based
awards to RPE. In doing so, most of the firms use market-based performance measures.
In addition, 61% of the firms use self-selected peers, whereas the rest of them use industry
or market indices.11 A study by Gong et al. (2011) goes a step further and incorporate the
contract details into RPE tests. They collect contract details based on what is disclosed in
the annual reports and proxy statements, and build a peer group based on the self-selected
peers that are disclosed in these contracts. Peer performance is denoted as a median stock
return of the peers reported in the 2006 proxy statement. A closer look at the sample of
1419 (S&P 1500) firms provides convincing evidence of the RPE presence.
Another studies that foster research on RPE in the markets other than the U.S. are
Chen et al. (2012) and Cai and Zheng (2016). Chen et al. (2012) use Shanghai and Shen-
zhen A-share listed companies from 1999 to 2009 – a total of 10724 observations. In
the full sample there is no compelling evidence of RPE use. However, when they dif-
ferentiate between SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) and non-SOEs (non-State Owned
Enterprises) they find that the latter has a higher tendency to use RPE, indicating that type
of ownership matters in structuring executive pay. Chen et al. (2012, p.129-130) argue
that this might be a consequence of different compensation regulation between SOEs and
non-SOEs such as non-SOEs having a cap, more market-based performance measures,
having minor exposure to the government intervention or SOEs having various additional
incentives. Finally, Cai and Zheng (2016) examine executive incentive mechanisms in
the subsidiaries of business groups in China.12 The authors analyze subsidiaries’ execu-
tive compensation in the 271 business groups in China from 2003-2011 – a total of 4124
firm-year observations. They report that executive pay in the subsidiaries is determined
by its own performance and the performance of other subsidiaries in the business group
or their relative performance ranking. Yet, the RPE use seems to be more prevalent in the
business groups that are privately owned, consistent with Chen et al. (2012).
Taken together, empirical literature on RPE in executive pay is vast. However, it
provides mixed and inconclusive evidence. Moreover, the RPE tests seem to be sensitive
to the firm performance measure and empirical specification. This gave rise to what has
10Short-term executive pay is adjusted for the FTSE-350 market performance, whereas the long-term is
adjusted for industry performance, FTSE-350 sector performance.
11The authors acknowledge that it is possible that studies reporting the RPE use do not actually entertain
it in practice. In order to address this issue, De Angelis and Grinstein (2011) empirically test RPE using
the traditional empirical specification. As a dependent variable they choose a component of CEO pay that
is tied to RPE according to the firms’ proxy statements. They find evidence consistent with RPE when this
measure of CEO pay is included in the regression. On the contrary, when the authors employ total pay
as dependent variable they report evidence inconsistent with the RPE use. The authors interpret this as an
indication that RPE disclosures are informative.
12Cai and Zheng (2016) report that 76% of listed companies were in the hands of business groups as of
2011.
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been known as RPE puzzle in the academic literature. On this account, many researchers
address this issue and offer several possible explanations.
1.3 The RPE puzzle – possible explanations
Murphy (1999) and Abowd and Kaplan (1999) recognize a lack of empirical evidence
with respect to RPE as an important unresolved puzzle in the academic literature on ex-
ecutive pay. This puzzle persists to this day. However, many streams of literature have
emerged offering plausible explanations for its existence. On this account, in this section
I review these branches of literature and group them based on the type of explanation they
offer.
1.3.1 Executive Characteristics and Relative Performance Evalua-
tion
To explain inconsistent results, several studies attribute the lack of RPE in the empirical
literature to the ignorance of CEO characteristics such as CEO talent (or CEO outside
opportunity), CEO age and his wealth in conducting RPE tests (Rajgopal et al. 2006,
Garvey and Milbourn 2003).
Some theoretical studies reveal the role the CEO talent plays in the design of CEO pay
(Holmstrom 1999, Oyer 2004, Lazear and Rosen 1981). For example, a study by Oyer
(2004) hypothesize that the lack of RPE in executive pay might be a consequence of an
executive outside opportunity that is sensitive to the market movements. The author shows
that it is optimal to offer an executive a higher wage (without RPE) in the light of booming
markets, as demand for talented CEOs as well as peer performance (against which a CEO
performance is benchmarked) increase during this time. Against this background, given
that the CEO talent is scarce, it is in the interest of shareholders to award a CEO with the
higher reservation wage in order to retain him in the firm. Under these circumstances,
no RPE might be optimal for the shareholders. This theoretical prediction has found an
empirical support in the academic literature. Namely, Rajgopal et al. (2006) build two
proxies for CEO talent: 1. the number of articles in which a CEO’s name appear 2.
firm’s past industry-adjusted accounting performance.13 They then argue that the more
talented CEOs are more likely to exhibit higher industry adjusted performance and are
also more likely to be mentioned and cited in the business newspapers. The authors
then regress the change of CEO’s pay against the realized shareholder return, industry
performance, the interaction term of industry performance and the CEO talent in order to
examine if CEO talent is related to RPE.14 The authors expect positive and statistically
13In order to make sure that the number of articles is not a reflection of a CEO’s disrepute, Rajgopal
et al. (2006, p.1814) code the tone of the articles, check the correlation between the number of articles and
reputation, and examine if the number of articles is correlated with the so-called explicit recognition by the
public.
14In addition, the authors include the interaction of shareholder return and several other control vari-
ables, industry and year dummies in the empirical specification. Industry performance is proxied with the
hypothetical shareholder return if the company had earned the industry return.
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significant coefficient on the last mentioned variable.15 Indeed, the available evidence
seems to support their expectation – the lack of RPE is related to the CEO talent.16 Further
evidence supporting Rajgopal et al. (2006), lie in the findings of Gopalan et al. (2010).17
In the study by Garvey and Milbourn (2003), the issue under scrutiny is whether and
how managerial costs of accommodating his investment portfolio affect RPE tests. Tradi-
tional RPE models presume that these costs are too high and therefore, ignore them in the
model specifications. To that end, Garvey and Milbourn (2003) introduce a RPE model
that allows for managerial hedging of market risks. The model admits that hedging can be
personally costly to the managers and that RPE can induce costs to firms. The results of
the model imply that RPE use diminishes with the drop in the managerial hedging costs.
To empirically test the model prediction the authors first examine if the 1400 large U.S.
firms entertain the RPE use over 1992-1998.18 On average, they find little support for
RPE. However, they use managerial age and financial wealth in order to examine how
RPE relates to managerial costs. The authors report strong evidence consistent with RPE
for the young and less wealthy managers. Interestingly, the wealthiest managers do not
seem to have RPE in their compensation contracts. The authors put forward the view
that elderly and more wealthy managers find it easier to privately hedge on their account.
Hence, "the practice of relative performance evaluation seems to reflect the firm’s compar-
ative advantage in providing insurance from market risks, relative to the executive doing
it for herself" (Garvey and Milbourn 2003, p.1580).
To sum up, CEO characteristics such as CEO talent, his age and wealth play a role in
detecting RPE. It seems that the use of RPE is not optimal for shareholders when demand
for talented CEOs is high during the bull markets. In addition, the more wealthy and
elderly CEOs are prone to less RPE as they find it easier to accommodate their portfolio.
1.3.2 Peer Groups and Relative Performance Evaluation
Studies by Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Barro and Barro (1990) were among the first
ones to note that inferences on RPE might be sensitive to the peer group composition.19
On this account, Albuquerque (2009) investigates how the choice of peer groups af-
fects RPE tests. She argues that solely relying on an industry or market index as a measure
of peer performance introduces noise in the tests of RPE. Industry and market indices are
broad measures of peer performance especially in significantly heterogenous industries
(Albuquerque 2009). As a consequence, she argues that such peer performance proxies
fail to capture exogenous shocks appropriately. This affects the RPE tests. Albuquerque
15The lack of RPE is assumed as the absence of strong-from version of RPE in the data.
16Rajgopal et al. (2006) use the sample of 2343 CEO-firm-year observations from 1993-2001. The
results seem to be robust to alternative explanations found in the literature – strategic interactions, rent-
seeking behavior and asymmetric benchmarking.
17Gopalan et al. (2010) use the following proxies for the CEO talent: industry adjusted return, an in-
dicator variable on whether a CEO is hired from the outside, stock return of the external CEO’s previous
firm.
18The sample consists of 6488 CEO-firm years observations.
19This argument is latter on analytically supported by Dikolli et al. (2013). They analytically demon-
strate that differences in peer group aggregation methods lead to complicated summarization errors. Such
errors then create a bias against finding support for strong-form RPE tests.
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(2009) argues that firm size is an important firm feature that is able to capture many of
firm characteristics and that, as such, it should be included in the peer group construction.
To that end, she builds an industry/size quartile peer groups and compares its power in
detecting RPE to the "traditional" measures of peer performance – S&P 500 Index and
SIC industry indices. In order to test what peer group is better able to capture exogenous
shocks, she regresses the total level of compensation (and change in total compensation)
on the firm stock performance and different proxies for peer performance separately.20
There is overwhelming evidence corroborating the notion that industry/size peers are bet-
ter able to capture exogenous shocks than traditional market and industry indices.21 Black
et al. (2015) reinforce this evidence. Namely, the authors examine RPE disclosure of S&P
500 firms. The study documents that 17.32% of firms report the RPE use in determining
executive compensation. Moreover, they find evidence consistent with RPE for the full
sample when using industry/size peers developed by Albuquerque (2009) and industry
peers. Consistent with Albuquerque (2009), industry/size peers seem to be the most pow-
erful in detecting RPE. In order to disentangle whether the peer choice affects the RPE
use and whether the RPE disclosure is indeed trustworthy, the authors break down the full
sample into RPE users and non-RPE users and conduct both explicit and implicit RPE
tests on both subsamples. Consistent with expectations, they implicitly detect RPE in
the subsample of RPE disclosure firms.22 The authors, however, detect RPE use in the
subsample of non-RPE disclosing firms when employing implicit test of RPE and indus-
try/size peer groups. This is regarded as an indication "that relying on explicit disclosures
of RPE may understate the prevalence of RPE in practice and that implicit tests for RPE
can be important in detecting both RPE and general compliance with regulations to dis-
close RPE details" (Black et al. 2015, p.5). Taken together, the authors report that the
industry/size quartile peer approach and the explicitly-disclosed peers represent powerful
methods for capturing exogenous shocks.
On the contrary, Gong et al. (2011) fail to find evidence consistent with RPE when us-
ing the above mentioned industry/size peers in their sample of 1500 S&P firms in 2006.23
This result also holds in the subsample of firms that disclose the use of RPE in the com-
pensation contracts, which is one quarter of the sample. Among the RPE disclosing firms,
almost 60% use self-selected peer groups, 35% employ traditional peer group methods
(industry and market indices), whereas 7% entertain both approaches (Gong et al. 2011,
p.1016). Yet, when they employ a self-selected peers as a measure for peer performance,
they are able to detect evidence of RPE use.24 In particular, the authors use the median
stock return of disclosed peers in 2006 firms’ proxy statements as a measure for peer
performance. These findings suggest that incorporating RPE contract details with respect
to peer group increase the power of the RPE tests. Hence, the RPE tests are sensitive to
20In addition, she controls for several firm characteristics, governance measures, year, industry and CEO
dummies.
21Statistically speaking, the coefficient on industry/size peers is constantly more negative and statisti-
cally significant than this is the case with industry and S&P 500 peers. This result is robust to several other
empirical specifications.
22This evidence is stronger in comparison to the full and non-RPE subsample.
23The sample consists of 1419 firms. There are 361 RPE firms and 1058 non-RPE firms in the sample.
24Put it differently, the authors employ the so-called explicit RPE tests.
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peer group construction and self-selected peers seem to be most powerful in capturing
exogenous shocks.
Another study that infers the importance of peers in drawing inferences about RPE is
Jayaraman et al. (2015). Following Hoberg and Phillips (2015), they argue that traditional
industry indices that are based on SIC classification are not able to seize main features of
firm’s product markets due to the fact that they seldom change over the years. Similar to
Albuquerque (2009) authors reason that traditional industry approach is not well-suited
for firms that belong to significantly heterogenous industries. The authors, however, offer
an alternative to peer group composition – product market-based peers. Firms operating
in the same product market face similar demand and supply, share similar customers, use
similar input supplies, and etc (Jayaraman et al. 2015, p.2). For these reasons, they choose
peers on the basis of textual analysis of firms’ product descriptions in 10-K filings in order
to examine their power to capture exogenous shocks. More precisely, they exploit Text-
based Network Industry Classification (TNIC) introduced by Hoberg and Phillips (2015),
which hinge on product similarities of firms.25 Jayaraman et al. (2015) then constitute
quartile portfolios which are based on the firm size and book-to-market within each firms
TNIC industry. Therefore, the firms that belong to the same quartile portfolio represent
the peers. They then further calculate the equal-weighted stock return which represents
the peer performance proxy. Using 19105 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2011, the
authors compare the product market based peers with the traditional industry peers, based
on SIC classification, and report stronger RPE evidence when using their measure of peer
performance. In addition, it seems that filtering of exogenous shocks increase with the
number of peers. With a sufficiently large number of peers, the external shocks seem
to be removed completely, which is consistent with the predictions of the optimal con-
tract theory. In similar fashion, Lewellen (2015) creates peer groups that are also based
on product market competition. However, his approach towards peer group composition
is somewhat distinct from the one used in Jayaraman et al. (2015). He also uses an-
nual 10-K filings from 2002-2008 where firms are required to report their product market
competitors by federal law. However, he does not employ textual analysis algorithm in
creating peer groups but solely relies on the information provided in the 10-K fillings. Af-
ter collecting peers, author then calculates equal-weighted stock returns in order to proxy
for peer performance.26 The author denotes these peer groups as firm-specific industries
(FSIs). He reports strong evidence supporting the use of RPE in executive compensation
when peer groups are based on FSIs in the sample of 17021 firm-year observations. On
the other hand, Lewellen (2015) contends that the lack of empirical evidence on RPE
stems from the peer group misspecification.
Taken together, the peer group choice seems to affect the inferences about RPE. The
aforementioned studies demonstrate that industry/size and product market-based peers
seem to be better in filtering out exogenous shocks from the compensation contract than
25Hoberg and Phillips (2015) gather business descriptions from 10-K filings and by means of textual
analysis create the co-called "text-based network industry classifications" (TNICs). These classifications
then reflect the firms’ product markets characteristics as disclosed in the 10-K fillings.
26The author chooses to assign equal weights on every peer as Regulation Law requires firms to list only
dominant competitors.
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the traditional industry benchmarks. The number of peers within the peer groups also
seems to have merit in detecting RPE. Finally, self-selected peers seem to have a greater
power than industry/size peers in drawing inferences on RPE.
1.3.3 Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Interaction
Some studies suggest that strategic interactions between firms might make RPE a subop-
timal incentive device (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999a, Joh 1999, Janakiraman 2004).
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) comprehend that the presence of RPE in executive
compensation contracts might incentivize executives to collusive behavior. Such behav-
ior reduces the peer return, leaving the CEO with higher reward. This behavior might be
especially prevalent if the firms in the industry are strategic competitors in the product
markets. In order to examine the effect of strategic competition on RPE, Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999a) model product market competition and derive the optimal compensa-
tion scheme. In their paper product market competition is modelled twofold: the outputs
are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Depending on the formulation of the
product market competition the model delivers different results with respect to RPE. In
the first case, RPE is not observed in the equilibrium as its presence induces managers
to compete more aggressively on the market where the competitors are strategic com-
plements, which can harm firm’s returns (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999a, p.2001).27 In
the optimal contract, the level of compensation raises with the firm and industry return,
thereby weakening the competition in the product market and reducing manager’s incen-
tives to compete aggressively on the market (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999a, p.2001). On
the contrary, in the second case, the model predicts that under the optimal contract design
the level of compensation increases with the firm performance but decreases with the in-
dustry returns. As pointed out by the authors, this model is consistent with the predictions
regarding RPE. However, the contract is not motivated by the principal-agent relationship
but rather by the firm’s strategic choice (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999a, p.2002). Aggar-
wal and Samwick (1999a) empirically test both of these predictions.28 Empirical results
in the U.S. sample from 1992-1995 support the strategic complements model. Namely,
the authors find little evidence of RPE – compensation is positively related to the firm as
well as to the peer performance.29 As noted by the authors this result suggests that lack of
empirical evidence on RPE might well be explained by the firms’ strategic interactions in
an oligopoly. In such environment, RPE is costly – it induces managers to collude which
undercuts shareholders’ returns.30
In similar manner, Joh (1999) contends that firms operating in an oligopolistic market
could acquire collusive returns that are higher than competitive equilibrium returns. In
27The authors employ the differentiated Bertrand model of price competition.
28As a proxy for product substitutability, the authors use the industry Herfindahl Index. The index varies
from 0 to 10000 and is defined at the four-digit SIC level as the sum of squared market shares for the largest
50 firms in the corresponding industry (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999a, p.2015).
29The authors, however, find some evidence of RPE in the short-term compensation. Yet, this evidence
seems to be restricted by the strategic interaction.
30The study by Cheng and Xu (2006) also provides some piece of evidence that competitive environment
affects managerial incentives.
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oder to achieve this, shareholders can use industry performance within the compensation
scheme as a commitment device for executives to cooperate with the rivals (and obligate
to collusive behavior) (Joh 1999). Under such compensation scheme, executive pay is
"directly related to the success of the collusive outcome" (Joh 1999, p.304). In this man-
ner the CEO is incentivized to keep up with the market collusion, which is the intention
of shareholders. Thus, the inconclusive results regarding RPE might stem from the share-
holders’ decisions to strategically tie executive compensation (positively or negatively) to
industry performance in an oligopolistic markets (Joh 1999, p.304). Indeed, a closer look
on 796 Japanese firms from 1968 to 1992, indicates that shareholders in an oligopoly can
strategically use RPE or the so-called "strategic group performance evaluation" (SGPE)
in executive compensation contracts, depending on what they want to achieve. The author
delivers such results by examining how the market growth and seller concentration affect
RPE tests. In particular, the author includes additional variables in the traditional RPE
empirical specifications: the interaction term between industry performance and market
growth, proxied by the annual industry sales growth rates, and the interaction term be-
tween industry performance and seller concentration, proxied by the Herfindahl Index.31
The firms belonging to the competitive and slow growing markets seem to exhibit a higher
degree of SGPE in compensating their executives. On the contrary, higher degree of RPE
is reported in more concentrated and fast-growing firms. These results are consistent with
the above mentioned arguments – the firms might not be incentivized to use RPE in the
competitive markets when the outcomes of product market collusion might be significant.
To briefly recap, the RPE appears to be sensitive to product market competition. The
RPE use seems to be too costly for shareholders when the products on the market are
strategic complements. In a situation when the collusive outcomes are higher than the
competitive returns, the board might use executive pay to promote the collusive beahvior.
In this case, RPE use is not optimal from the shareholders’ perspective.
1.3.4 Relative Performance Evaluation and Managerial Power Hy-
pothesis
According to the proponents of the managerial power hypothesis or the so-called skim-
ming model, managers use their power over boards to extract more favourable compen-
sation schemes than they would be able under the optimal contracting view.32 Bebchuk
and Fried (2004) discuss several reasons why the board might be too weak or powerless
to oppose the executive. For example, board members might actually have financial and
non-financial incentives to please executives rather than to constrain them. In addition,
31In order to evaluate this, the author employs both weak-and strong-form versions of RPE.
32Bebchuck and Friend are probably the most famous bemoaners of executive compensation. In their
book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, Bebchuck and Fried
argue that the rise in executive pay has been widespread and systematic. Moreover, they argue that there are
serious flaws in the current U.S. corporate governance system, which allow executives to exert influence on
the board of the directors, and thereby influence the level of their pay. They develop their own paradigm
– managerial power hypothesis – that explains the current flaws in executive pay and why the pay-setting
process has been inconsistent with the traditional contract theory. For more details see Bebchuk and Fried
(2004).
20
Chapter 1. Relative Performance Evaluation: A Survey
managers usually enjoy a great reputation inside as well as outside of the company which
could be very beneficial for the members of the board. As a result, there is no bargaining
at arm’s length over executive compensation and no RPE as it might negatively affect a
CEO awards when peer performance rise. Hence, the managerial power theory predicts
a positive correlation between the manager’s power and excessive pay.33 Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001), Garvey and Milbourn (2006) and Bell and Van Reenen (2016) find
empirical support for this case.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) investigate whether common shocks, which they
label as "luck", are taken into consideration in evaluating the performance of the CEO.
They use several measures of "luck" and show that CEO compensation in the oil industry
reciprocates as much to a lucky dollar as to a general dollar.34 In other words, CEO pay
is tied to the "lucky", systematic part of firm performance that has nothing to do with
his effort. This result seems to be more prominent in firms with weaker corporate gover-
nance structure.35 In addition, sensitivity of pay to luck is stronger when shareholders are
diffuse and more passive. The last two points indicate that CEOs who are under weaker
control have a greater influence over their pay, consistent with the skimming model. Gar-
vey and Milbourn (2006) complement this study. They also observe pay-for-luck in the
U.S. data with 6263 observations from 1992-2001. However, they report strong empirical
evidence that executives are able to get rewards coming from good luck, whereas they are
isolated from bad luck.36 They show that benchmarks used to evaluate the CEO perfor-
mance are not used consistently across years. They are more prominent when they are
down which is inline with the interest of managers. Consistent with the study by Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001), they find that the practice of such asymmetric benchmarking
is prevalent in companies with bad corporate governance.37 They then examine if the
boards change the option-granting policies in order to protect CEOs from bad luck. In
particular, they investigate two stock option granting policies: fixed-number and fixed-
value granting policies. In the first one the values of grants grow with the firm value,
whereas in the second one the value of the option grants is fixed and is therefore indepen-
dent of the stock price. The authors then reason that firms would opt for a fixed-number
granting policy when the luck is good, but would choose fixed-value option policies when
the luck is bad. The empirical evidence they report support this prediction. Gopalan
et al. (2010) also find evidence of asymmetric benchmarking in the sample of firms they
investigate. This asymmetry seems to be more pronounced in the multi-segment firms,
firms whose CEOs have a greater flexibility in making decisions about the firm’s strategy,
and in firms that have more talented CEOs. A more recent study also implicitly supports
the managerial power hypothesis. Namely, Bell and Van Reenen (2016) examine a sam-
33For more details see Bebchuk and Fried (2004).
34The authors use movements in oil prices, changes in exchange rates, year-to-year differences in mean
industry performance as measures for luck.
35The corporate governance is measured by the presence of large shareholders, CEO tenure (interacted
with the presence of large shareholders to better proxy for entrenchment), size of the board, and the fraction
of directors that are insiders.
36Industry stock returns at the two-digit SIC level is used as a proxy for luck.
37The authors use the corporate governance index developed by Gompers et al. (2003) as a proxy for
corporate governance.
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ple of U.K. relative long-term incentive plans in executive pay and report an asymmetric
pay-performance relationship.38 CEO pay seems to be more sensitive to increases in firm
stock performance than decreases. Consistent with Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and
Garvey and Milbourn (2006), the authors report that such relationship is more prevalent
in firms with weak governance structures. They also report that despite the presence of
relative long-term incentive plans, the CEO seems to be compensated for "luck". It seems
that these schemes have weak effect on reducing pay for luck in compensation contracts.
To sum up, the absence of RPE seems to be more prevalent in firms with weaker
governance structure. Such firms offer more space for executive to exercise their power
and influence the level of their pay. Moreover, the asymmetric performance benchmarking
is also dominant in such firms. If CEO can influence his pay, he would rather have his
performance evaluated against a falling benchmark.
1.3.5 Other Possible Explanations
1.3.5.1 RPE and strategic flexibility
Gopalan et al. (2010) find that a managerial flexibility in determining a firm’s strategy
might make RPE compensation contracts suboptimal.
Traditional principal-agent model assumes that sector performance is a noisy part of
the firm performance over which the CEO has no control. Thus, the board should be
interested in unsystematic firm performance which is within the CEO power and a result
of his effort. However, Gopalan et al. (2010) contend that a board should also consider
whether the CEO has the right foresight of the firm’s strategy when evaluating a CEO per-
formance. When a CEO makes investment and strategical firm decisions, he might want
to affect the firm’s exposure to its sector performance and should be concerned how well
the firm fits into it (Gopalan et al. 2010). As a consequence, Gopalan et al. (2010) argue
that CEOs should be compensated for peer performance. Indeed, the model introduced by
Gopalan et al. (2010) supports this argumentation. Put it other way, they show that pres-
ence of RPE in compensation contract is suboptimal if sector performance impacts firm
performance. In addition, the model predicts that pay for sector performance (no RPE)
is more likely in the multi-segment firms, firms that offer larger flexibility to their CEOs
to change the firm’s exposure to the sector performance, and in the firms with the more
talented CEOs.39 The empirical results support all these theoretical predictions. Namely,
the authors use U.S data from 1992-2006, where the proxy for sector performance is rep-
resented by industry returns. The authors argue that a CEO can alter exposure of his firm
to the sector by altering the exercise timing of the growth options (Gopalan et al. 2010,
p.2064). Hence, the authors use market-to-book ratio at the industry level, and industry
research and development (R&D) expenses as proxies for strategic flexibility (Gopalan
et al. 2010, p.2064). Indeed, the empirical results support the theoretical prediction – pay
for sector performance appears to be more prevalent in the firms and industries offering
greater strategic flexibility to the management. This result is justified by the fact that such
38The sample in the study consists of 472 large publicly listed UK firms each year from 1999 to 2014.
39The results of the study with respect to the CEO talent are outlined in Section 1.3.1.
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firms provide bigger chance for the manager to "shift resources to the sectors expected to
outperform" (Gopalan et al. 2010, p.2063).
Briefly, no RPE in executive compensation contract might be optimal when the CEO
pay serves as a device that offers strategic incentives to the CEO.
1.3.5.2 RPE model specifications
Alanis (2015) calls for a new metric for firm performance and argues that many studies
failed to detect RPE because they used unsatisfactory firm performance measure. The
author argues that executives hold significant amount of inside debt implying that firm
performance measures should capture this variable as well (Alanis 2015, p.3). Hence, he
calls for the use of total firm return metric which includes equity returns and return on the
firm’s debt in testing RPE. He uses two methods to determine total return metric. First,
Alanis (2015) employs a model of firm value introduced by Merton (1974) and by means
of calibration procedure estimates the total return.40 Second, as the above mentioned
method does not reflect true market information (and it is sensitive to the calibration
parameters), the author uses actual bond prices acquired from the Trade Reporting and
Compliance Engine (TRACE) database in order to calculate market prices for a firm’s
debt. On the sample of U.S firms from 1992 to 2012, the author tests the RPE use and
employs battery of firm performance measures: equity returns, total return based on the
method developed by Merton (1974) and total return based on the market prices of firm’s
debt.41 He detects stronger use of RPE when employing his measure of firm performance.
In addition, the evidence is in line with the strong-form RPE version in the models where
total returns are utlilzed. This result seems to be robust to several other potential issues.42
Angelis and Grinstein (2016) argue that the CEO contracts with RPE in practice have
non-linear form and that the linear empirical specification of RPE used in the academic
literature does not reflect the reality. Consequently, they contend that this might be a rea-
son for the inconclusive results regarding RPE. Therefore, they introduce a new measure
for peer performance that is meant to capture this non-linearity – peer performance mea-
sure based on the rank performance of an executive to his peers (Angelis and Grinstein
2016, p.3). In particular, they propose "the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of to-
tal shareholder return (TSR) relative to the TSR of firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry
code" (Angelis and Grinstein 2016, p.23). They expect the coefficient on this variable to
be positive as RPE is determined in a rank-based fashion. In addition to TSR, they include
return on assets (ROA) as absolute measure of firm performance.43 They find evidence
consistent with RPE in the sample of 18014 firm-year CEO pay observations over 1992-
2005. Namely, Angelis and Grinstein (2016, p.25) report 1% increase in the rank of the
CEO performance relative to the industry leads to 0.14% increase in CEO pay. Moreover,
40According to Merton (1974) a firm’s equity value can be regraded as its call option on its assets. The
exercise price is equal to the firm’s debt.
41The sample consists of 24207 firm-year observations for 2525 firms and 4774 different CEOs.
42Alanis (2015) repeats the same regression procedures at the firm level and on different industry speci-
fications and weighting schemes.
43Consistent with previous studies, they control for the firm size, CEO tenure and for the CEO-firm and
year fixed effects.
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their empirical specification seems to have a slightly better explanatory power than the
traditional empirical specification with industry performance. In an additional test, the
authors include both traditional RPE and rank-based specification in the empirical model.
The empirical evidence reveals that measure of peer performance in the traditional spec-
ification – industry TSR – is insignificant. This is not the case for the coefficient of CDF
of TSR relative to the TSR of firms in the same industry. The coefficient is statistically
significant but also similar in magnitude to the coefficient in previously mentioned speci-
fication. As noted by Angelis and Grinstein (2016, p.25), this might indicate that the CDF
is better able to seize the variation in pay in comparison to the industry return.
1.4 Relative Performance Evaluation and Firm Charac-
teristics
This section examines how the use of RPE varies with different firm characteristics.
1.4.1 RPE and common uncertainty
Kren (2002) hypothesize that the likelihood of RPE use is positively related to the com-
mon uncertainty faced by both firm and peers.44 In oder to proxy for common uncertainty
Kren (2002) introduces two variables in a sample of 2410 firm-year observations over
1985-1994. The first one is adopted from Tosi et al. (1973) and is based on accounting
measures. This measure for the uncertainty combines proxies for market, technological
and income volatility (Kren 2002, p.123). These three measures are then aggregated for
each firm and each industry. Kren (2002) then calculates correlation between each firm’s
uncertainty measure and the mean of the four-digit SIC industry uncertainty measure over
ten year period. This represents the first measure of the common uncertainty. The sec-
ond measure is represented by correlation between firm’s common stock return and the
mean industry stock return on the monthly basis (Kren 2002, p.124). In order to test the
hypothesis, the author first conducts a traditional implicit test of RPE for each firm in the
sample. In the second step, the estimated coefficient on industry performance is regressed
on the measure of common uncertainty and a vector of control variables.45 The author
then predicts that the coefficient on the common uncertainty will be negative, should his
hypothesis hold.46 Indeed, the data shows that in the presence of higher uncertainty, the
CEO pay seems to be better filtered from industry exogenous shocks. This, however,
holds only when the common uncertainty is proxied by the Kren’s second proxy based on
stock returns. Consistent with this finding, Gong et al. (2011) also document that firms
that are exposed to common risk have a greater tendency to use RPE.
44This is a theoretical prediction that goes back to Holmstrom (1982) who shows that risk-sharing ben-
efits of RPE are increasing with the common risk that affects both firm and peers.
45Firm’s financial leverage, free cash flow, firm growth, market share, CEO tenure and industry dummies
are used as control variables.
46Since negative (and statistically significant) coefficient on industry performance indicates a presence
of RPE and the measure of common uncertainty is a positive number, a negative coefficient on common
uncertainty demonstrates support for his hypothesis.
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Carter et al. (2009) use annual reports of FTSE 350 firms in 2002 and investigate the
use of RPE at the firm- and compensation plan-level in the performance-vested equity
grants in the U.K.47 In order to examine determinants of the RPE use in equity grants,
the authors estimate multinominal logit model. For an examination of the RPE use at
the firm level, they employ a thrichotomous variable that denotes if all, some or none of
the performance-vested equity grants are based on RPE as a dependent variable (Carter
et al. 2009, p.288). The authors then estimate the same empirical model with a battery
of different dependent variables at the equity plan level in order to examine the pay-out
characteristics of these equity grants. These variables reflect the features of the equity
plans and their corresponding performance conditions. They are: a dummy variable equal
to one if the plan comprises a payout hurdle and zero if it embraces a payout range, the
minimum peer group percentile ranking for vesting to start, and the difference between
the peer group percentile rankings necessary for minimum and absolute vesting to take
place (Carter et al. 2009, p.279). In addition, they incorporate a dummy variable equal to
one if the firm employs already existent index as a peer group, and zero if the firm self-
selects peers in the equity plans (Carter et al. 2009, p.281). In order to examine the drivers
of the RPE use in the equity plans the authors include a set of independent variables in
their estimation model.48 For our interest here the variable proxying for common risk is
relevant. Carter et al. (2009) proxy for common risk is represented by the interaction term
between the measure of volatility, and correlation between firm and peer returns. The first
variable is measured as a standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the 24 months,
while the second one is a firm’s β.49 Both variables are then rescaled to range from 0
to 1. Contrary to the expectations, they find little evidence that common risk drives the
RPE use in performance-vested equity grants. There is some evidence that when common
risk is excessive, the likelihood that the firms will use RPE in all of their equity grants is
decreasing. On the other hand, the common risk seems to be related to the specific relative
performance conditions in the equity plans. Namely, they find that common risk drives
the use of hurdles in the equity grants, suggesting that "firms facing greater common risk
tend to use relative performance hurdles to remove common shocks from performance
evaluations, rather than requiring executives to achieve significantly higher performance
rankings relative to competitors to receive full vesting" (Carter et al. 2009, p.290). In
addition, common risk induces the use of relative percentile ranking for minimum vesting
in equity plans.
1.4.2 Growth Options and RPE
Albuquerque (2014) examines how the use of RPE varies with the level of growth options.
In order to capture the level of growth options in firms, she uses market-to-book ratio and
ratio of research and development (R&D) costs to assets (Albuquerque 2014, p.28). The
study then estimates the pooled cross-sectional, time-series regression model on a sample
47In these type of grants vesting of a grant is related to the performance targets which are determined
relative to a peer group performance. In this study the authors examine 145 RPE plans in 129 firms.
48For more details on all the independent variables, see p.281-285 in Carter et al. (2009).
49The firm’s β is acquired in the regression of firm returns on the peer returns, where peer returns are
proxied by FTSE 350 index and FTSE industry returns.
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of 15557 observations in 1995-2008.50 In particular, Albuquerque (2014) uses regression
of the CEO pay against the firm and peer performance measures, the interaction term
between firm performance and growth options, and the interaction term between peer per-
formance and growth options.51 In the first test, the variable of interests is the interaction
term between the peer performance and growth options. It is expected to be positive if
growth option firms refrain from the use of peer groups in the RPE test. Such result would
then support argumentation that the RPE use incurs greater costs to the benefits for the
high growth option firms (Albuquerque 2014). Indeed, empirical results confirm this ex-
pectation. Albuquerque (2014) puts forward the view that such evidence might well be
a consequence of high growth option firms facing a difficulty in identifying an appropri-
ate peer group that would seize the common risk exposure appropriately. She notes that
high growth option firms "expect to earn future abnormal economic rents through the ex-
istence of firm-specific know-how, barriers to entry, or other proprietary information (e.g.
patents) that is not available to other firms" (Albuquerque 2014, p.28). Consequently, the
implementation of RPE is too costly due to the difficulty in identifying the peer group for
high growth options firms. In the second test, the author then analyzes a sample of 750
firms from 2006 to 2008 and finds that the likelihood that a firm will disclose the RPE use
decreases with the level of growth options. Moreover, the high-growth option firms that
use RPE in compensating their executives use less number of peers when constructing
a peer group. In analyzing RPE use at the industry level, the study reports that indus-
tries such as utility, financial and energy industries (low growth options industries) have
a greater tendency to use RPE. On the contrary, this does not hold for high-growth option
industries such as health care, information technology, confirming previously presented
results – RPE in CEO pay in negatively related to the level of growth options. The study
by Gong et al. (2011) dovetails these results.
1.4.3 RPE and R&D Costs
Keune (2015) investigates if the use of performance-vesting, long-term RPE incentives
is related to the under-investment in research and development (R&D). Precisely, the au-
thor wants to shed light on whether compensation committees monitor the risk of under-
investment in R&D and correspond to such risks by awarding the long-term RPE incen-
tives to their executives in order to mitigate such risks. The author expects that com-
pensation committees facilitate long-term RPE incentives when CEOs are more likely to
under-invest in R&D.
For the sake of testing these hypothesises, the author gathers data on S&P 500 com-
panies that contain 3024 firm-year observations over 1995-2009. In order to answer his
research question, he conducts two empirical tests. Keune (2015) first calculates the mea-
sure for the under-investment in R&D. Precisely, he calculates the so-called "differences
from expected R&D investment" which are represented by the residuals from the OLS
estimation of R&D costs scaled by lagged total assets on sales growth. Keune (2015,
50The sample consists of 3885 executives and 2457 firms.
51In addition, the author also employs a battery of control variables. For more details, see p.32 in
Albuquerque (2014).
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p.18-19) then ranks this variable and constructs a dummy that equals 1 if the measure
lies in the bottom quartile. The dummy is equal zero otherwise (Keune 2015, p.18-19).
He assumes that companies with the measure equal to 1 are more likely to invest less in
R&D as they are more financially constrained. He conducts a logistic regression, where
the dependent variable is this dummy that captures the under-investment in R&D. The
independent variables include: an indicator variable for performance-vesting, long-term
RPE incentives, investment, governance, and compensation control variables.52 In the
second test the author uses the OLS regression model of R&D costs scaled by lagged
total assets against the set of independent variables. The independent variables include an
indicator variable for the RPE incentives, a measure for likelihood of under-investment
in R&D, an interaction term between RPE incentives and the measure for likelihood of
under-investment in R&D and a battery of control variables.53
As predicted, the author reports that the performance-vested, long term RPE incen-
tives are negatively related with the under-investment in R&D as one part of the strategic
investment. This effect develops gradually over time. He finds that firms with the risk of
under-investment offer their CEOs more performance-vested long-term RPE incentives.
In other words, the probability that compensation committees offer such incentives to the
CEO is higher in firms with low cash balance, in which R&D costs have decreased over
years, and in firms in which R&D is less than industry peers over the years. In similar
manner, Liu (2008) investigates if there is an association between R&D costs and the use
of RPE in cash compensation of board of directors in the U.K. They test for strong-from
RPE tests in the panel sample of 586 UK non-financial public listed firms from 1990 to
1998. Namely, they test RPE on two subsamples – high R&D cost firms and low R&D
firms. The presented evidence is inconclusive. Liu (2008) documents a weaker relation
between the accounting-based RPE use in cash compensation in R&D intensive firms in
comparison to the low intensive R&D firms. However, it seems that both intensive and
low R&D firms entertain RPE use in compensating their directors, when the market-based
firm performance measure is employed.
1.4.4 RPE and IFRS
Ozkan et al. (2012) investigate how the adoption of International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) impacts the executive compensation contracts. Precisely, the authors
are interested in how this regulation change affects the use of accounting-based RPE and
the overall pay-performance sensitivity in executive compensation contracts. The authors
expect that if compensation committees perceive the accounting information to be im-
proved by the regulation, they will tend to increase the use of accounting earnings as a
measure of firm performance in executive contracts. This would then positively impact
pay-performance sensitivity. In similar manner, due to increased comparability of differ-
ent accounting standards across countries the authors expect a greater use of foreign peers
52For more details on this model, the independent and control variables see p.19-21 in Keune (2015).
53A measure for likelihood of under-investment in R&D is calculated as "the average of the ranking of
cash and the ranking of negative one multiplied by leverage" (Keune 2015, p.16). Keune (2015, p.16) again
creates a dummy equal to one if the measure lies in the bottom quartile, and zero otherwise.
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in accounting-based RPE. This would then open the door for greater use of accounting-
based RPE. Such insight provides useful information on how compensation committees
of the European companies perceive the new regulation (Ozkan et al. 2012).
To examine the issue under scrutiny Ozkan et al. (2012) employ a sample of 892 public
companies from 15 central European countries that adopted IFRS in 2005.54 In order
to investigate whether the new regulation made accounting information more prevalent
as firm performance proxy, the authors estimate the change in the natural logarithm of
executive pay on several independent variables. These variables are: change of pre-tax
income divided by total assets (accounting firm performance), the indicator variable Post
that captures pre- and post-regulation period, the cumulative stock return (market-based
performance), the interaction term between the market-based performance and the Post
variable, and the interaction term between the Post variable and accounting-based firm
performance.55 The variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term between
the accounting performance and the variable Post. Given their hypothesis, the authors
expect this variable to be positive and statistically significant.
The authors also predict that there is a change in the use of RPE based on accounting
performance after the new regulation has been adopted. In order to test this, Ozkan et al.
(2012) utilize the same empirical model mentioned above but add proxies for peer per-
formance, and the interaction terms between these peer measures and the Post variable.
The interaction terms are included in order to estimate the effect of the new regulation
change on the RPE use. Peers are chosen based on similarity of firm size to the size of the
target company within the same three-digit SIC industry code. As in the RPE tests, the
coefficient on the interaction term is expected to be negative and statistically significant.
Finally, in another test Ozkan et al. (2012) examine whether companies tend to use more
foreign peers for performance benchmarking. In the empirical model, they differentiate
between domestic and foreign peers when building a peer group. In particular, they add
peer performance measures based on domestic peers and foreign peers respectively, and
the interaction term of these variables with the variable Post in the empirical specification
(in order to control for the IFRS regulation change). Thus, they predict a statistically
significant and negative coefficient on the interaction term between the Post variable and
accounting-based foreign peer performance.
Consistent with expectation, Ozkan et al. (2012) report that compensation committees
increased the use of accounting measures in compensation contracts after IFRS came
into force, leading to the higher pay-performance sensitivity. This effect seems to be
facilitated by the countries exhibiting discrepancies between IFRS and local accounting
standards. Moreover, foreign peers appear to have a greater use in constructing peer
performance after 2005. In addition, firms with more foreign operations and those with
fewer comparable domestic peers seem to entertain a greater use of accounting RPE in
determining level of executive pay.
54The full sample covers 1505 CEO-year observations for 3046 firm-years.
55The Post variable equals one for years 2006-2008 and 0 for years 2002-2004. The authors also control
for market-to-book ratio, firm size, CEO fixed effects, CEO age and include a dummy variable that equals
1 if executive has been in that position for less than two years. In addition, the authors include year and
country fixed effects.
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1.4.5 RPE and other firm characteristics
In their attempt to examine firm’s decisions to use RPE, Gong et al. (2011) employ multi-
variate logistic regression where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm uses RPE in at least one component of the total executive pay. They use several
firm and CEO characteristics to determine which one of them drives the RPE use.56 This
test reveals several important findings (Gong et al. 2011, p.1025-1027). The evidence
suggests that the less concentrated industries have a greater tendency to benchmark the
performance of the CEO against the peer group. They clarify this as a result of the higher
risk that firms in competitive industries face. Moreover, firm size also drives the use of
RPE in executive compensation findings which dovetails the results of the previous stud-
ies. The amount of the CEO equity holdings also seem to play a role in determining the
RPE use (Gong et al. 2011, p.1025-1027). There is a negative relation between the RPE
use and large CEO equity holdings. Corporate governance, as expected by the authors,
plays a role in determining RPE tests – firms with more independent boards seem to enter-
tain the RPE use in greater extent (Gong et al. 2011, p.1025-1027). Finally the presence
of compensation consultants also enhances the RPE use (Gong et al. 2011, p.1025-1027).
1.4.6 RPE effects
Tice (2015) investigates the effects of RPE use on managerial investment decisions and
firm performance. The author expects that RPE firms are less prone to the under- or over-
investing in the presence of RPE compensation contracts as such contracts, according to
the theory, should optimally set managerial incentives (Tice 2015, p.3).
On this account, Tice (2015) employs propensity score matching in order to match
firms on determinants of RPE use. Hence, she ends up with a matched sample of RPE
firms that represent a treatment group, and a group of non-RPE firms representing a con-
trol group.57 In order to proxy for investment efficiency, Tice (2015) uses residuals from
the estimation model of total investment on investment decisions determinants – sales
growth, leverage, level of cash, firm age, and firm size.58 The author then argues that
residuals from this estimation model contain information about firm’s deviation from ex-
pected investment, and therefore groups firms based on the size of the residuals. Tice
(2015, p.24) denotes firms with residuals in the highest quartile as over-investing, and
those with residuals in the lowest quartile as under-investing. Firms whose residuals are
in the middle quartile are denoted as the benchmark group. In order to investigate how
the RPE affects investment efficiency, she uses a multinominal logistic model where the
dependent variable is 0 for the benchmark group, 1 for the firms that are under-investing
and 2 for the firms that are over-investing. In the set of control variables, she includes a
dummy variable equal to 1 when firms report the use of RPE in the CEO pay, and 0 oth-
erwise in order to examine how the RPE use affects the likelihood that a firm will over-
56For more details on how these variables are constructed see p. 1023-1025 in Gong et al. (2011).
57RPE sample contains 1812 firm-year observations, whereas non-RPE sample consists of 2030 firm-
year observations.
58Tice (2015, p.24) defines total investment as the sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, and R&D
costs minus the sale of property, plant, and equipment.
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or under-invest.59 In similar fashion, the effect of RPE in firm performance is examined.
Namely, the author estimates the regression model where the firm performance, proxied
by total shareholder return, is a function of a RPE use and a set of other control variables.
Results indicate that RPE presence in compensation contracts indeed enhances the
managerial investment decision behaviour. Namely, Tice (2015) finds that RPE firms are
less likely to under-or over-invest, which is consistent with the initial expectation. Inter-
estingly, results suggest that the RPE use in executive pay impels the investment efficiency
improvement in firms that do not entertain the RPE use. With regard to the effect of RPE
on firm performance, the results are inconclusive. Tice (2015) documents some evidence
that RPE firms that use total shareholder return perform better than non-RPE firms. How-
ever, this does not hold in general for the whole sample. Matsumura and Shin (2006) also
provide some piece of evidence on the effect of RPE on firm performance. Namely, they
examine incentive plans of all employees of the 214 postal stores in Korea from 1997-
1999 and report that financial performance improved after the implementation of RPE in
compensation schemes in 1998.60 Moreover, they report a positive correlation between a
store’s degree of common uncertainty and its profitability, when the RPE compensation
scheme is entertained. These findings propose that firms facing higher level of common
uncertainty with RPE compensation plan might motivate managers to increase their effort,
which is followed by a better financial performance.
1.5 Relative Performance Evaluation and CEO Turnover
1.5.1 Do boards filter out exogenous shocks when deciding to retain
a CEO or not?
A CEO turnover represents a departure of one CEO and the ascension of another. The
conditions on which an executive is being dismissed is an important element of the exec-
utive contract (Gibbons and Murphy 1990). As such, it provides significant insights about
governance policy in every firm. By dismissing a CEO a firm hinders costs that might be
caused by his incompetency (Gibbons and Murphy 1990, p.26). However, if his perfor-
mance is not evaluated in appropriate manner, the CEO departure might incur even higher
costs to the shareholders. That is, the costs of the valuable human capital loss related to
the CEO education and skills (Gibbons and Murphy 1990, p.26).
In the context of CEO turnover, RPE implies that boards consider CEO’s performance
relative to a peer group when deciding whether to keep him or not. If this is not the case,
the CEO is then exposed to common risk, which introduces uncertainty into his contract
(Gibbons and Murphy 1990). Researchers typically estimate logistic regression where
an indicator variable, equal to one in the year of the CEO departure (the year when a
CEO leaves the office) and zero otherwise, is a function of firm and peer performance in
order to determine the effect of firm and peer performance on the probability that a CEO
59In addition, she employs a set of other control variables. For more details, see p.24 in Tice (2015).
60The authors examine the incentive plans of all employees, including executives.
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is about to leave the office.61 According to the RPE theory, a CEO is more (less) likely
to be fired following bad (good) firm performance (negative and statistically significant
coefficient on firm performance) but is less (more) likely to leave following bad (good)
years in the peer return (positive and statistically significant coefficient on peer returns).
Against this background, Warner et al. (1988) investigate 87 CEO turnovers in the
sample from 1963 to 1978 and report that CEO turnover is negatively related to the firm
and positively to the market return, which is inline with the theory.62 However, the evi-
dence is inconclusive when the industry returns are applied as a measure of peer perfor-
mance. They find that common industry shocks are not removed from the CEO dismissals
when using lagged returns. In addition, CEO turnover is not sensitive to industry peers
after controlling for market return. Similarly, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) find that over
half of their CEOs left the office during their sample period and examine whether and
how this turnover is related to the firm and peer performance measures. They use battery
of different peer performance measures: market returns, and one-, two-, three-, four-digit
industry returns and report that turnover probabilities are negatively and significantly re-
lated to the firm return, and positively and significantly with the peer return. However,
in line with their findings with regard to executive pay, they report that the coefficient
on industry return declines with the narrowness of industry definition. Therefore, CEO
turnover seems to be more sensitive to market shocks. Barro and Barro (1990) estimate
the logit regression in order to examine how the probability of CEO departure relates to
the CEO age, absolute and relative performance, and market-based versus accounting-
based measures in the banking industry. As expected the probability of CEO turnover
increases with the CEO age, and tends to be the highest when the CEO is around 65
years old. That comes as no surprise given that this is the average retirement age. On
the other hand, the probability of dismissal declines for the CEOs of age 52 or younger.
However, across all age groups the probability of a CEO dismissal is a declining function
of a better stock performance. Unlike with the growth of compensation, Barro and Barro
(1990) document that CEO dismissal is sensitive to the regional performance indicating
that decisions about the CEO turnover involve peer comparisons.63 Yet, they find evidence
inconsistent with RPE use in CEO dismissal decisions when accounting-based measures
are employed. Barro and Barro (1990, p.477) interpret this as a result of accounting re-
turns being more prone to short-term manipulation coming from the CEO. For example,
if a CEO is aware that he is about to be dismissed, his incentive to manipulate accounting
earnings over the short horizon increases (Barro and Barro 1990, p.477).64
Blackwell et al. (1994) focus on the lower-ranked managers who are in charge of
subunits within the firm. They investigate the relationship between accounting-based per-
formance and decisions over their turnover and promotion. For this purpose, they employ
61This is a weak-form version of RPE. The same distinction between different types of RPE mentioned
in the Section 1.2 applies in the context of CEO turnovers.
62Even though Morck et al. (1989), Weisbach (1988) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) do not explicitly
test RPE in CEO turnover decisions, they provide some implicit empirical evidence on this case.
63Moreover, the CEO dismissal is also a sensitive to relative stock performance measure calculated as a
difference of absolute firm and regional performance measures.
64More details on the data used in Barro and Barro (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Jensen and
Murphy (1990) are presented in Section 1.2.
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a sample of managers of subsidiaries of Texas bank holding companies from 1984-1987.
The authors examine whether the CEOs are dismissed based on their relative performance
and if promotions within the firm are sensitive to accounting performance. As a perfor-
mance measure, the authors employ return on assets (ROA) after tax and extraordinary
items. Peer performance is set twofold: ROA for median bank within the same holding
company and ROA for median bank in the same region. The empirical results gener-
ally support the relative-performance evaluation – the coefficient on the peer performance
is positive and statistically significant, whereas the coefficient on the absolute firm per-
formance measure is negative and statistically significant when the first proxy for peer
performance is employed. This, however, does not hold when peers are set at the regional
level. Blackwell et al. (1994) explain that this might well be a results of very low correla-
tion between the ROA for the median bank in the region and individual bank performance.
Finally, it seems that firm’s decision to promote internally rather than externally is (pos-
itively) sensitive to the performance of a subsidiary bank. Based on these finding the
authors conclude that firings and promotions are indeed represent a motivational mecha-
nism for the lower-level mangers.65
The study by Chen et al. (2005) refrains from managerial turnovers and investigates
turnovers of Chinese provincial leaders. Precisely, the authors investigate whether the
Chinese government makes decisions about the dismissal of provincial leaders based on
provincial economic performance relative to their predecessors’ performance. The au-
thors employ the sample of 344 provincial leaders from 28 Chinese provinces over 1979-
2002. In evaluating whether leaders are being dismissed based on relative performance,
Chen et al. (2005) set moving average of provincial GDP growth rates over provincial
leaders’ tenure as a performance metric. Peer performance metrics are proxied by the av-
erage GDP growth rate of immediate predecessor and the average GDP growth of neigh-
bouring provinces. They then estimate the ordered probit model and report that the Chi-
nese central government uses relative performance evaluation in making decisions about
the turnover of the provincial leaders.66 However, the Chinese central government seems
to benchmark the performance only against the immediate predecessor, but not against
neighbouring provinces.
Perviously mentioned studies find evidence consistent with hypothesis that exoge-
nous shocks are filtered from the performance of the manager when decision about his
dismissal is made at the top, but also at the lower managerial level. These studies em-
ploy a weak-form tests of RPE which imply that some but not all the shocks are removed
from the performance evaluation of the CEO. Jenter and Kanaan (2015) plunge deeper
in the subject and employ strong-form tests of RPE and come across intriguing findings.
65The study by Cichello et al. (2009) supports these results. In similar manner, Cichello et al. (2009)
examine turnover of division managers in multidivisional firms in the U.S. on the sample of 1294 obser-
vations from 1993-2000. Consistent with RPE, turnover of a divisional manager is positively associated
with the industry performance but not to the firm performance or other divisions’ performance. Overall,
the study suggests that accounting information seems to be a useful metric in evaluating the performance
of divisional managers and that divisional managers are provided with considerable incentives to increase
performance of their division.
66The authors control for provincial leaders’ characteristics such as working experience within the gov-
ernment, age and education.
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They examine a sample of 3042 U.S. firms and 3365 CEO turnover decisions over 1993-
2009 and report very weak evidence that boards partially remove industry and market
performance from the performance evaluation in CEO dismissal decisions.67 When they
turn to the strong-form RPE tests, the evidence suggests that CEOs are more likely to be
dismissed after the negative peer performance, which does not lend support to the RPE.
Digging deeper, the authors find that the likelihood of a forced CEO departure doubles as
the systematic component of firm performance declines from 90th to its 10th percentile.68
They then further report that this negative effect is prevalent in groups of CEOs who un-
derperform the industry. There seems to be no influence of peer performance on CEOs
who outperform their industry peers. Based on these results the authors conclude "that
the peer performance effect on CEO turnovers is driven by boards removing many more
underperforming (but not outperforming) CEOs in bad times than in good times" (Jenter
and Kanaan 2015, p.2177). Underperformance of CEOs in recessions is not well-regarded
by the board about the CEO’s quality. This typically causes the forced CEO turnover. In
addition, it seems that filtering of shocks is stronger when the value-weighted industry
performance is used in comparison to the equal-weighted peer performance. This might
suggest that boards evaluate the CEO performance against more "precise" benchmark
(Jenter and Kanaan 2015). The study by Barakova and Palvia (2010) goes in line with
the findings presented in Jenter and Kanaan (2015). Strengthening the results by Jenter
and Kanaan (2015), they report that the probability of CEO dismissal in the U.S. in a
small, commercial, mostly private banks increases with the bad industry accounting per-
formance from 1985-1994.69 Barakova and Palvia (2010, p.224) build a regulatory rating
of bank management as a proxy for corporate governance in order to examine how this
result is related to the corporate governance.70 They then report that this result is more
pronounced at better-governed banks, which the authors interpret as a signal that less RPE
in not necessarily facilitated by bad governance structure. On the contrary, they argue that
"bad times allow for better identification of management quality" (Barakova and Palvia
2010, p.216). This leads to greater number of CEO dismissals. Consistent with Barakova
and Palvia (2010) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015), Gopalan et al. (2010) find that the proba-
bility of a disciplinary turnover is decreasing with sector performance.71 They report that
this effect is stronger in industries with high market-to-book ratios and intensive R&D
costs – industries that offer higher flexibility for the CEO to choose firm’s strategy.
67The sample consists of 2490 voluntary and 875 forced CEO turnovers.
68Systematic component of firm performance is set as industry component of firm performance.
69The sample with 18944 bank-year observations consists of banks with assets of USD100 million or
less.
70Barakova and Palvia (2010, p.223) define the rating as a "summary measure of regulatory opinion
of management competence, leadership, administration ability, planning ability, depth and succession, and
self-dealing tendencies." It might take a value from 1 (best) to 5 (worst).
71Disciplinary turnover is defined as any departure of CEO which is caused by his dismissal, forced
dismissal or unspecified differences in corporate policy. This definition is adopted by Parrino (1997).
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1.5.2 Relative Performance Evaluation and CEO Turnover around
IFRS
Wu and Zhang (2010) examine how the mandatory International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) affect financial reporting comparability, and consequently the use of
RPE in the context of CEO turnover decisions. In particular, they want to reveal empirical
evidence on whether better accounting comparability after IFRS adoption improves the
RPE use in CEO retention decisions.
Their sample consists of Continental European firms from 1993-2006.72 They em-
ploy the logit model where the dependent variable, equal to one in the year of the CEO
dismissal, is a function of the lagged return on assets and lagged raw stock return before
the IFRS adoption respectively, lagged return on assets and lagged raw stock return after
the IFRS adoption, and corresponding peer performance measures before and after the
IFRS change.73 Peer group measures in this paper are determined twofold. First, they
are proxied by an indicator variable equal to one if the median peer group performance is
greater than the firm’s own performance. Second, in an alternative specification Wu and
Zhang (2010) use continuous peer performance measures. They differentiate between the
foreign peer performance based on domestic accounting standards and foreign peer per-
formance based on IFRS. The foreign peer group consists of firms that belong to the same
2-digit SIC industry but different country (Wu and Zhang 2010). The authors then expect
a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the peer performance measures should
the effect of common shocks be removed from decisions regarding the CEO turnover.
The authors first conduct RPE tests on the foreign peer group performance based on
domestic accounting standards in years 1993-2005, before the IFRS adoption. They then
compare these results with those after 2005 when the foreign peer group is aggregated
following IFRS. They find strong empirical evidence consistent with accounting-based
RPE after the IFRS adoption when the peer group is aggregated based on the foreign
peers. On the contrary, they find no such evidence before the adoption. In addition,
consistent with previous studies, the authors document that CEO turnover is negatively
associated to a firm’s own accounting and stock performance. The authors argue that
these results are a consequence of a better financial reporting comparability with foreign
peers or more precise peer performance measures after the IFRS has taken place which is
consistent with findings presented in Ozkan et al. (2012).
1.5.3 RPE Model Specifications in CEO Turnover
The study by Fee et al. (2015) tries to shed light on two questions. First, the study in-
vestigates the role of modelling choices in drawing empirical inferences on the use of
RPE in the CEO turnover decisions. The authors argue that this would offer researchers
guidance on how to appropriately conduct the RPE tests in the context of CEO departure.
Second, it examines the robustness of previous studies conducted on the relation between
72They argue that these firms are particularly suitable for testing the RPE as they encounter similar
exogenous shocks.
73In addition, the authors control for firm size, leverage, book-to-market value, country, year and indus-
try dummies.
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CEO turnover and firm performance, and CEO turnover and industry performance. In
this manner, they want to strengthen out whether the findings of the previous studies are
resilient. For this purpose, they employ a sample of Compustat firms that consists of
60816 firm-years observations from 1991-2007.74 They report that the way the turnover
is specified and how the stock performance metric is calculated significantly affects the
RPE tests. To that end, they suggest that every researcher should check the robustness of
his results on the liberal and conservative measure of the CEO turnover. By the liberal
definition, they refer to all the CEO departures that are not caused by the health, death,
acquisitions or jump events (Fee et al. 2015, p.15). They argue that many studies treat
some of the CEO departures as a voluntary which does not correspond to the reality. This
yet affects the number of observations of the dependent variable in the regression mod-
els. Consequently, this alters the inferences made about RPE in CEO turnover decisions.
In addition, they recommend that the results should be robust to different performance
metrics. Specifically, Fee et al. (2015, p.37) recommend the use of log transformed stock
returns or a percentile ranking in order to capture "non-normality" of the stock return
data. Moreover, they suggest the use of linear probability models instead of logit and Cox
models which often tend to be sensitive to model specifications (Fee et al. 2015, p.37).
The authors then implement all the above mentioned recommendations on their sam-
ple of Compustat and compare it to the traditionally used specifications. They find that
sensitivity of firm performance to CEO turnover is extremely robust across most of the
model specifications. This leads to the conclusion that boards do consider firm perfor-
mance when making decisions on whether to retain a CEO or not. However, this does not
hold for the relation between industry performance and CEO turnover. The authors obtain
evidence of such relation only under very specific model specifications. Hence, Fee et al.
(2015, p.38) conclude that the widely presented finding that the industry performance
affects CEO turnover might be misleading.
1.6 Conclusion
The empirical research has scrutinized the theoretical prediction of relative performance
evaluation for more than 30 years. In this respect, we can distinguish between the stud-
ies that examine relative performance evaluation in executive pay and executive turnover
decisions. Results of both of these branches provide insights relevant for both academic
society and the public. To that end, this paper provides an overview of the state of the
academic literature on relative performance evaluation.
A comprehensive overview of the RPE literature in the context of executive pay has
brought inconclusive evidence. Yet, the academic literature offers several explanations
for this case. First, in the light of booming markets compensating manager based on the
constantly rising peer performance benchmark might not be optimal if the CEO talent on
the market is scarce. As the demand for the CEO skill is high, shareholders might lose
manager who has an incentive to leave if the other firms on the market offer a compensa-
74They use all Compustat firms except for utilities, financials, foreign firms, firms with less than USD
10 million in assets and firms that are not listed in the Compustat name file.
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tion contract without RPE provision. In this situation RPE might not be optimal for the
shareholders. When the CEO is older and more wealthy, he is able to hedge the market
risk on his private account. Hence, we find no RPE in their compensation contracts. Sec-
ond, peer group construction plays important role in detecting RPE in CEO pay. Industry
and market indices have shown not to perform well when it comes to capturing exoge-
nous shocks on the market. This introduces bias in the empirical tests. For this purpose,
product-market, industry/size or self-selected peers are more suitable. Third, empirical
tests of RPE often neglect strategic interactions between firms. Absence of RPE in com-
petitive environment might be optimal as it offsets managerial collusive behavior, that
might undermine shareholder returns. Fourth, managers might exert their influence over
the board in order to set the pay that fits their interests the most. Hence, in this case
we observe no RPE when that is not in executive interests. Fifth, in a situation when a
CEO determines firm’s exposure to the sector performance in making decisions related to
the firm’s strategy, the manager should be compensated based on the sector performance.
In this case, RPE contract is not optimal. Finally, performance metrics affect inferences
about RPE tests.
RPE in executive pay seems to be more prevalent when common risk faced by the
firm and its peers is high. This is consistent with the optimal contract theory. The high
growth option firms seem to entertain the use of RPE to a lesser extent than the low
growth firms. Such firms might find it hard to identify an appropriate peer group that
captures the exposure to common risk. On the other hand, firm size seems to drive the use
of RPE. Firms that face a risk of under-investment in R&D are more prone to the RPE
use. This sets the right incentives for the CEO to mitigate risks of under-investment. In
addition, the amount of equity holdings held by the CEO is negatively related to the RPE
use at the firm level. Proxies for good corporate governance such as the greater number
of independent directors and the presence of compensation consultants also seem to lead
to the increased likelihood of RPE in the firms. In addition, some studies report better
investment efficiency in firms that entertain the RPE use. The IFRS introduced in 2005
improves the quality of accounting information, leading to a greater use of accounting-
based RPE. Finally, studies investigating the effect of RPE on firm performance seem to
be inconclusive. This provides room for future research.
Studies examining whether boards remove exogenous shocks from the CEO perfor-
mance when making decisions about his departure seem to be more conclusive at the
first sight. In particular, the majority of the literature examining the weak-form version
of the RPE in the CEO turnover seems to lend support for the RPE use. However, the
studies that plunge deeper into this topic and rely on the strong-form version provide less
convincing evidence of RPE in CEO departure decisions. Some evidence suggests that
previous studies have been too conservative when defining a CEO turnover which affects
the tests of RPE. Taken together, these studies provide important suggestions on how to
improve the research design of the RPE tests in CEO turnover decisions in the future.
Overall, this paper offers an overview of important factors which affect the inferences
drawn on relative performance evaluation in CEO pay and CEO turnover decisions. Inclu-
sion of such factors in traditional econometric models of relative performance evaluation
have important implications for the power of RPE tests. Therefore, they should be taken
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into account in the future research on RPE.
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Chapter 2
Preaching Water But Drinking Wine?
Relative Performance Evaluation in
International Banking
Chapter Overview
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is, at least on paper, enjoying widespread popular-
ity in determining the level of executive compensation. Yet existing empirical evidence of
RPE is decidedly mixed. Two principal explanations are held responsible for this discord.
A constructional challenge arises from intricacies of identifying the correct peers. And on
a simpler note, corporate commitments to RPE could be mere exercises in empty rhetoric.
We address both issues and test the use of RPE in a new sample of large international
non-U.S. banks. Taken as a whole, the banks in our sample show moderate evidence con-
sistent with RPE. We report stronger evidence once we investigate the subsample of banks
that disclose the use of peers in their compensation schemes. This finding lends support
to the credibility and thus informational value of RPE commitments. Digging deeper, we
conclude that RPE usage is driven by firm size and growth options.
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2.1 Introduction
The rise in executive compensation in international banking in the last two decades has
been striking. By the end of 2003 Citigroup, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns, large
players in the banking industry at that time, were run by CEOs whose earnings were
among the top ten in the S&P 500 (Hodgson 2004). Two of these banks - Lehman
Brothers and Bear Stearns - happened to collapse in 2008, triggering a global economic
panic and unfolding the recent financial crisis. According to Bebchuk et al. (2010), in
spite of obvious mismanagement the executives of these banks had received considerable
performance-based compensation packages during the years preceding the financial cri-
sis. It stands to reason that the effectiveness of such compensation schemes have since
become subject of ever more heated discussions, not least in international banking. Sure
enough, the recent rise in executive compensation has not been confined to the banking
industry. Other industries have been following the same trend. Murphy (2013) documents
that total pay for executives in the S&P 500 exploded in the late 2000s.
This general development has also piqued the interest of economists, who are par-
ticularly intrigued by the underlying pay-setting mechanism. Executive compensation is
a classic example of a principal-agent problem and lies at the heart of the controversy
of corporate separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Put suc-
cinctly, the challenge lies in motivating the CEO (the agent) to act in the best interest of
the shareholder (the principal). Because the effort of the agent is not perfectly observable,
the principal is not able to force the agent to choose the action that would be optimal
from the principal’s perspective. This invokes a moral hazard problem. There has been
much discussion how and in what way firms are to solve this agency problem (Ross 1973,
Gjesdal 1982, Mahoney 1995). A straightforward solution would involve a compensation
scheme which provides desirable incentives for the CEO.
This is where relative performance evaluation (RPE) comes in (Holmstrom 1982).
RPE implies that compensation contracts should be linked to firm performance in relation
to peers with similar characteristics. Such contracts account for common shocks that
are out of the agent’s control and thus offer a more conclusive way to assess the agent’s
individual performance. Moreover, RPE contracts offer the same incentives as contracts
based on absolute performance. The case for employing RPE in executive compensation
contracts seems clear-cut. Indeed, RPE has become seemingly popular in practice. For
example, recent studies suggest that roughly every fourth firm in the S&P 1500 openly
claims to use RPE in their compensation contracts (Carter et al. 2009, Gong et al. 2011).
In this paper, we test the existence of RPE in international banking and pay particular
attention to banks that seem to purport its application. This is a particularly intriguing
issue given that banks might have incentives to misreport RPE practice if their board
of directors are prone to the managerial influence. The board members might actually
have financial and non-financial incentives to satisfy executives. For example, managers
of large banks usually enjoy a great reputation outside of the bank which could be very
beneficial for the members of the board. As noted by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Be-
bchuk and Fried (2004), they also enjoy a great authority within the company and as such
directors, just like other employees, are naturally inclined to avoid any sort of conflict
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with the manager. As a consequence, executive compensation schemes endorsed by the
board of directors are created in a manner favourable to executives. However, if man-
agerial compensation packages are recognized as flagrant by the public, managers face
social disapproval and criticism. This is denoted as "outrage" costs by Bebchuk and Fried
(2004). The stronger the negative perception of the public and shareholders, the larger
the managers’ cost of enjoying enormous compensation packages. This criticism can be
avoided by camouflaging compensation packages.1 Hence, the ability to camouflage the
peer group of the underperforming bank manager would actually make his excessive pay
look more acceptable and legitimate to the public and investors. Against this background,
it comes as not surprise that banks would rather avoid evaluating the performance of their
underperforming manager relative to the performance of their peer group.
RPE has been extensively investigated empirically. However, the scope of the existing
studies is rather limited. Thereby, the focus is on compensation practices of industrial
firms, and most studies exclusively use U.S. data.2 This regional limitation comes as no
real surprise. It is difficult to obtain comprehensive data on executive compensation out-
side of the U.S. Despite the ubiquitously proclaimed use of RPE in practice, the empirical
results of these studies have been a mixed bag.3 This is partly owed to the fact that the
post hoc construction of the peer groups is rarely open to scrutiny. If the econometrician
identifies a different peer group than the target firm itself had actually used, inferences on
RPE are no longer meaningful. Yet peer group identification in managerial performance
benchmarking is only one reason why one may fail to find evidence of RPE. A simpler
explanation would be that the RPE claims are merely empty rhetoric to appease propo-
nents of good corporate practice. As Albuquerque (2009) puts it, any empirical tests of
RPE are, in this sense, joint tests.
This paper embraces this duality and tests for RPE in a new sample of large and glob-
ally operating non-U.S. banks.4 We contend that the global banking industry is an ideal
playground to test the usage of RPE, for at least three reasons. First, RPE makes espe-
cially sense for firms that are exposed to common shocks. This applies particularly well
to international banking. The main reason for this exposure is that banks are highly lever-
aged institutions. Around 90 percent of their assets come from debt, making them more
prone to exogenous volatility (Houston and James 1995, Chen et al. 2006). Second, the
barriers to global integration in the banking industry have been significantly trimmed in
1This is known as the managerial power hypothesis developed by Bebchuck and Fried. It is depicted in
more detail in Chapter 1.
2Antle and Smith (1986) examine RPE in a sample of chemical, aerospace, and electronics firms.
Rajgopal et al. (2006) cover a wide range of industries with the three largest groups being Electric, Gas, and
Sanitary Services, Chemicals and Allied Products, and Depository Institutions. Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999b) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) exploit ExecuComp data, restricting them to U.S. firms. Joh
(1999) tests RPE on a sample of Japanese firms in the manufacturing sector.
3For example, Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Albuquerque (2009), and Black et al. (2015) find empirical
support for the RPE hypothesis. In contrast, Janakiraman et al. (1992), Antle and Smith (1986), Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999b), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Antle and Smith (1986) fail to provide evidence for
RPE or present mixed results.
4U.S. banks were excluded in our analysis because of a regulatory event during the observed timeframe
(see Section 2.3.1 for details). To our knowledge, there are only two studies that test RPE on U.S. banks,
Barro and Barro (1990) and Crawford (1999). We elaborate on them in Subsection 2.2.1.
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the last two decades, shifting banks from once highly centralized domestic organizations
to global behemoths. In turn, the structure of competition in the industry has adjusted
(Berger and Smith 2003). Hence, large banks operating at the international level are now
dealing with intense competition.5 Third, the recent financial crisis was characterized
by failures of large international banks such as Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, or Lehman
Brothers. The downfall of these banks has drawn increasing attention to corporate gov-
ernance issues in remuneration policy.6 If anything, this pressure has prompted banks to
make more efficient use of RPE.
Our study tackles the caveat that the soundness of empirical tests on RPE critically
hinges on the correct identification of the peer groups in a company’s CEO’s relative-
performance based pay. We follow the sophisticated approach by Albuquerque (2009)
and aggregate peer performance on the basis of industry and industry/size peer groups.
Aggregating in this manner accounts for the observation that industry affiliation and firm
size are informative proxies for the common market risks that RPE-setting firms face.
This approach, then, takes up Holmstrom’s (1979) theoretical requirement of common
uncertainties. Our study also deals with the potential issue of RPE being corporate cheap
talk. If that were the case then signalling the disclosure of peer group usage would be
mere noise, and incorporating this information should not alter our results qualitatively.
To test this hypothesis, we differentiate between disclosing and non-disclosing banks.
Hence, disclosing banks claim to compare the firm performance relative to a peer group
performance in determining one or several components of the executive pay.7
We collect a new data set with information of 42 large international banks. The re-
sults of our basic regression specification document negative and insignificant parameter
estimates in industry peers. Taken by itself, this casts doubt on the use of RPE in our
sample. However, when we perform tests of RPE on more nuanced industry/size peers,
we find moderate evidence consistent with RPE. When further restricting attention to the
subsample of disclosing banks, we find stronger and more conclusive evidence that sys-
tematic risk is filtered out from CEO compensation. Strong-form RPE tests support this
conclusion. This finding stands in contrast to Gong et al. (2011), who do not find informa-
tional value in RPE disclosure among U.S. firms.8 To gain more insight, we disentangle
the main drivers of RPE. A logistic regression indicates that firm size and growth options
play a major role in determining the likelihood of RPE usage. The results imply that the
greater a bank is, the higher is the probability that it will use RPE in its compensation con-
tracts. On the other hand, the probability of using RPE is decreasing with the magnitude
5Bikker and Haaf (2002) investigate the competitive conditions and concentration in banking markets
of 23 industrialized countries inside and outside Europe over 10 years. They form three sub-markets in
terms of bank sizes for each country and estimate the corresponding competition conditions. They show
that large banks operate mostly in international markets and are exposed to strong competition. On the other
hand, smaller banks operate mainly in local markets and are facing less competition.
6Bebchuk et al. (2010) find that the pay structures in Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers had provided
top executives with overbearing risk-taking incentives. This misalignment let them focus on a company’s
short-term performance while paying too little attention to the long term value of the company.
7We collect this information from the annual reports and proxy statements of the respective banks. See
Section 2.3.1 for more details.
8Our classification of RPE statements is less strict than Gong et al. (2011) so our estimates on its
informational value are, if anything, to be interpreted conservatively. See Section 2.3.1 for more details.
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of growth options.
Our paper contributes to the ongoing discussion on RPE along several dimensions.
Existing studies testing RPE on banks have focused solely on U.S. data. This is hard
to square with an industry that is characterized by pronounced international competition.
We provide broader evidence by conducting tests on a newly collected sample of large
international banks from 2004 to 2013. In addition, we determine the main drivers of
RPE in this industry. Both tasks rely on a sound and accountable peer group construction
mechanism, adding to the conclusiveness of our findings. We also shed new light on the
informative value of disclosure over time. Our results suggest that the banks in our sample
which proclaim the use of peers in assessing the performance of their CEOs are not merely
window dressing: We do find stronger evidence for RPE usage among disclosing banks.
For our sample, this would imply that lumping together disclosing and non-disclosing
firms can be detrimental to the conclusiveness of RPE tests.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the main char-
acteristics of the banking industry. The section also introduces the empirical model and
depicts the peer group construction mechanism. Section 2.3 presents our novel dataset
of international banks. Section 2.4 reports summary statistics and regression results. In
Section 2.5, we identify the main drivers of RPE in our sample. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Relative performance evaluation and the banking in-
dustry
2.2.1 Executive Pay in the Banking industry
This section discusses current executive compensation practices in the banking industry.
The literature on executive compensation in the banking industry attends to the particular-
ities of the banking industry. The literature stresses three characteristic features of banks
(John and Qian 2003, Macey and O’Hara 2003, Tung 2011). First, banks have a pecu-
liar capital structure. They hold much less equity than other companies, rendering them
highly leveraged. Roughly 90 percent of the funds in banks comes from debt. Moreover,
a bank’s assets and liabilities are mismatched (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). Second, the
presence of federal guarantees of bank deposits, as a public measure to protect private
depositors from losses in case of insolvency, differ then from other firms. Third, these
deposits can increase the risk of fraud and self dealing in the banking industry because it
reduces the incentives for monitoring (Macey and O’Hara 2003).
As a consequence two main branches of academic literature on executive pay in the
banking industry have evolved (Houston and James 1995). The first branch discusses
how the sensitivity of executive compensation to the bank’s performance was affected
by the U.S. corporate control market deregulation (Crawford et al. 1995, Hubbard and
Palia 1995, Cuñat and Guadalupe 2009).9 The second branch in the literature questions
9Since 1980 many states in the U.S. have passed so-called interstate banking laws that allow local banks
to be acquired by out-of-state banks. This has led to higher competition among banks on the interstate
market and has had consequences on the pay-performance relation.
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whether the existing compensation policies promote risk-taking in the banking sector.
These studies examine the relation between the specific component of the compensation
and market measures of risk (Houston and James 1995, Chen et al. 2006). The results are
inconclusive.10
Though limited, the empirical literature on CEO pay in the banking industry provides
some insight about their remuneration practice. The data show that bank CEOs receive
less cash compensation on average, are less likely to participate in a stock option plan,
and hold fewer growth options than CEOs in other industries. These differences are likely
to stem from different investment opportunities of banks (Houston and James 1995). But
not all is different in the banking industry. Houston and James (1995) do not find any
differences between banking and non-banking industries regarding the overall sensitiv-
ity of pay to performance. They presume that the factors that influence compensation
in the banking industry are similar to those in non-banking industries despite differences
in the compensation structure. Adams and Mehran (2003) suggest that the difference in
the governance structures between manufacturing firms and banks are industry-specific.
Furthermore, the differences seem to be mostly due to different investment opportunities
of bank holding companies (BHCs) and pertinent regulation (Adams and Mehran 2003).
Adams and Mehran’s study questions if firm performance measures are influenced by the
governance structure. Their results indicate that differences between the board structures
of manufacturing firms and banks might not be a reason for concern in this respect. Aebi
et al. (2012) study the strength of incentive features of top management compensation
contracts in banks. They compare the pay-performance sensitivity in banks with those in
manufacturing firms and show that debt ratio, firm size, risk, and regulation are important
determinants of pay-performance sensitivity in banks. Finally, the executive compensa-
tion structure and the governance structure of banks differ from firms in other industries.
Even so, the factors that influence the overall pay-performance sensitivity do not seem to
differ significantly across industries.
Studies testing RPE in the banking industry are rare. Barro and Barro (1990) test
RPE on a data set that covers 83 commercial banks in the U.S. between 1982 and 1987.
They regress the growth rate of real compensation on the average of the real total rate
of return from the current and previous period, the first difference of accounting based
returns, regional averages for both accounting-based return, and the average of the real
total rate of return. This effectively compares the performance of banks relative to the
performance of other banks in the same region. Their evidence is not consistent with
the use of RPE. Crawford (1999) tests two hypotheses on 215 executives from 118 U.S.
commercial banks from 1976-1988. He regresses change in CEO pay for a specific bank
on a change in shareholder wealth for that bank, an industry relative performance measure,
and a market performance measure using S&P 500 returns. His findings suggest that
relative compensation is negatively related to market and industry returns and positively
related to shareholder returns. In addition, in his sample the use of RPE increases upon
introduction of banking deregulation. Crawford reports evidence consistent with RPE if
10For example, Saunders et al. (1990) find evidence for this hypothesis and observe a positive and
statistically significant relation between bank risk and stock held by the executive. In contrast, Houston and
James (1995) provide results that are inconsistent with this hypothesis.
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CEO compensation is evaluated relative to industry peers. He does not, however, find
evidence of RPE when using market performance measures.
To sum up, two branches in the academic literature on CEO pay have evolved as a
consequence of bank particularities. The first one tries to identify the effect of U.S. cor-
porate control market deregulation on the sensitivity of executive compensation to bank
performance. The second branch investigates whether compensation policies promote
risk taking in the banking sector. The literature on RPE in the banking industry is scarce
and virtually non-existent for the non-U.S. market.
2.2.2 Empirical model
We employ a model that is based on Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). Specifically, we
use the following weak-form test of RPE:11
Compit = α0 + α1 · FirmPerf it + α2 · PeerPerf it + α3 ·Cit + it (2.1)
Compit measures executive compensation in monetary terms, FirmPerf it stands for the
performance of firm i measured as the continuously compounded gross real rate of re-
turn to shareholders (assuming that dividends are reinvested), and PeerPerf it denotes the
performance of firm i′s peer group. In order to account for variation not included in the
firm’s and the peer groups’ performances we include several control variables, subsumed
in the column vector Cit, which account for firm size and growth options. In addition,
we include time, industry, and country dummies. The subscript t denotes the respective
year and it represents an independent firm specific white noise process. Furthermore,
α0, α1, α2, and α3 denote model parameters.12
In this model, rejecting the null hypothesis H0 : α2 ≥ 0 against the one-sided alterna-
tive H1 : α2 < 0 provides evidence of RPE in executive compensation contracts. In that
case, exogenous shocks outside of the control of the executive management are filtered
out from the compensation contract.
In order to examine whether all exogenous shocks were removed from the compen-
sation contract, researchers typically use the so-called strong-form RPE test. The first
step in conducting this test is to regress firm performance on peer performance (Antle
and Smith 1986). For this purpose, we employ a battery of peer performance aggregation
methods (see the next section). The first step regression model is:
FirmPerformanceit = γi + βi · PeerPerformanceit + it (2.2)
The unsystematic and systematic performance are obtained from the equation above in
the following manner:
UnsysFirmPerformanceit = ̂it,
SysFirmPerformanceit = γ̂i + β̂i · PeerPerformanceit.
(2.3)
11Originally, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) defined RPE as α2
α1
. They test H0 : α2α1 ≥ 0 against the
alternative H1 : α2α1 < 0. Since α1 is expected to be positive, most of the literature that uses the model
proposed by Holmstrom and Milgrom test whether α2 < 0. We follow their approach.
12Note that α3 is a row vector.
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Note that ̂it denote regression residuals and γ̂i, β̂i parameter estimates. Since the
goal is to differentiate between systematic and unsystematic firm performance, we do not
account for control variables in this step. The second step estimates the sensitivity of
CEO compensation with respect to the unsystematic and systematic components of firm
performance, that is:
Compit = δ0 + δ1 · UnsysFirmPerformanceit + δ2 · SystFirmPerformanceit+
δ3 ·Cit + it (2.4)
If the systematic risk is filtered out from the compensation contract, the systematic per-
formance δ2 in equation (2.4) should not be significantly different from zero. Cit denotes
a column vector of control variables and the row vector δ3 its coefficients.
2.3 Data description
This section describes the data preparation process in creating our sample of international
banks. Subsection 2.3.1 reports the collection of the international compensation data,
Subsection 2.3.2 provides details about the sample that we use in the regression analysis,
and Subsection 2.3.3 documents the peer group data selection process.
2.3.1 Compensation data
There is no standardized database for international corporate executive compensation.
We collect data from several sources for the years 2003-2014. Financial and accounting
data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream and Thomson Reuters Worldscope.
Compensation data are collected manually either from annual reports or management
proxy circulars available online. We do not include U.S. banks in our analysis as in August
2006 a new regulatory requirement by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
mandated, among other things, full disclosure of peer group compositions (if applicable)
for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2006. In a recent study, Faulkender and
Yang (2013) suggest that this event generated a structural break in peer group selection,
discouraging the use of U.S. compensation data for our purpose.13 For the other countries
in our sample, we could not find any corresponding regulation that was introduced in our
observed timeframe.14
Our initial data set is composed of firms classified as banks from the FTSE All World
Index with an index weight higher than 0.02. This yields 75 firms. Based on this list we
collect remuneration data for 42 different firms with a total of 318 firm-year observations
(henceforth dubbed the "full sample"). In line with the source information, we quantify
the compensation in nominal terms. As CEO compensation we define the compensation
paid by the parent company as well as the one paid by subsidiaries (for the CEO position).
In rare cases firms only provide a certain wage range. In that case we always include
13We retain U.S. banks as possible peers, however. See Section 2.3.3.
14For E.U. firms, for example, Ferrarini and Moloney (2005, p. 318) point out that peer group disclosure
is not required. We are not aware that this has changed since 2005.
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the higher bound as the actual compensation. We do not include the measure of CEO
compensation changes in the value of existing firm options and stock holdings owned by
the CEO.
In order to collect the total compensation data we focus on the amount the firm itself
defines as the "total". This always includes all the positions used for the fixed compen-
sation amount as well as performance-related components. The name and the exact com-
position of these performance-related components vary significantly between firms. For
example, some firms differentiate between long-term and short-term incentives, whereas
others just talk about bonuses. This seems to be related to the pertaining country and its
national regulations. We ignore any extraordinary compensation such as restricted shares
(which had been allocated when starting as CEO), payment in lieu of notice, or buyout.
We also exclude all amounts received related to the holding of a director position in addi-
tion to the CEO position.
In addition to the compensation data we collect information to create a dummy vari-
able that indicates the disclosure of peers selected to determine a company’s CEO’s
relative-performance based pay. We translate such disclosure as indication of RPE usage
and examine the subsample of thusly disclosing firms in Section 2.4.2. We then identify
possible drivers of disclosure in Section 2.5. Note that this approach is less excluding than
a strict requirement of overt RPE claims (for details, see Gong et al. 2011). This runs the
risk of not rejecting the null hypothesis even if it is false. If we do find evidence against
the null hypothesis, however, we can be quite confident that disclosure has a significant
impact.
2.3.2 International banking sample
We convert all compensation data into U.S. Dollars by using exchange rates from Thom-
son Reuters Datastream. The exchange rate is determined by the day after the end of the
fiscal year (e.g., if the fiscal year ends on December 31, 2010, we take the exchange rate
on January 1, 2011). We measure firm performance with stock market return data from
Thomson Reuters Datastream. Following the literature, we control for firm size (sales)
(Smith and Watts 1992, Fama and French 1992) and growth opportunities (Fama and
French 1992). In addition, we include dummies to control for year-specific differences
in the level of compensation, industry dummies that capture unobservable variation at the
industry level, and country dummies that capture any country specific variation (e.g., due
to different regulations or legal directives). In order to control for this possible country
specific heterogeneity, we only keep banks from countries with at least two banks.
Panel A of Table 2.1 shows the full sample, and the RPE disclosure and non-RPE
disclosure subsamples frequencies for each year. Altogether, the data for the full sample
are equally well distributed over the years 2004-2013, though the frequency of the data
tends to increase somewhat over time.15 The same applies for the both subsamples.
Panel B of Table 2.1 displays the sample frequency by industry group within the bank-
ing industry. In addition, it reports the frequency of RPE disclosing and non-disclosing
15The low number of firms in the last year is because not all firms in our sample had yet released proxy
circulars by the time we collected the data.
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banks by industry group. Subsector 6029 (Commercial Banks) dominates the full sample
with more than 80% of all observations. The other subsectors are National Commer-
cial Banks (6021), State Commercial Banks (6022), Federal Saving Institutions (6035),
and Security Brokers and Dealers (6211). Similar to the full sample results, RPE dis-
closing (41.82%) and non-RPE disclosing banks (42.71%) belong to the subsector 6029
(Commercial Banks). All the banks belonging to the subsector 6022 (State Commercial
Banks) and the subsector 6035 (Federal Saving Institutions) disclose the peer group in
benchmarking the performance of their CEO in the compensation policy.
Panel C of Table 2.1 depicts the sample frequency by country. Furthermore, it doc-
uments the frequency by country of the RPE and non-RPE subsamples. Among the 14
countries in the full sample, Canada together with Australia, Singapore, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom provide the largest share of our banks. The banks in Canada, Australia,
Germany dominate in our sample when it comes to the RPE disclosure in their annual
reports. All the banks in Australia and Germany disclose information about their peer
group, where as none of the banks in Singapore, Hong Kong, China and Norway provide
such information.
[Insert Table 2.1 about here]
Table 2.2 shows Pearson correlation coefficients between performance measures and
the control variables firm size and growth options. Firm stock returns and industry as
well as industry/size peers display positive correlations (0.73 and 0.80, respectively). The
correlation of firm stock returns with its industry peer is lower than the correlation of
firm stock returns with its industry/size peer, which is consistent with previous evidence
(Albuquerque 2009). The statistically significant correlation coefficients increase our con-
fidence that that industry and industry/size peers are eligible candidates to filter out noise
from the individually observed firm performance measures. In addition, total executive
compensation is positively and significantly correlated with the firm stock return (0.15).
The same applies for the correlation between the total compensation and industry, and
industry/size peer return. This coefficient is, however, not significant at 1% level but at
5% level. As expected, the total compensation is positively correlated with firm size.
[Insert Table 2.2 about here]
2.3.3 Peer Group Composition
For the selection of possible peer firms, we start with a comprehensive list of 4228 firms,
most of which are financials. We use SIC-codes to remove firms which do not belong to
the banking industry.16 We also exclude other firms which we do not consider valid peers,
such as the Allied Irish Banks, which technically became state-owned during the financial
crisis. We then apply a number of screens to the return data to obtain a qualitatively sound
16Datastream provides up to five different SIC codes for each firm, in order of relevance. We include a
firm if the first SIC code is one of the following: 6021, 6022, 6029, 6035, 6036, 6061, 6062, 6081, 6082,
6091, 6111, 6141, 6159, 6162, or 6712. If the first SIC code is either 6311, 6211, 6153, 6163, or 6221, we
include the firm only if one of the four other SIC-codes is in the previous list.
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data set (Ince and Porter 2006). First, we delete any consecutive zero returns at the end
of the sample period. Second, we remove returns below -80% and above 300%. We also
require that the one-year continuously compounded return obtained from monthly data
is available. We end up with 1,570 firms which form the pool of potential peers in our
analyses. Note that this sample also contains so-called "dead stocks" which were delisted
from the stock market during the sample period to mitigate survivorship bias.
We build the peer groups by adapting the industry/size approach by Albuquerque
(2009). She constructs groups based on both the two-digit Standard Industrial Classi-
fication System (SIC) level and firm size. The first step in her construction sorts firms
by beginning-of-year market value into size quartiles within an industry. This yields four
peer groups per industry. Each firm is then matched with an industry/size peer group. It
turns out that this approach yields stronger empirical support for the use of RPE in ex-
ecutive compensation than sorting by industry classification alone, an improvement that
is due to the information that firm size captures. Firms of similar size are also similar
along several other characteristics that proxy for systematic risk. Albuquerque shows
how the levels of diversification, financing constraints, and operating leverage vary with
industry/size-ranked portfolios and provides evidence that firm size subsumes these char-
acteristics. She finds that larger firms tend to be more diversified, have greater operating
leverage, and smaller financing constraints. This claim is supported by other literature
(Demsetz and Strahan 1997).
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Full sample results
This section presents the results for the full sample of banks. First, we show descriptive
statistics of compensation data, performance measures, and firm characteristics (Subsec-
tion 2.4.1.1) for the 42 firms across the 2004-2013 time span. Subsection 2.4.1.2 then
documents the regression results. We regress the logarithm of total CEO compensation
on firm stock performance, peer return, and several control variables.
2.4.1.1 Summary statistics
Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample. We report two measures of
compensation: total compensation and the logarithm of total compensation. In the re-
gression analysis, we use the logarithm of total compensation as a dependent variable
because its empirical distribution is more symmetrical than the one for total compensa-
tion. This mitigates heteroscedasticity as well as extreme skewness and allows for a direct
comparison with results from previous studies (Murphy 1999). We aggregate peer per-
formance based on industry affiliation and on the industry/size approach (Albuquerque
2009). Summary statistics for the control variables firm size (log of sales and sales) and
growth options are also reported. The results show that the average (median) total com-
pensation of an executive in our sample is USD 5.44 million (USD 4.31 million), which
is not all that surprising in a sample that largely consists of the major global players in
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the banking industry.17 Firm performance is measured using log-returns. The mean firm
stock return is 6% and the median is 14%. Averages of peer returns hover around 8%.
The average (median) size of a bank in our full sample is USD 30240 million (USD 19225
million).
[Insert Table 2.3 about here]
2.4.1.2 Regression results
We proceed to test the use of RPE in CEO compensation with equation (2.1). Peer groups
are constructed with the industry and industry/size approach. We then regress the loga-
rithm of total CEO compensation on firm stock return, peer return, growth options, and
log of sales. Year, country, and industry dummies are also included.
Panel A of Table 2.4 shows the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to RPE when us-
ing industry and industry/size peer groups. The coefficient on firm stock return is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level for both peer group specifications, with val-
ues of 0.47 and 0.56 for the industry and industry/size specifications, respectively. When
the peer group is restricted to firms within the same industry the coefficient of the peer
portfolio is negative yet insignificant (-0.06 with a p-value of 0.78).18 Put differently, the
performance of these peers does not seem to be filtered out from the CEO compensation
contracts. However, if we include size into sorting and consider industry/size peers, the
parameter estimates are negative and statistically significant (with a coefficient of -0.31
and a p-value of 0.09).19 Even so, we consider this result only as moderate evidence of
RPE. The peer group coefficient is significant at the 10% level (5% if we use the more
suited one-sided test) but robustness checks with self-created size sorting algorithms yield
mixed results.20
[Insert Table 2.4 about here]
By and large, the results for our international banks dovetail with previous findings for
U.S. firms, which also showed that industry/size peers are better able to capture exogenous
shocks than industry peers alone (Albuquerque 2009).
17See A.3 for a list of the banks in our analysis.
18In untabulated results we repeat Albuquerque’s tests using changes regression and report qualitatively
similar results.
19This result does not hold when we repeat the changes regression procedure presented in Albuquerque
(2009). In untabulated results, we report insignificant coefficients on industry/size peer returns.
20Although the results are robust across different treatments of standard errors (see A.2 for more details),
we are not able to document robustness when we generalize Albuquerque’s (2009) simple sorting specifica-
tion. Specifically, we implement a novel Kernel-based peer group construction approach, presented in detail
in Chapter 3, with three different Kernel-functions: a standard normal pdf (Knor), a ”cosine” pdf (Kcos),
and a uniform distribution pdf (Kuni). These generalized approaches give different weights depending on
the peers’ size ”distance” from the target firm’s size. The results from these new specifications are reported
in Table A1 in A.1.
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2.4.2 RPE subsample results
2.4.2.1 Weak tests of RPE
The results above are moderately consistent with the notion that the banks in our full
sample compensate according to an RPE scheme. We now turn to the informational value
of peer disclosure. Although there is a risk of taking such disclosure at face value, we
exploit this information to sharpen our sample’s profile. In this subsection we test the
sensitivity of CEO pay to RPE in the subsample of banks that explicitly state the use
of peers in determining the performance of their CEOs in their statement proxies (see
Section 2.3.1). We follow the same empirical specification used in the previous section
and take a closer look at 25 disclosing banks, which form 156 firm-year observations from
2004-2013.
Panel B of Table 2.4 shows the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to RPE in the
subsample when using industry and industry/size peers. The results show positive and sta-
tistically significant parameter estimates on firm stock performance for both peer group
specifications. The estimates are 0.49 and 0.68, respectively, indicating that a CEO is
being rewarded for positive firm performance. Hence on average, CEO compensation
increases with firm performance. When the peer groups are composed of banks within
the same industry, the coefficient on the peer portfolio is negative and statistically in-
significant (with a coefficient of -0.30 and a p-value of 0.40). The industry/size parameter
estimate is also negative but statistically significant at the 5% level (with a coefficient of
-0.64 and a p-value of 0.03; or 0.015 when we use the one-sided test). What is more, in
contrast to the full sample, this result is robust across different self-created specifications
of peer groups.21 This goes hand in hand with our previous results and once again suggests
that the industry/size approach captures more variation. The results for the subsample of
disclosing banks provide again evidence consistent with RPE, but more strikingly so than
the results for the full sample did. In the subsample, the coefficient on the peer portfolio
doubles in size and increases sharply in statistical significance. Accounting for disclosure
increases the precision of the estimates, suggesting that peer group disclosure holds in-
formational value regarding RPE. One might also say that the inclusion of non-disclosing
banks in the full sample dilutes the statistical inference and renders it less conclusive by
lowering statistical power.22 This stands in contrast to Gong et al. (2011), who find no
informational value of RPE disclosure. However, their sample only comprises U.S. firms
for one year.
2.4.2.2 Strong-form test of RPE
Following Antle and Smith (1986), we perform so-called strong-form tests of RPE on the
subsample of RPE disclosures to verify the robustness of our results. Strong-form tests
of RPE examine whether all the noise that can be removed is indeed filtered out from
the compensation contracts. Details on the construction of systematic and unsystematic
21For more details see Panel B of Table A1 in A.1.4.
22Untabulated results for the non-disclosing subsample support this reasoning. On their own, non-
disclosing banks do not seem to make use of RPE.
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firm performances and the employed empirical model are reported in Section 2.2.2. In a
nutshell, the results are consistent with RPE if only the unsystematic performance exerts
influence on CEO pay, and not the systematic one.
Panel C of Table 2.4 documents the regression results from equation (2.4) for the
subsample of disclosing banks. Here we regress the logarithm of CEO compensation on
unsystematic firm performance, systematic firm performance, and control variables for
156 firm-year observations over the time span 2004-2013. In that specification we rely
on industry/size groups for constructing the systematic performance variable. The sys-
tematic component is insignificant with a coefficient estimate of 0.14 (p-value = 0.47).
The unsystematic performance variable, however, is positive and statistically significant
with a coefficient of 0.68 (p-value = 0.00). This suggests that the CEOs in our subsample
are being compensated for unsystematic performance only.23 These results provide evi-
dence in accord with the use of strong-form RPE and reinforce the previous finding that
CEOs are not being compensated for systematic performance in the subsample of RPE
disclosures.
2.5 What drives RPE in the banking industry?
Prior studies have put forth a variety of factors that influence the usage of RPE in compen-
sation contracts (Carter et al. 2009, Gong et al. 2011, Albuquerque 2014). These studies
focus on RPE usage in U.K. or U.S. firms. They do not, however, examine the influence
of one factor at a time on the usage of RPE while controlling for other factors. Gong
et al. (2011) investigate explicit disclosures on RPE in the U.S. to identify the factors that
prompt the use of RPE in compensation contracts in 2006. Carter et al. (2009) examine
the use of RPE in performance-vested equity grants in a sample of U.K. firms in 2002.
This section addresses this gap and examines international firms over a longer time span.
Understanding what drives RPE is instructive for its potential effect on RPE testing.
In order to pinpoint possible RPE drivers we conduct a logit regression. The de-
pendent variable yit is an indicator variable that equals 1 for banks that disclose in-
formation on the use of a peer group in determining the level of executive compen-
sation in their proxy statements, and 0 otherwise (see Section 2.3.1). The indepen-
dent variables include CEO pay (Compit), firm performance (FirmPerf it), various spec-
ifications of peer return (PeerPerf it), and control variables. We control for firm size
(FirmSizeit) and growth options (GrowthOptionsit) and include year (YearDummyit), in-
dustry (IndustryDummyit), and country (CountryDummyit) dummies to control for cross-
sectional variation. Sales are used as a proxy for the firm size. Growth options are calcu-
lated as follows: (Market Equity + Total Assets − Common Equity)/Total Assets.
We estimate our logit model based on the following latent variable model:
yit = γ0 + γ1 · Compit + γ2 · FirmPerf it + γ3 · PeerPerf it + γ4 · FirmSizeit
+ γ5 · GrowthOptionsit + γ7 · YearDummyit + γ8 · IndustryDummyit
+ γ9 · CountryDummyit + it.
(2.5)
23These results are again robust. See Panel C of Table A1 in A.1.5.
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In order to estimate equation (2.5), we use the full sample of 318 firm-year observa-
tions from 2004-2013. Table 2.5 reports the results. We find that the likelihood of using
RPE is positively related to firm size and negatively related to growth options for indus-
try and industry/size peers.24 In other words, the probability that a bank will use RPE is
increasing with firm size. The opposite holds for growth options. None of the other pre-
dictors are statistically significant, suggesting that size and growth options are the main
drivers of RPE in our sample.25
[Insert Table 2.5 about here]
These results are in line with existing evidence. Gong et al. (2011) find that larger
firms are more likely to use RPE. Firm size could represent a crude proxy for public
scrutiny and shareholder concerns about compensation practices. Large firms are also
more exposed to monitoring pressure in comparison to smaller ones. This might well
force them to be more committed to RPE (Bannister and Newman 2003). Albuquerque
(2014) and Gong et al. (2011) find that the level of RPE in CEO compensation contracts
is negatively associated with a firm’s level of growth options. Carter et al. (2009) examine
the disclosure of performance-based conditions in equity grants and document that growth
options are inversely related to the performance-based conditions. Albuquerque (2014)
argues that high growth options firms have to bear more risks and thus exhibit a higher
idiosyncratic variance. These firms are also characterized by firm-specific know-how and
operate in markets with high barriers to entry. As a consequence, these characteristics
make peer performance non-informative with respect to capturing external shocks, lead-
ing to the less usage of RPE among high growth options firms (Albuquerque 2014).
2.6 Conclusion
This papers tests the presence of RPE in a novel sample of 42 international non-U.S.
banks from 2004 to 2013. To that end, we regress the logarithm of total compensation
on firm performance, industry and industry/size peer performance, and control variables
such as firm size and growth options. We control for unobservable variation in the level of
compensation across years, industries, and countries. When we account for peer groups,
with peer selection based on industry and firm size, we find moderate evidence for the use
of RPE in international banking. This evidence becomes stronger and more robust once
we focus on banks who openly disclose the use of peers in their renumeration practice.
This insight contrasts and complements previous findings for the U.S.
These overarching findings suggest four things. First, large international banks seem
to entertain the use of RPE in assessing the performance of their CEOs. This holds even
24Strictly speaking we do not examine the likelihood of using RPE but the more encompassing likelihood
of disclosing peer groups. This translates into a conservative estimation. Because peer group usage is only
a necessary condition for RPE, our findings are reflecting a lower likelihood bound of using RPE.
25The regression results based on our self-created Kernel-based peer group specifications are presented
in Table A3 in A.1.6 and are similar to the results in this section. This approach is depicted in detail in
Chapter 3.
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more likely for peer group disclosing banks. The latter implies the second point: Dis-
closure statements seem to have some merit, at least in our sample, and credibly reflect
good corporate practice on that score. Boasting firms do not seem to limit themselves
to preaching water; they likely drink it, too. Third, in our sample empirical evidence on
RPE runs the risk of diluting in undifferentiated data. It is worthwhile, if nothing else for
robustness, to stratify by disclosure. Finally, in line with previous studies our evidence in-
dicates that industry/size peers are better able to capture exogenous shocks than industry
peers alone.
In order to identify possible drivers of RPE in international banking, we employ a logit
regression model. The evidence supports the working theory that growth options and firm
size play a crucial role in banks’ decisions to use RPE. Our results are robust to different
model specifications and dovetail with existing evidence. We find that the likelihood
of RPE usage is decreasing with growth options. The implementation of RPE in high
growth option banks might be too costly due to difficulties in identifying the correct peer
group, rendering such banks less likely to use RPE. We also find that larger banks are
more inclined to use RPE in their compensation contracts. This is hardly surprising.
In light of the recent financial crisis, high levels of CEO compensation have attracted a
lot of attention and large banks in particular have been under significant monitoring and
shareholder pressure. In response to such pressure, large banks are more likely to have
become incentivized to be committed to RPE use in determining the level of CEO pay.
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Table 2.1: Sample frequency by year, SIC level, and country
Panel A: Sample frequency by year
Full Sample RPE Subsample Non-RPE Subsample
Year Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
2004 14 4.40 7 2.20 7 2.20
2005 22 6.92 10 3.14 12 3.77
2006 26 8.18 14 4.40 12 3.77
2007 32 10.06 17 5.35 15 4.72
2008 33 10.38 17 5.35 16 5.03
2009 38 11.95 17 5.35 21 6.60
2010 40 12.58 17 5.35 23 7.23
2011 42 13.21 20 6.29 22 6.92
2012 41 12.89 20 6.29 21 6.60
2013 30 9.43 17 5.35 13 4.09
Panel B: Sample frequency by SIC level
Full Sample RPE Subsample Non-RPE Subsample
SIC Level Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
6021 21 6.60 5 1.57 16 5.03
6022 8 2.52 8 2.52 0 0.00
6029 272 85.53 133 41.82 139 43.71
6035 10 3.14 3 0.94 7 2.20
6211 7 2.20 7 2.20 0 0.00
Panel C: Sample frequency by country
Full Sample RPE Subsample Non-RPE Subsample
Country Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Australia 30 9.43 30 9.43 0 0.00
Canada 52 16.35 45 14.15 7 2.20
China 16 5.03 0 0.00 16 5.03
France 24 7.55 10 3.14 14 4.40
Germany 19 5.97 19 5.97 0 0.00
Hong Kong 9 2.83 0 0.00 9 2.83
Malaysia 19 5.97 2 0.63 17 5.35
Norway 10 3.14 0 0.00 10 3.14
Singapore 30 9.43 2 0.63 28 8.81
South Africa 14 4.40 6 1.89 8 2.52
Spain 20 6.29 5 1.57 15 4.72
Sweden 33 10.38 17 5.35 16 5.03
Switzerland 13 4.09 7 2.20 6 1.89
United Kingdom 29 9.12 13 4.09 16 5.03
Note: Panel A shows the sample frequency by year for the full sample, for the sample of RPE disclosing
banks (RPE subsample), and for the subsample of non-disclosing banks (non-RPE subsample). We report
the year, the frequency of the sample observation for each year, and the the yearly percentage of the sample.
Panel B shows the sample frequency by SIC level for the full sample, for the sample of RPE disclosing
banks (RPE subsample), and for the sample of non-disclosing banks (non-RPE subsample). We report the
SIC level, the frequency of the sample observation for each SIC level, and the SIC percentage of the sample.
Panel C shows the sample frequency by country for the full sample, for the sample of RPE disclosing banks
(RPE subsample), and for the sample of non-disclosing banks (non-RPE subsample). We report the country,
the frequency of the sample observation for each country, and the country percentage of the overall sample.
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Table 2.2: Pearson correlation coefficients
Firm stock return Industry Peer Return Industry/Size Peer Return Log(Sales) Growth Options Total Compensation
Firm stock return 1.00
Industry Peer Return 0.73* 1.00
Industry/Size Peer Return 0.80* 0.96* 1.00
Log(Sales) −0.19* −0.09 −0.08 1.00
Growth Options 0.42* 0.29* 0.28* −0.48* 1.00
Total Compensation 0.15* 0.12 0.11 0.33* 0.04 1.00
Note: This table shows Pearson product moment correlation coefficients between total compensation, per-
formance measures and control variables. The sample consists of 318 observations covering the time period
2004-2013. A star indicates significance at the 1% level.
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean St.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Total Compensation 318 5.44 4.07 0.24 2.05 4.31 8.41 20.40
Log(Total Compensation) 318 8.25 0.93 5.46 7.62 8.37 9.04 9.92
Firm stock return 318 0.06 0.43 -1.59 -0.06 0.14 0.29 1.24
Peer return (Industry) 318 0.09 0.26 -0.72 -0.12 0.15 0.25 0.86
Peer return (Industry/Size) 318 0.08 0.31 -0.83 -0.07 0.16 0.27 0.53
Firm size (Sales) 318 30240 33396 1011 7450 19225 49384 142752
Firm size (log(Sales)) 318 16.76 1.12 13.83 15.82 16.77 17.72 18.78
Growth options 318 1.04 0.04 0.96 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.19
Firm Stock Return Variance 318 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.19 1.09
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics of the compensation data, firm performance measures, and
control variables. Specifically, we document firm stock return and peer return. Summary statistics for peer
groups are based on an industry affiliation and an industry/size quartiles approach. We report the num-
ber of firm observations (N), mean (Mean), minimum (Min), standard deviation (St.Dev.), 25th Percentile
(Q1), median (Median), 75th Percentile (Q3), and maximum (Max) for the time span 2004-2013. Total
Compensation and Sales are in million USD.
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Table 2.4: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Panel A: Weak-Form RPE Tests Panel B: Weak-Form RPE Tests Panel C: Strong-Form RPE Tests
– Full Sample – Disclosure Subsample – Disclosure Subsample
Independent Variables Industry Peer Group Industry/Size Peer Group Industry Peer Group Industry/Size Peer Group Industry/Size Peer Group
Intercept 3.18* 3.22* -3.37 -2.78 -2.81
(0.08) (0.08) (0.34) (0.42) (0.42)
Firm stock return 0.47*** 0.56*** 0.49** 0.68***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Peer return(Industry) -0.06 -0.30
(0.78) (0.40)
Peer return (Industry/Size) -0.31* -0.64**
(0.09) (0.03)
Unsystematic Firm Perf 0.68***
(0.00)
Systematic Firm Perf 0.14
(0.47)
Firm size (sales) 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.70*** 0.68*** 0.68***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth options -0.59 -0.61 0.17 -0.03 -0.03
(0.65) (0.64) (0.95) (0.99) (0.99)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 76.31% 76.53% 63.47% 64.64% 64.64%
Number of observations 318 318 156 156 156
Note: Panel A and B show OLS regression results for the equation Compit = α0 + α1 · FirmPer fit + α2 · PeerPer fit + α3 · Cit + it. The first and third column
show the results from regressing log of total CEO compensation on stock return, peer performance composed of the firms within the same industry, and control
variables. The second and fourth column document regression results based on the industry/size quartiles peer group approach by Albuquerque (2009). Panel A
shows the results for the full sample, and Panel B reports the results for the disclosure subsample. Panel C documents OLS regression results for the equation
Compit = δ0 + δ1 · UnsysFirmPer f ormanceit + δ2 · S ystFirmPer f ormanceit + δ3 · Cit + it on the subsample of disclosing banks. We regress logarithm of CEO
compensation on the unsystematic firm performance, systematic firm performance, and control variables for 156 firm-year observations over the time span 2004-
2013. We use industry/size peer group specification in order to construct a systematic performance variable. All regressions include year, industry, and country
dummies. For more details on systematic and unsystematic variable construction see Section 2.2.2. Significance levels are two-sided and denoted as follows: 1%
(∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗). The corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
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Table 2.5: Logit regression of RPE use in executive compensation contracts
Independent Variables Industry Peer Group Industry/Size Peer Group
Intercept -25.52 -26.08
(0.13) (0.12)
Compensation 0.47 0.46
(0.38) (0.38)
Firm Perf 0.00 -0.27
(0.99) (0.75)
Peer return(Industry) 0.10
(0.95)
Peer return (Industry/Size) 0.89
(0.53)
Firm size (sales) 2.71*** 2.69***
(0.00) (0.00)
Growth options -19.66* -19.39*
(0.09) (0.10)
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
Country dummies yes yes
R2 51.71% 51.79%
Number of observations 318 318
Note: Table documents logit regression results for the equation yit = γ0 + γ1 · Compit + γ2 · FirmPer fit +
γ3 ·PeerPer fit +γ4 ·Cit + it. The dependent variable is RPE, an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the
firm discloses the use of peer group in the compensation contracts. We regress RPE on firm performance,
peer returns, firm size, and growth options for 318 firm-year observations over the time span 2004-2013.
We also include year, country, and industry dummies in the regression estimation for two specifications,
industry and industry/size peers. We report the Cox and Snell’s R2. Significance levels are denoted as
follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗). The corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses below
each coefficient estimate.
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Chapter 3
Relative Performance Evaluation, Firm
Size and Stock Returns – An empirical
study
Chapter Overview
We study the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in executive compensation
contracts for a large sample of U.S. firms. We take into consideration various specifica-
tions of peer groups: industry, industry/size peer group, and a novel Kernel-based peer
group and test which one of them is better able to capture exogenous shocks in RPE
tests. The Kernel-based approach adopts firm size as a criterion for building individu-
ally specified peer groups. We report negative and statistically significant coefficients on
industry/size and Kernel-based peers, which is consistent with the RPE hypothesis. How-
ever, the coefficients for the Kernel-based peers are more negative in comparison to the
industry/size peers, suggesting that this method might be better able to remove noise from
executive compensation contracts. The Kernel-based approach is robust across different
specifications of peer weights. In addition, we construct a predicted excess executive
compensation variable that arises from the use of firm and peer performance. The pre-
dicted excess compensation variable is meant to capture the RPE use in executive pay.
We then investigate the association between the RPE use proxied by the predicted excess
compensation variable, and firm performance. We find no such evidence.
Chapter 3. Relative Performance Evaluation, Firm Size and Stock Returns – An
empirical study
3.1 Introduction
The theory of relative performance evaluation (RPE) suggests that tying executive pay
to peer performance removes exogenous shocks from the observed performance of the
manager, offering a better evaluation of his effort. Consequently, the unsystematic shocks
are only attributed to the manager. In this manner, the compensation scheme is structured
such that the manager gets paid for his own contribution to the firm’s value. This theo-
retical prediction of RPE has been widely investigated empirically. However, the results
of these studies are mixed and inconclusive. For example, Gibbons and Murphy (1990),
Albuquerque (2009) and Black et al. (2015) provide evidence consistent with the RPE
hypothesis. In contrast, Janakiraman et al. (1992), Antle and Smith (1986), Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999b), Barro and Barro (1990), Jensen and Murphy (1990) fail to find RPE in
executive compensation contracts or their results are inconclusive.1
The potential reasons for such inconclusive results might stem from several factors.2
For example, biased peer groups might be one of the reasons for such results (Bannister
and Newman 2003, Albuquerque 2009, Black et al. 2015, Gong et al. 2011, Lewellen
2015). In particular, industry and market indices are the most frequently used peer groups
in conducting tests of RPE. This might not always represent an optimal benchmark for
capturing systematic risk, especially in "significantly heterogeneous industries" (Albu-
querque 2009, p.70). Murphy (2001) notes that an appropriate choice of peers is an im-
portant determinant of the effectiveness of the compensation contract. This strongly holds
when the pay-setting process could be influenced by the executive compensation plan par-
ticipants (Murphy 2001). In addition, different studies tend to use different measures of
firm performance which plays a role when testing RPE in executive compensation con-
tracts. For example, Albuquerque (2009) does not find empirical support for RPE when
using accounting returns as a proxy for firm performance. On the other hand, she finds
strong evidence consistent with RPE when using stock market returns for similar indus-
try/size peers. Furthermore, failure to account for all the necessary control variables might
lead to a misspecified empirical model and eventually to misleading results. Moreover,
Cordeiro et al. (2014) investigate inter-industry differences of RPE usage and find that the
use of RPE at the industry level is significantly associated with industry discretion and
industry homogeneity. This might also influence inferences about RPE.
In this chapter we follow the branch of academic literature which argues that the
reason for such inconclusive findings regarding RPE might be due to misspecified peer
groups.3 The ideal peer group should – to the greatest extent – capture systematic risk
and share many of the firm’s characteristics such as diversification, financial constraints,
operating leverage, industry, and size (Albuquerque 2009). Most of the studies testing
RPE use very broad peer groups, which are typically not able to subsume all the men-
tioned characteristics (Albuquerque 2009). There is a good reason to believe that firm
size on its own is a good proxy for systematic risk and a variable that captures many of
1The extensive overview of the main results of the studies investigating RPE in executive pay is pre-
sented in Chapter 1.
2Chapter 1 reviews these factors in more detail.
3For example, see Albuquerque (2009), Gong et al. (2011), Lewellen (2015) and Jayaraman et al.
(2015).
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the firms’ properties. It should be therefore taken into consideration when constructing
peers.4 Against this background we build peer groups by adopting a similar approach im-
plemented in Albuquerque (2009) and conduct implicit RPE tests. However, we believe
that there is room for improvement in Albuquerque’s approach, and adopt a more refined
peer group method – a Kernel-based approach. This method is more adjustable in terms of
firm size. Instead of fixed-size peer groups, each firm in the sample is assigned a unique,
individual peer group based on the target firm’s size.
In this study we conduct the implicit RPE tests as solely relying on explicit disclosures
of RPE may undervalue the prevalence of RPE in practice (Black et al. 2015, Dikolli et al.
2013). Moreover, the study by Faulkender and Yang (2013) indicates that U.S. firms do
not compose less-biased peer groups after the introduction of new, stricter disclosure rules
in 2006. Namely, in 2006 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted
changes to the disclosure rules regarding executive compensation. Under the new reg-
ulation a company should disclose more details on the executive pay design and how
executive pay is related to the corporate performance. This includes information on the
peer groups used in managerial performance benchmarking. Contrary to the expectations,
firms seem to be more inclined to choose peer companies with higher CEO pay after the
rule had been passed (Faulkender and Yang 2013). These findings bring into question
whether the new disclosure rules indeed resolved the problems in the compensation struc-
ture, or it rather magnified them. Taking this into consideration, implicit RPE tests matter.
We aggregate peer performance by using the industry and industry/size approaches
and juxtapose them to our novel Kernel-based peer group approach in RPE tests. We
test the relative performance evaluation hypothesis on a sample of 2806 U.S. firms from
1992-2011. It turns out that the parameter estimates for the Kernel-based peers and the
industry/size peers are negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with RPE
use in CEO compensation. There are differences in explanatory power, however. The
peer coefficients on the Kernel-based peers are more negative as to the industry/size ap-
proach. This is an indication that the Kernel-based method is better able to filter out
exogenous shocks from the level of CEO pay in comparison to the industry/size method.
Additionally, the Kernel-based approach is robust across different specifications of the
peer weights.
We also examine whether there is an association between firm performance and its
tendency to use RPE. There is a literature which suggests that this might be the case.
For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) argue that well-governed firms are better
able to remove the "lucky" component from executive pay. This would imply that firms
with stronger corporate governance are possibly more prone to RPE use in compensation
contracts. Several other studies indicate that firms with good governance practice enjoy
higher returns (Gompers et al. 2003, Core et al. 1999, Brown and Caylor 2004). Taking
this into account, investigating whether the use of RPE in CEO-pay setting process is
related to the firm performance represents an interesting consideration. In order to ex-
amine this question we adapt a methodology used in Core et al. (1999) for our purposes
and build a variable labeled "predicted excess compensation" which arises from the RPE
4For more details on the relevance of the firm size as a proxy for the systematic risk, see Fama and
French (1992), Core and Guay (2002) and Albuquerque (2009) and Jensen and Murphy (1990).
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use.5 The "predicted excess compensation" variable serves as a criterion for constructing
portfolio returns for our analysis. More precisely, we sort firm stock returns by "predicted
excess compensation" variable and divide them in 10 groups. We compute yearly value-
weighted portfolios for each group in our sample. We then calculate the average value
of the portfolio returns for each group over 1992-2011 and report t-statistics. Moreover,
we employ the Carhart four-factor model in order to calculate the excess returns of the
value-weighted portfolios. Our evidence suggests that there is no apparent association be-
tween the firm performance and RPE use, proxied by the "predicted excess compensation"
variable.
This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion with respect to RPE along four di-
mensions. First, we develop a new method for individual peer group specification by
introducing a Kernel based approach. This approach seems to be better able to filter ex-
ogenous shocks from the compensation contract than the traditional industry/size method.
Second, we test for the presence of RPE by constructing peers based on the industry ap-
proach, the industry/size quartiles approach, and the novel Kernel-based approach. Our
results are consistent with the use of RPE in CEO compensation. This adds to the lit-
erature that examines executive compensation and, in particular, tests RPE in executive
compensation contracts. Third, our study substantiates the finding that firm size represents
an important consideration in aggregating a peer group. This observation complements
previous studies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the the-
oretical background of RPE (Subsection 3.2.1) and discusses several methods of peer
group composition (Subsection 3.2.2). In particular, Subsection 3.2.2 describes a novel
Kernel-based peer group approach. Subsection 3.2.3 introduces an empirical model that
is used for performing RPE tests. Section 3.2.4 describes the dataset which is used for
the empirical analysis. Section 3.2.5 reports summary statistics and regression results. In
Section 3.3 the portfolio analysis is conducted. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Relative Performance Evaluation
3.2.1 Theory of Relative Performance Evaluation
This section summarizes the theoretical foundation of relative performance evaluation
(RPE). In a first step, we outline the principal-agent framework that underlies the relation
between executive compensation and the performance of the firms they manage.6 We
then briefly discuss the seminal theoretical works of Holmstrom (1979, 1982) as well
as the essay of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) on contracting, which has had useful
applications in the RPE literature.
Holmstrom (1979) analyzes the principal-agent problem in a theoretical framework.
In his setting only the noisy outcome of an agent’s action is observable, so optimal con-
5Subsection 3.3.1 thoroughly depicts the methodological approach.
6For more information on the basic moral hazard problem and its applications to wage contracts see
Salanie (2005). Furthermore, Gibbons and Roberts (2013) provide an overview of the theoretical models
on agency contracts.
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tracts are bound to be second-best because of moral hazard. To ameliorate the effect
of negative incentives, a principal can use other available information about the agent’s
action or other agents’ state of nature. Holmstrom (1982) refines his earlier results and
shows that an ”agent’s sharing rules can, without loss in welfare, be written on a statistic
of all observations if and only if this statistic is sufficient in the sense of statistical deci-
sion theory" (Holmstrom 1982, p.325). One application can be found in the use of relative
performance evaluation in incentive contracts. Holmstrom concludes that ”relative per-
formance evaluation will be valuable if one agent’s output provides information about
another agent’s state uncertainty. Such will be the case if and only if agents face some
common uncertainties” (Holmstrom 1982, p.325). He goes on to show that compensation
schemes that compare the agent’s performance with aggregate measures such as peer av-
erages are more efficient since they provide more information on common uncertainties.
Following Holmstrom (1979), Holmstrom (1982), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987),
and Gibbons and Murphy (1990), we now present a simple model of relative performance
evaluation. Assume that y denotes a measurable output, a represents an effort of the
agent, and  is observational noise with zero mean. Let output be directly linked to effort
as follows:
y = a +  (3.1)
If output is the only observable variable, the principal will make the agent’s wage contin-
gent on it, so w(y). The principal observes outcome y, pays wage w(y) to the agent, and
keeps the surplus y−w(y) for himself. Holmstrom (1979) assumes that the agent receives
the wage contingent on one additional variable, z. This makes the agent’s wage a function
of two variables, so we denote the wage with w(y, z). z is a noisy but informative signal. It
provides additional information for evaluating the agent’s unobservable effort. In practice
this signal can be a market index or an output of some other agents.
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) assume that y and z are jointly normally distributed.
Furthermore, they assume that the expected value of the new information is zero (E[z] =
0), the variance of the new signal is Var[z] = σ2z , the variance of the output Var[y] = σ
2
y ,
the correlation of z and y is Cor(z, y) = ρ and the covariance between the output and the
informative signal is therefore Cov(z, y) = ρσz σy. Finally,  denotes an error term. In
this model, the optimal sharing rule is linear in y and z:7
s(y, z) = α1 · y + α2 · z +  (3.2)
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) calculate the regression coefficients as well as the
action and profit level and observe that the additional signal z is equivalent to a reduction
in the variance of y.8 Equation (3.2) represents a simple model of relative performance
evaluation, a model that has been widely used in empirical papers to test the presence of
RPE. Holmstrom (1982) suggests that the necessary information regarding the common
uncertainty can be captured by an aggregate measure such as the weighted average of
peer performance. RPE is thus an application of the informativeness principle: Tying the
7The optimal sharing rule in this context represents the wage of an agent.
8The reduced variance is the conditional variance of y given z (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987).
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income of an agent relative to his peer group filters out exogenous sources of randomness
from the agent’s compensation. The main advantage of relative performance evaluation is
that it provides the same incentives as compensation based on absolute performance while
isolating the agent’s performance from exogenous sources of randomness that influence
the observed performance.
3.2.2 Peer Group Composition
In this subsection we discuss the peer group aggregation methods we employ in the
upcoming analysis. Subsection 3.2.2.1 describes the industry/size quartiles approach,
whereas Subsection 3.2.2.2 points to some issues within the industry/size approach and
proposes a novel Kernel-based approach. This method is similar to the one adopted in
Albuquerque (2009), but more rigorous in the selection of the relevant peer group.
3.2.2.1 Industry/Size Peers
RPE companies assess their CEOs’ compensation levels based on performance in relation
to their respective peers. These peers are not simply a random draw of the market. RPE
companies follow a specific methodology in selecting their peers. Most studies accessing
RPE use broad industry or market indices as a comparison group for peer performance.
This is not without problems. Firms within an industry are hardly homogenous in their
characteristics, so simple benchmarks are not able to adequately capture common shocks
(Albuquerque 2009).9 This introduces a bias in the statistical estimation and can distort
inferences. An inappropriate comparison group can lead to a higher (or lower) recom-
mended level of CEO pay, skewing the desired incentives for CEOs. An expedient and
replicable comparison group based on a reasonable and objective criterion is therefore the
key element when empirically testing for RPE.
Albuquerque (2009) provides a pragmatical solution for the composition of peer
groups. She constructs groups based on both the two-digit Standard Industrial Classi-
fication System (SIC) level and firm size. The first step in the construction sorts firms
by beginning-of-year market value into size quartiles within an industry. This yields four
peer groups per industry. Each firm is then matched with its quartile group. It turns
out that this approach yields stronger empirical support for the use of RPE in executive
compensation than sorting by industry classification alone, an improvement that is due
to the information that firm size captures. Firms of similar size turn out to be also simi-
lar along several other characteristics that proxy for systematic risk. Albuquerque shows
how the levels of diversification, financing constraints, and operating leverage vary with
industry/size ranked portfolios and provides evidence that firm size subsumes these char-
acteristics. She finds that larger firms tend to be more diversified, have greater operating
leverage, and smaller financing constraints. This claim is supported by other literature.
9Jensen and Murphy (1990) aggregate peer performance based on the two-digit SIC level or a market
index, Janakiraman et al. (1992) match their peers on the same two-digit SIC industry level. Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999a) use two-, three-, and four-digit SIC levels in order to compose a peer group, and
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) choose peers in the same two-, three- and four-digit SIC level industry or
a market index.
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Demsetz and Strahan (1997), for example, construct a measure of diversification of bank
holding companies. Their results establish a strong, positive effect of bank size on the
diversification of these firms. Moreover, they report that small firms tend to face bigger
financial constraints in comparison to large ones.
In line with Albuquerque we do not argue that firm size fully captures systematic risk.
However, it is a proxy with high explanatory power for the common uncertainty which
Holmstrom (1982) insinuated.
3.2.2.2 Kernel-Based Peer Group Construction
This section points to some issues within the industry/size approach and introduces a
novel Kernel-based approach. This novel method extends Albuquerque (2009) with a
more rigorous peer group selection.
To highlight the main caveat of the industry/size quartile approach implemented in
Albuquerque (2009) consider the following situation. The approach partitions and ranks
all firms into four size groups (per industry). The first group contains the 25% firms
with the smallest firm size, and the fourth group contains those 25% of the firms with the
biggest size. The boundaries between the four groups, the so-called breakpoints, lie on
25%, 50%, and 75% of the ranked values of firm size. Let us assume that we want to
test the RPE hypothesis in a target company that is very close to the breakpoint between
the first and the second quartile, but which just happens to fall into the first one. In this
particular case it is not readily obvious why the first peer group, and not the second one,
should be assigned to the target firm, which lies so close to the breakpoint.
Our method of peer group aggregation addresses this issue. Every target firm is as-
signed a unique peer group that corresponds to the size of that target firm. We achieve
this by implementing a Kernel-based weighting scheme. Put simply, firms that are closer
to the target firm in terms of firm size receive a higher weight in that firm’s peer group.
We differentiate between the size of a chosen target firm and other firms in the sample.
A specific weighting function assigns a higher weight to a peer firm if it exhibits a smaller
distance to the target firm in terms of firm size.
We measure the differences of the firm sizes in the following manner:
Di = SizeT − Sizei where i = 1, ...,N (3.3)
SizeT denotes the size of the target company measured in terms of firm sales, and Sizei is
a proxy for the size of all other firms. We standardize the ”distances” by dividing them
with the cross-sectional standard deviation, s(Di):
D∗i =
Di
s(Di)
where i = 1, ...,N (3.4)
From these standardized distances, we construct weights using a kernel weighting func-
tion.10 The firm i in the sample of N firms will be assigned the weight
wi = K(D∗i ) (3.5)
10For the graphical representation of the different types of kernel functions see Figure B.1 in Appendix B.
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Additionally, we create weights by multiplying the standardized difference with the fol-
lowing scaling factor (SF):
SFi = Median
(
s(Sizei)
s(SizeT )
)
· 2 (3.6)
D∗∗i = D
∗
i · SFi (3.7)
wi = K(D∗∗i ) (3.8)
For robustness we use three types of kernel functions: 1. The probability density function
(pdf) of the Standard Normal Distribution, 2. the pdf of the Uniform Distribution, and 3.
the pdf of the ”Cosine Distribution”.11 In addition, we standardize each weight with the
sum of all weights. This amounts to the following peer performance weight:
wi∗ =
wi∑N
j=1 w j
(3.9)
So that,
N∑
i=1
wi∗ = 1 (3.10)
Finally, we use the performance weights and individual firm performance Perfi in order
to construct each target firm’s peer group as follows:
Peer Perf =
N∑
i=1
w∗i · Perfi where i = 1, ...,N (3.11)
In contrast to Albuquerque’s industry/size quartile approach that generates fixed-size peer
groups, we thus allow for individual peer groups that correspond more closely to the
target firm in terms of firm size. We argue that this approach is more in keeping with the
theoretical models, which are built on the assumption of common uncertainties.
3.2.3 Empirical Model
We employ a model that is based on Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). Specifically, we
use the following weak-form test of RPE:12
Compit = α0 + α1 · FirmPerf it + α2 · PeerPerf it + α3 ·Cit + it (3.12)
Compit measures executive compensation in monetary terms, FirmPerf it stands for
the performance of firm i as measured by the continuously compounded gross real rate
11There is no Cosine Distribution to our knowledge, but if there was one this would be its probability
density function.
12Originally, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) defined RPE as α2
α1
. They test H0 : α2α1 ≥ 0 against the
alternative H1 : α2α1 < 0. Since α1 is expected to be positive, most of the literature that uses the model
proposed by Holmstrom and Milgrom test whether α2 < 0. We follow their approach.
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of return to shareholders (assuming that dividends are reinvested), and PeerPerf it denotes
the performance of firm i′s peer group. In what follows, we use a industry, industry/size
peer group, and a novel Kernel-based approach. In order to account for variation not
included in the firm’s and the peer groups’ performances we control for several control
variables, subsumed in the control variable column vector Cit, which are explained in
detail in data section. In addition, we include time, industry, and CEO dummies. The
subscript t denotes the respective year and it represents an independent firm specific
white noise process. Furthermore, α0, α1, α2 and α3 denote model parameters.13
In this model, rejecting the null hypothesis H0 : α2 ≥ 0 against the one-sided alterna-
tive H1 : α2 < 0 provides evidence of RPE in executive compensation contracts. In that
case, exogenous shocks outside of the control of the executive management are filtered
out of the compensation contract.
The first step in conducting the so-called strong-form test is to regress firm perfor-
mance on peer performance.14 For this purpose, we employ a battery of peer performance
aggregation methods. The first step regression model is:
FirmPerformanceit = γi + βi · PeerPerformanceit + it (3.13)
The unsystematic and systematic performance are obtained from the equation above
in the following manner:
UnsysFirmPerformanceit = ̂it,
SysFirmPerformanceit = γ̂i + β̂i · PeerPerformanceit.
(3.14)
Note that ̂it denote regression residuals and γ̂i, β̂i parameter estimates.
Because the goal is to differentiate between systematic and unsystematic firm perfor-
mance, we intentionally do not account for control variables in this step. The second
step estimates the sensitivity of CEO compensation with respect to the unsystematic and
systematic components of firm performance, that is:
Compit = δ0+δ1 ·UnsysFirmPerformanceit+δ2 ·SystFirmPerformanceit+δ3 ·Cit+it (3.15)
If the systematic risk is filtered out of the compensation contract, the systematic per-
formance δ2 in equation (3.15) should not be significantly different from zero. In that
equation Cit denotes a column vector of control variables and the row vector δ3 its coeffi-
cients.
3.2.4 Data
This section describes the data preparation process in creating our sample for the regres-
sion analysis in the next step. We collect data from several sources. Compensation data
comes from Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database. Financial data are collected from
Compustat, and stock return data are obtained from the Center for Research in Security
13α3 is a raw vector.
14For more details on strong-form RPE tests see Antle and Smith (1986).
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Price (CRSP). Our initial sample consists of 31479 firm-CEO-year observations for the
time span 1992-2011. We exclude observations with missing or negative values for sales,
market value, common equity or total compensation and observations for which the CEO
was employed less than a year. We also remove observations for which there was more
than one CEO per year and company. Finally, we exclude performance and governance
variables with missing values. In the end, our final sample for regression analysis consists
of 25845 firm-CEO-year observations for 2806 U.S. firms.
Table 3.1 shows the sample frequency for each year. Most of the data are equally
distributed over the years 1992-2011, though the frequency of the data tends to be smaller
in 1992 and 1993.
[Insert Table 3.1 about here]
As a executive compensation proxy (Compit) we use total annual flow compensa-
tion in real terms. We use the natural logarithm of the real total annual compensa-
tion flow in the regression analysis, in order to alleviate heteroskedasticity, which can
be a consequence of extreme skewness. This also enables a comparison with previous
studies (Murphy 1999, Albuquerque 2009).15 As a proxy for performance measures
(FirmPerfit) we use firm stock returns.
16 We construct peer performance (PeerPerfit)
by applying the industry, the industry/size (Albuquerque 2009), and the novel Kernel-
based methods. These approaches are detailed in Section 3.2.2. Following Albuquerque
(2009), in addition to firm stock return and peer return we use several control vari-
ables in the estimation process: firm size, growth options, CEO tenure, firm-specific
stock return variance, regulation dummy, and several measures of corporate governance.
Analogously with Albuquerque (2009, p.88), the regulation dummy is equal to one for
the companies that belong to gas and electric industries with SIC codes from 4900 to
4939 (Albuquerque 2009, p.88). In addition, growth options are calculated as follows:
(Market Equity + Total Assets−Common Equity)/Total Assets. In the regression analysis,
we use the natural logarithm of sales as a proxy for firm size. This is common practice
in the academic literature. Following Core and Guay (1999) we also use the natural loga-
rithm of tenure in the regression analysis. Similar to Albuquerque (2009, p.88) we include
three measures of corporate governance: a CEO chair dummy, a CEO ownership dummy,
and an interlock dummy.17 The first dummy takes a value of one if the CEO is a chair-
man and zero otherwise (Albuquerque 2009, p.88). The second one is equal to one if the
CEO share ownership is lower than the median for the years across CEOs in the dataset
(Albuquerque 2009, p.88). Finally, the third dummy takes a value of one if the manager
is involved in interlock relationship (Albuquerque 2009, p.88).18 Year and industry dum-
15Total annual compensation flow is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation,
long-term incentive payouts, restricted stocks granted during the year, the values of stocks granted and all
other compensation.
16Firm stock return is measured as the continuously compounded gross real shareholder rate of return
assuming that dividends are reinvested.
17The construction of these variables is adopted from Albuquerque (2009).
18Interlock relationship refers to the situation when a CEO serves on the board that is making decisions
about his compensation or if he is on the board of a company whose CEO is involved in decisions about the
CEO’s in question pay package.
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mies are also included in order to control for year-and industry-specific differences in the
level of compensation. Furthermore we control for CEO dummies. This accounts for
differences in executive compensation emerging from some unobservable CEO features
(Albuquerque 2009, p.78).
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for our sample. The average (median) CEO total
compensation is USD 3.45 million (USD 1.85 million). The total compensation is skewed
as the mean of the total compensation is higher than the median. The average (Median)
firm stock return is -2.0 % (8.0%). The averages (medians) of peer returns range from
-6.0% (2.0%) to 1.0% (2.0 %) depending on the specification. The sales figures of the
average firm amount to USD 3.9 million.
[Insert Table 3.2 about here]
In Table 3.3 we regress firm stock performance on the peer group performance and
document a slope coefficient ρ. A higher parameter estimate on peer performance is
an indication that this peer group represents a better tool for filtering exogenous shocks
(Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987). When peer performance is based on industry affiliation
the slope coefficient equals 0.53. When we regress firm stock performance on indus-
try/size peers, the parameter estimate is 0.51. However, the ρ on Kernel-based peers is
around 1.60 suggesting that these peers might be better able to filter exogenous shocks.
[Insert Table 3.3 about here]
3.2.5 Results
In this section we test the use of RPE in CEO pay with equation (3.12). Peer groups
are constructed with the industry, the industry/size, and the novel Kernel-based approach,
respectively. We then regress the logarithm of CEO pay on firm stock return, peer return,
firm size, growth options, CEO tenure, regulation dummy, firm stock return variance,
CEO chair dummy, CEO ownership dummy, and an interlock dummy. We also include
year, industry and CEO dummies. First, we report the results of the sensitivity of CEO
pay to weak-form test of RPE. After that, we document the results of the strong-form RPE
test.
Table 3.4 shows the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to RPE when using indus-
try and industry/size peer groups. The parameter estimates on firm stock performance
are positive and statistically significant for both peer group specifications. Estimates are
0.06 (p-value=0.00) for both specifications, indicating that CEO pay increases in firm
stock performance. When the peer group consists of industry and industry/size peers,
RPE cannot be rejected. The coefficients on both peer groups are negative with a coef-
ficient of -0.07 and statistically significant (p-value=0.00), which is consistent with the
RPE hypothesis and indicates that external shocks are filtered out of the compensation
contract.19
[Insert Table 3.4 about here]
19We always report two-sided p-values.
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Table 3.5 shows regression results with the Kernel-based peers. Firm stock return is
again positive and statistically significant for all three Kernel-based peer groups. The co-
efficient on the peer return is negative and statistically significant. RPE is not rejected
as the coefficient on the peer portfolio is negative and significantly different from zero.
The coefficient on peer return is more negative in comparison to the industry and indus-
try/size peer return indicating that this peer group specification may be better able to filter
common shocks from CEO pay. The coefficients are, however, slightly less significant
than those of the industry and industry/size peers. The parameter estimates are -0.35 (p-
value=0.01) for the normal Kernel function, -0.34 (p-value=0.01) for the cosine Kernel
function and -0.34 (p-value=0.01) for the uniform Kernel function.
[Insert Table 3.5 about here]
When the peer groups are based on the adjusted Kernel-based method (labeled as
"scaled" in the table) the coefficients on peer returns are higher in absolute terms and
statistically significant at 1% level. This suggests that this method might be better able
to filter out shocks unrelated to manager’s performance from the compensation contract.
Table 3.6 reports the main results. Firm stock return is again positive and statistically
significant for all three Kernel-based peer groups. Parameter estimates on Kernel peers
do not differ much across the Kernel-based specifications. They are -0.35 (p-value=0.00)
for the normal Kernel function, -0.35 (p-value=0.00) for the cosine Kernel function and
-0.34 (p-value=0.01) for uniform Kernel function.
[Insert Table 3.6 about here]
Table 3.7 reports the level of CEO pay regression results from simultaneously includ-
ing industry, industry/size, and Kernel-based peer groups. By including all peer group
specification, we intend to test the marginal contribution of each peer group specification
in eliminating common shocks from CEO pay.
The first column documents regression results when we simultaneously include in-
dustry, industry/size, and normal Kernel-based peer group. The industry coefficient is
-0.05 (p-value=0.01) and the Kernel-based peer group coefficient is -0.35 (p-value=0.02).
The parameter estimate on the industry/size peer group is -0.02 (p-value=0.16) and thus
insignificant. The results suggest that the common shocks are eliminated through the in-
dustry and the Kernel-based peer group, but a Kernel-based peer group might be better
in eliminating them since the coefficient on this peer group is more negative. The results
do not differ much across Kernel peer group specifications. The second column docu-
ments the results when we simultaneously include the industry, the industry/size, and the
cosine Kernel peer group. Again, the coefficient on the industry/size peer is insignificant
(p-value=0.16), but the coefficients on the industry peer and the Kernel-based peer are
negative and statistically significant (coefficient of -0.05 and p-value=0.01 and coefficient
of -0.30 p-value=0.02 respectively). The third column reports the same estimation pro-
cess, but here we include the uniform Kernel-based peer groups in addition to the industry
and industry/size peers. The results are qualitatively similar to the first and second col-
umn. Thus, the results indicate that external shocks are filtered out when we use industry
69
Chapter 3. Relative Performance Evaluation, Firm Size and Stock Returns – An
empirical study
and Kernel-based peer group, but the coefficient on the Kernel peers are more negative
suggesting that this approach might be better able to eliminate common shocks.20
[Insert Table 3.7 about here]
Table 3.8 reports yet stronger results in favour of Kernel-based peers.21 It documents
the level of CEO pay regression results from simultaneously including the industry, indus-
try/size, and the adjusted Kernel-based peers. The results in column suggest that common
uncertainties are filtered out of executive compensation only through the Kernel-based
peers and the industry peers. The coefficients on the Kernel-based peers are again not
qualitatively different. They are -0.31 (p-value=0.01) for the normal Kernel-based peer
group, -0.31 (p-value=0.01) for the cosine Kernel peer group, and -0.30 (p.value=0.01)
for the uniform Kernel peer group.
[Insert Table 3.8 about here]
Next we perform the so-called strong-form tests of RPE.22 Strong-form tests of RPE
examine if all the noise that can be removed is filtered out from the compensation con-
tract (Albuquerque 2009). Details on constructing systematic and unsystematic firm per-
formance as well as the empirical model we employ are reported in Section 3.2.3. In a
nutshell, the results are consistent with RPE if only the unsystematic performance exerts
influence on CEO pay, and not the systematic one. In practice, this means that CEO is not
being compensated for systematic performance.
Table 3.9 documents the regression results for equation (3.15). Here we regress the
logarithm of CEO compensation on unsystematic firm performance, systematic firm per-
formance, and several control variables for 25845 firm-year observations over the time
span 1992-2011. We also include industry, year and CEO dummies. We rely on industry,
industry/size, and the Kernel-based peer groups for constructing the systematic perfor-
mance variable.
The first and second column of Table 3.9 show the regression estimates with system-
atic firm performance based on industry and industry/size peers. The systematic com-
ponent is significant for the industry and the industry/size peer groups (value of 0.53, p-
value=0.01 and value of 0.52, p-value=0.02, respectively). These numbers do not support
the use of RPE in this model specification. In the rest of the table, we use Kernel-based
peer groups to construct the systematic performance variable. We document qualitatively
similar results. The systematic component of firm performance is statistically signifi-
cant for the estimation with Kernel-based peers. The coefficients are 0.78 for the normal
Kernel-based peer (p-value=0.03), 0.78 for the cosine Kernel-based peer (p-value=0.03),
and 0.78 for the uniform Kernel-based peer (p-value=0.03). Thus, in this model specifica-
tion the CEO is partly compensated for systematic performance. The same holds for the
estimation results with adjusted Kernel-based peers (labeled as "scaled" in the Table 3.9
).
20This reasoning is supported by the untabulated results where we repeat the same regression procedure
on the standardized variables.
21This reasoning is again dovetailed by the untabulated results where we repeat the same regression
procedure on the standardized variables.
22For more details on the construction of the strong-form RPE tests, see Antle and Smith (1986).
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[Insert Table 3.9 about here]
To sum up, our results dovetail with previous studies. Firm size represents an im-
portant characteristic when constructing a peer group. In our sample industry and indus-
try/size peers are equally good in filtering out exogenous shocks from the compensation
contract. However, the adjusted Kernel-based peer group approach which allows for the
construction of individual peer groups seems to be better in performing this task. The co-
efficient on the Kernel peers tends to be constantly more negative than it is the case with
industry/size peers only. This result is robust across different peer group specifications.
Our evidence indicates that on average some noise was removed from the compensation
contract.
3.3 Portfolio Analysis
This section examines whether there is an association between the predicted excess ex-
ecutive compensation and firm performance. Precisely, we introduce a predicted excess
compensation variable that captures the compensation arising from stock and peer per-
formance. By means of this variable, we intend to capture the RPE use. In other words,
we intend to examine whether firms having higher predicted excess compensation, which
stems from the firm performance and peer performance, tend to under- or overperform
firms with a lower predicted compensation.23 The empirical literature provides intuition
that this might be the case. Subsection 3.3.1 explains the methodology we use to examine
this question. The main results are presented in the subsection 3.3.2.
There is reason to believe that well-governed firms are more inclined to remove ex-
ogenous shocks from executive compensation contracts (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001,
Garvey and Milbourn 2006). Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) investigate how the pres-
ence of large shareholders affects the manager’s pay design. In particular, they exam-
ine if this governance practice has any influence on whether managers are rewarded for
"luck".24 The study shows that CEOs in firms with large shareholders, large shareholders
on the board, smaller board, and less insider board presence are better able to remove
the lucky component from the compensation package. Hence, this study suggests that
firms exhibiting stronger governance practices, might be more prone to the RPE use. In
another study, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) report that CEOs with bad governance
practice receive smaller reductions in cash compensation after the incentive-based com-
ponent of the compensation contract is increased, suggesting that bad governance practice
is related to the higher executive pay.25 Garvey and Milbourn (2006) extend the study by
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). They provide strong empirical evidence that execu-
tives are able to get rewards arising from good luck, whereas they are isolated from bad
23Namely, firms whose RPE use is stronger (higher coefficient on peer performance in absolute terms),
have a lower predicted excess (executive) compensation.
24The authors refer to "lucky" pay whenever the pay is unrelated to the managers’ performance.
25In the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) the absence of the large shareholders is a proxy for
a bad corporate governance practice.
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luck. Garvey and Milbourn show that benchmarks are only used to evaluate the CEO per-
formance when they are rising. This result is in line with the assumption that executive
compensation is not determined ex ante. On the contrary, it seems that executive pay is
determined only after the performance of the benchmark has been observed. Garvey and
Milbourn (2006) find that this phenomenon is particularly prevalent in companies with
bad corporate governance structures.
The belief that governance best practices lead to superior firm performance is
widespread in the academic literature (Gompers et al. 2003, Core et al. 1999, Brown and
Caylor 2004, Wu et al. 2009, Amba 2014). Gompers et al. (2003) examine whether better
governed firms tend to exhibit higher performance. For this purpose, they build a gover-
nance index that represents a proxy for shareholder rights. The index consists of several
sets of governance provisions for around 1500 firms in 1990.26 It essentially measures
good corporate governance practice of firms. Furthermore, they estimate the empirical
relationship between corporate performance and the index. The results support their hy-
pothesis: firms with stronger governance practice exhibit higher firm values, profits, and
sales growth – they perform better. Moreover, these firms also face lower capital expendi-
tures and fewer corporate acquisitions. Furthermore, Core et al. (1999) present evidence
suggesting that firms with weaker governance practices face greater agency problems and
as a consequence, perform worse. CEOs in these firms also receive greater compensa-
tion packages. "More precisely, CEO remuneration is higher when the manager is also a
chairman, the board is larger, there is a greater percentage of outside directors, and when
the outside directors are appointed by the CEO or are considered gray" (Core et al. 1999,
p.372). Brown and Caylor (2004), Wu et al. (2009), Amba (2014) endorse this evidence.
On the one hand, there is strong empirical evidence that better governance practices
induce higher firm performance. On the other, there is some evidence suggesting that bet-
ter governed firms are more likely to reward their managers with compensation schemes
that are unrelated to the common risk. Against this background, it is worthwhile to con-
sider whether there is an association between RPE (as one aspect of a good governance
practice) and firm performance.27
3.3.1 Methodology
This subsection summarizes the methodology we use in order to examine the question
mentioned above. Our approach is essentially based on the methodology applied in Core
et al. (1999). We provide a brief overview of the approach developed in their study and
then go on to show how we adjust their method for our purposes.
In their study Core et al. (1999, p.372) intend to answer two questions: 1. Are ex-
ecutive pay and the quality of corporate governance related? 2. Is there a link between
26For details on how the governance index was built, see p.114-119 in Gompers et al. (2003).
27To our knowledge there is only one study that investigates whether RPE use increases shareholder
wealth. Tice (2015) tests whether RPE firms perform better than non-RPE firms and reports mixed results.
In the overall sample she finds evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis that RPE firms generally better
perform than non-RPE firms. She documents, however, that RPE firms on average perform better in com-
parison to the similar non-RPE firms solely when the contract is based on market-based firm performance
measure.
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the quality of governance practice and firm performance? In their attempt to provide
answers to these questions, they find that executive pay varies with the corporate gover-
nance variables and ownership structure. Given this, they note: "The variation of CEO
pay that stems from governance variables could be interpreted twofold: 1. The results
might be a consequence of a misspecified model for the equilibrium wage or 2. They
might be a consequence of unresolved agency problems" (Core et al. 1999, p.372). In
order to plunge deeper in resolving this puzzle, Core et al. (1999) create a new vari-
able – predicted excess compensation. This variable captures the part of the CEO pay
that arises from the governance variables (board and ownership variables) in excess of
the standard control variables for executive pay. Core et al. (1999, p.390) use the fol-
lowing equation in order to quantify this variable: Predicted excess compensation =∑
β̂i · board structurei + ∑ γ̂i · ownership structurei. The βi’s and the γi’s are obtained
in the regression of CEO pay on board and ownership variables, standard economic de-
terminants of CEO pay, and industry and year dummies. The authors then investigate if
this variable correlates with future stock market performance.
In order to set up a criterion for the portfolio analysis, we adjust the method of Core
et al. (1999) in the following manner:
In the first step, we regress the logarithm of total compensation (Compit) on the inter-
action between industry and firm performance (Industryit ×Perfit), an interaction between
industry, and peer performance (Industryit×Peer Perfit) and several control variables (Cit):
Compit = α0 +α1 ·(Industryit×Per fit)+α2 ·(Industryit×PeerPer fit)+α3 ·Cit +it (3.16)
We use industry, industry/size, and a Kernel-based peer group measures for peer perfor-
mance, and use firm stock return as a proxy for firm performance. The list of control
variables is described in Section 3.2.4.
In a second step, following Core et al. (1999) we compute a predicted excess compen-
sation variable based on the estimated coefficients from equation (3.16):
̂Compit = α̂0 + α̂1 · (Industryit × Per fit) + α̂2 · (Industryit × PeerPer fit) (3.17)
Third step consists of portfolio construction. For this purpose we use two variables: 1.
Ĉompit which catches the predicted compensation arising from the firm and peer per-
formance variables. 2. Additionally we deflate the predicted compensation with total
compensation in the following manner: ĈompitCompit+8 in order to put emphasis on how much a
CEO actually earns on the grounds of peer performance.
In order to construct portfolio returns for our analysis we sort firm stock returns by pre-
dicted excess compensation variable and group them into deciles. This yields 10 groups
of firm stock returns for each year. We then compute yearly value-weighted portfolios for
each group. We repeat the same procedure with the relative predicted excess compensa-
tion. The idea behind it is to observe whether returns of the firms with the small predicted
excess compensation outperform or underperform those with high predicted excess com-
pensation.
In order to evaluate this we calculate the average of value-weighted returns for each
group over 1992-2011 and report the corresponding t-statistics. In addition, we calculate
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excess returns by applying the four-factor model proposed by Carhart (1997). The four-
factor model – consisting of the market, the value, the size, and the momentum risk factors
– explains the cross-section of stock returns better than the simple one-factor model based
on Capital Asset Pricing Model which includes only a market factor.28 Therefore, in the
regression we control for these four factors. It has become common to control for these
factors in a wide range of applications such as portfolio analysis due to the fact that
researchers require reliable predictions for expected returns based on an asset pricing
model. The market momentum (WML), size (SMB), and value (HML) risk factors are
obtained from Kenneth’s French website.
3.3.2 Results
This subsection reports the main results of our portfolio analysis.
All tables in this section are divided into two parts. The first one reports portfo-
lios returns sorted by the predicted excess compensation (Ĉompit) labeled as "fitted CEO
pay". The second one reports portfolio returns sorted by relative predicted compensation
( ĈompitCompit+8 ) labeled as "fitted relatives CEO pay". Each part of the table documents "raw"
portfolio returns – averages of value-weighted returns over 1992-2011 (labeled as "raw"
in tables) and excess returns calculated using the four-factor model (labeled as "FF" in
tables).
In Table 3.10 we use an industry/size peer group in order to construct the predicted
excess compensation and relative excess compensation variable. "Raw" value-weighted
portfolios in both parts of the table show a non-monotonic behavior. The "raw" value-
weighted portfolio returns sorted by predicted CEO pay variable for the first group is
0.78, the second 0.99, the third 1.03, the fourth 0.94, the fifth 1.15, the sixth 1.13, the
seventh is 0.90, the eight 1.00, the ninth 1.03 and for the tenth group 1.10. The returns
in all groups are statistically insignificant. We report qualitatively similar results when
we empoly the Fama-French model for calculating excess returns. The excess returns for
the portfolios sorted by predicted CEO pay variable for the first group is 0.39, the second
0.61, the third 0.72, the fourth 0.57, the fifth 0.72, the sixth 0.74, the seventh is 0.41, the
eight 0.76, the ninth 0.71 and for the tenth group 0.55. These results are robust when we
use relative CEO pay as a sorting criteria.
[Insert Table 3.10 about here]
In Tables 3.11–3.13 we use the adjusted Kernel-based peer specification in order to
construct the predicted excess compensation and relative excess compensation variables.
In Table 3.11 we use the normal Kernel peer group for constructing the sorting criteria. In
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 we use the cosine and uniform Kernel peer groups respectively. We
show qualitatively similar results as in Table 3.10. We report a non-monotonic behavior
of the portfolio returns. This also holds when we adapt Fama-French methodology for
calculating excess returns.29
28The Carhart’s four factor model is an extension of three factor model developed by Fama and French
(1993).
29These results are again qualitatively similar when we adopt Kernel-based peers.
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[Insert Table 3.11 about here]
[Insert Table 3.12 about here]
[Insert Table 3.13 about here]
Taken together, our evidence suggests that there is no association between predicted
excess compensation variable, that serves as proxy for the RPE use in our analysis, and
firm performance.
3.4 Conclusion
This study develops a new approach for peer group aggregation – a Kernel-based peer
group approach and investigates the RPE hypothesis on a sample of 2806 U.S. firms
for the time period 1992-2011. The novel Kernel-based approach identifies peer groups
within the same industry by taking into consideration a more precise link of firm size in
relation to peer groups. In doing so, we allow for individual peers for every firm.
To that end, we regress the logarithm of total compensation on firm performance, in-
dustry peers, industry/size peers, kernel-based peers, and various control variables. We
also include CEO dummies. We control for unobservable variation in the level of com-
pensation across years and industries. In addition, we examine whether an association
between RPE use in executive pay and firm performance can be empirically established.
In order to examine this, we create a predicted excess compensation variable that to cap-
ture the RPE use in executive pay. We then sort firm returns by the means of this variable
and create ten groups of firms. We calculate value-weighted portfolio returns and corre-
sponding excess returns.
We find negative and statistically significant coefficients for all peer group specifica-
tions, which is in line with the notion of RPE. This indicates that on average some noise
was removed from the compensation packages of a CEO. However, when we account
for peer groups, with peer selection based on the Kernel methodology, the peer coeffi-
cients are more negative in comparison to other peer group specifications suggesting that
accounting for Kernel peers delivers more powerful tests of RPE. This result is robust
across different specifications of peer weights.
Our findings suggest four things. First, we develop a new approach for peer group
selection which is robust and implementable. This approach seems to be better able to
capture exogenous shocks in executive compensation contracts than traditional industry
and industry/size peers. Second, the U.S. firms in our sample entertain the use of RPE in
assessing the performance of their CEOs on average. Hence, on average the U.S. firms
are pursuing a good governance practice with respect to RPE. Third, peer group selection
seems to play a role in conducting tests of RPE. Fourth, firm size plays an important
role when composing appropriate peer groups. These observations complement previous
studies.
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Table 3.1: Sample frequency by year
Year Frequency Percent
1992 645 2.13
1993 1165 3.84
1994 1398 4.61
1995 1481 4.89
1996 1527 5.04
1997 1549 5.11
1998 1610 5.31
1999 1580 5.21
2000 1553 5.13
2001 1532 5.06
2002 1555 5.13
2003 1634 5.39
2004 1633 5.39
2005 1555 5.13
2006 1609 5.31
2007 1755 5.79
2008 1697 5.60
2009 1701 5.61
2010 1655 5.46
2011 1467 4.84
Note: The table shows the sample frequency by year for the full sample. We report year, the sample
frequency observation for each year, and the yearly percentage of the overall sample.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Sample Statistics
Variable N Mean St.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Total Compensation 25845 3.45 7.43 0.61 0.93 1.85 3.86 558.06
Log of Total Compensation 25845 7.55 1.12 -7.40 6.82 7.52 8.26 13.23
Firm stock return 25845 -0.02 0.51 -7.21 -0.15 0.08 0.25 1.36
Peer return (Industry) 25845 -0.06 0.41 -4.51 -0.16 0.02 0.16 0.76
Peer return (Industry/Size) 25845 -0.02 0.38 -7.21 -0.12 0.05 0.18 1.41
Peer return (Knor) 25845 0.01 0.04 -0.28 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.18
Peer return (Kcos) 25845 0.01 0.04 -0.61 -0.00 0.02 0.04 0.19
Peer return (Kuni) 25845 0.01 0.04 -0.28 -0.00 0.01 0.04 0.18
Firm size (Sales) 25845 3.90 11.62 0.00 0.37 0.96 2.93 279.23
Firm size (log(Sales)) 25845 6.96 1.57 -2.76 5.90 6.86 7.98 12.54
Growth options 25845 1.71 1.830 0.09 0.62 1.20 2.15 52.52
Firm Stock Return Variance 25845 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 2.20
Regulation Dummy 25845 0.06 0.24 0 0 0 0 1
Log of CEO Tenure 25845 7.76 0.84 0 7.20 7.79 8.35 10.02
CEO chair dummy 25845 0.54 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
CEO ownership dummy 25845 0.52 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
Interlock dummy 25845 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics of 25845 CEO-firm observations over the 1992-2011 time span
for 2806 firms. We report compensation data, firm performance measures and control variables. Peer
groups are based on: industry affiliation, industry/size quartiles and various specifications of Kernel-based
approach. We document the number of firm observations (N), Mean (Mean), Minimum (Min), Standard
Deviation (St.Dev.), First Quartile (Q1), Median, Third Quartile (Q3) and Maximum (Max). Total compen-
sation and firm characteristics are in USD millions.
Table 3.3: Regression estimating the sensitivity of firm performance to peer performance
Peer Group N ρ
Industry 25845 0.53*
Industry/Size 25845 0.51*
Knor 25845 1.60*
Kcos 25845 1.61*
Kuni 25845 1.61*
Knor (Scal) 25845 1.61*
Kcos (Scal) 25845 1.61*
Kuni (Scal) 25845 1.61*
Note: The table shows the slope coefficient ρ from a pooled OLS regression of firm performance on industry,
industry/size peer group and various Kernel-based peer groups. The regression is pooled on 25845 CEO-
firm observations over 1992-2011 time span for 2806 firms. We report the mean coefficient (ρ) and the
number of observations (N). Significance level is denoted as follows 1% (∗).
77
Chapter 3. Relative Performance Evaluation, Firm Size and Stock Returns – An
empirical study
Table 3.4: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Independent Variables Industry Peer Group Industry/Size Peer Group
Intercept 4.06*** 4.05***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm stock return 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00)
Peer return (Industry) −0.07***
(0.00)
Peer return (Industry/Size) −0.07***
(0.00)
Firm size (sales) 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.00) (0.00)
Growth options 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
CEO Tenure 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.00) (0.00)
Regulation Dummy −0.07 −0.07
(0.87) (0.87)
Firm Stock Return Variance 0.61*** 0.62***
(0.00) (0.00)
CEO Chair Dummy 0.02 0.02
(0.29) (0.29)
CEO ownership Dummy −0.02 −0.02
(0.23) (0.17)
Interlock Dummy 0.05* 0.05*
(0.07) (0.07)
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
CEO dummies yes yes
Adjusted R2 70.63% 70.63%
Number of observations 25845 25845
Note: The table reports regression results for the equation Compit = α0 +α1 ·FirmPer fit +α2 ·PeerPer fit +
α3 · Cit + it. The first column reports results from regressing the log of total CEO compensation on stock
return, the industry peer group and several control variables. The second column reports results based on the
industry/size peer group specification proposed by Albuquerque (2009). We control for firm size, growth
options, CEO tenure, regulation dummy, firm stock return variance, CEO chair dummy, CEO ownership
dummy, and interlock dummy. We also include year, industry, and CEO dummies. We report coefficients,
adjusted R2, and number of observations. P-values are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are
denoted as follows 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗).
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Table 3.5: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Independent Variables Knor (unscaled) Kcos (unscaled) Kuni (unscaled)
Intercept 4.05*** 4.05*** 4.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm stock return 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Peer return (Knor) −0.35**
(0.01)
Peer return (Kcos) −0.34**
(0.01)
Peer return (Kuni) −0.34**
(0.01)
Firm size (sales) 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth options 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO Tenure 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Regulation Dummy −0.06 −0.06 −0.06
(0.89) (0.89) (0.89)
Firm Stock Return Variance 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.62***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO Chair Dummy 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
CEO Ownership Dummy −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Interlock Dummy 0.05 * 0.05* 0.05*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
CEO dummies yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 70.61% 70.61% 70.61%
Number of observations 25845 25845 25845
Note: The table reports regression results for the equation Compit = α0 +α1 ·FirmPer fit +α2 ·PeerPer fit +
α3 ·Cit +it. We regress the log of total CEO compensation on stock return, peer group and control variables.
Peer performance is aggregated according to the Kernel-based approach. We control for firm size, growth
options, CEO tenure, regulation dummy, firm stock return variance, CEO chair dummy, CEO ownership
dummy, and interlock dummy. We also include year, industry, and CEO dummies. We report coefficients,
adjusted R2, and number of observations. P-values are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are
denoted as follows 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗).
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Table 3.6: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Independent Variables Knor (scaled) Kcos (scaled) Kuni (scaled)
Intercept 4.05*** 4.05*** 4.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm stock return 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Peer return (Knor) −0.35***
(0.00)
Peer return (Kcos) −0.35***
(0.00)
Peer return (Kuni) −0.34**
(0.01)
Firm size (sales) 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth options 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO Tenure 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Regulation Dummy −0.06 −0.06 −0.06
(0.89) (0.89) (0.89)
Firm Stock Return Variance 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.62***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO Chair Dummy 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
CEO Ownership Dummy −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Interlock Dummy 0.05* 0.05* 0.05*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
CEO dummies yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 70.61% 70.61% 70.61%
Number of observations 25845 25845 25845
Note: The table reports regression results for the equation Compit = α0+α1·FirmPer fit+α2·PeerPer fit+α3·
Cit + it. We regress the log of total CEO compensation on stock return, peer group and control variables.
Peer performance is aggregated according to the adjusted Kernel-based approach. We control for firm
size, growth options, CEO tenure, regulation dummy, firm stock return variance, CEO chair dummy, CEO
ownership dummy, and interlock dummy. We also include year, industry, and CEO dummies. We report
coefficients, adjusted R2, and number of observations. P-values are reported in parentheses. Significance
levels are denoted as follows 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗).
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Table 3.7: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Independent Variables Knor (unscaled) Kcos (unscaled) Kuni (unscaled)
Intercept 4.07 *** 4.07*** 4.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm stock return 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Peer return (Industry) −0.05** −0.05** −0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Peer return (Industry/Size) −0.03 −0.02 −0.03
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Peer return (Knor) −0.35**
(0.02)
Peer return (Kcos) −0.30**
(0.02)
Peer return (Kuni) −0.29**
(0.02)
Firm size (sales) 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth options 0.00 *** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO Tenure 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Regulation Dummy −0.06 −0.06 −0.06
(0.88) (0.88) (0.88)
Firm Stock Return Variance 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.61***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO Chair Dummy 0.02 0.029 0.02
(0.25) (0.25) (0.23)
CEO Ownership Dummy −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Interlock Dummy 0.05 * 0.05* 0.05*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
CEO dummies yes yes yes
R2 75.95% 75.95% 75.95%
Number of observations 25,845 25,845 25,845
Note: The table reports regression results for the equation Compit = α0 +α1 ·FirmPer fit +α2 ·PeerPer fit +
α3 · Cit + it. Here we simultaneously include industry, industry/size peer group and the Kernel-based peer
group. The control variables are firm size, growth options, CEO tenure, regulation dummy, firm stock
return variance, CEO chair dummy, CEO ownership dummy, and interlock dummy. We also include year,
industry, and CEO dummies. We report coefficients, R2 and number of observations. P-values are reported
in parentheses. Significance level are denoted as follows 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗).
81
Chapter 3. Relative Performance Evaluation, Firm Size and Stock Returns – An
empirical study
Table 3.8: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Independent Variables Knor (scaled) Kcos (scaled) Kuni (scaled)
Intercept 4.07*** 4.07*** 4.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm stock return 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Peer return (Industry) −0.05** −0.05** −0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Peer return (Industry/Size) −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Peer return (Knor) −0.31**
(0.01)
Peer return (Kcos) −0.31**
(0.01)
Peer return (Kuni) −0.31**
(0.01)
Firm size (sales) 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth options 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO Tenure 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Regulation Dummy −0.06 −0.06 −0.06
(0.89) (0.89) (0.89)
Firm Stock Return Variance 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.61***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO Chair Dummy 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
CEO Ownership Dummy −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Interlock Dummy 0.05* 0.05* 0.05*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
CEO dummies yes yes yes
R2 75.95% 75.95% 75.95%
Number of observations 25845 25845 25845
Note: The table reports regression results for the equation Compit = α0 +α1 ·FirmPer fit +α2 ·PeerPer fit +
α3 · Cit + it. Here we simultaneously include industry, industry/size peer group and the adjusted Kernel-
based peer group. The control variables are firm size, growth options, CEO tenure, regulation dummy, firm
stock return variance, CEO chair dummy, CEO ownership dummy and interlock dummy. We also include
year, industry, and CEO dummies. We report coefficients, R2 and number of observations. P-values are
reported in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. Significance levels are denoted as follows 1%
(∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗).
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Table 3.9: Strong-form test of RPE
unscaled scaled
Independent Variables Industry industry/size Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni
Intercept 1.93* 1.97 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.88
(0.09) (0.11) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60)
Unsystematic Firm Perf 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Systematic Firm Perf 0.523** 0.52** 0.78** 0.78** 0.78** 0.79** 0.78** 0.78**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
CEO dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 76.20% 76.20% 75.92% 75.92% 75.92% 75.92% 75.92% 75.92%
Number of observations 25845 25845 25845 25845 25845 25845 25845 25845
Note: Table documents regression results for the equation Compit = δ0 +δ1 ·UnsysFirmPer f ormanceit +δ2 ·S ystFirmPer f ormanceit +δ3 ·Cit +it. Here we regress
the logarithm of CEO compensation on unsystematic firm performance, systematic firm performance, and control variables for 25845 firm-year observations over
the time span 1992-2011. We use industry, industry/size as well as Kernel-based methodology to construct systematic variables. For more details on systematic and
unsystematic variable construction see Section 3.2.3. We report coefficients, R2, and number of observations. P-values are reported in parentheses. Significance
levels are denoted as follows 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗).
83
Chapter 3. Relative Performance Evaluation, Firm Size and Stock Returns – An
empirical study
Table 3.10: Portfolio Analysis
Pf 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 L–S
fitted CEO Pay
raw 0.78 0.99 1.03 0.94 1.15 1.13 0.90 1.01 1.10 1.03 0.25
t 2.11 2.71 2.69 2.81 2.92 3.23 2.59 2.97 3.74 3.00 1.00
FF 0.39 0.61 0.72 0.57 0.72 0.74 0.41 0.76 0.71 0.55 0.16
t-FF 1.55 2.26 2.08 2.59 2.31 3.38 1.63 2.83 3.41 2.52 0.63
fitted relatives CEO Pay
raw 0.96 1.12 0.98 1.00 1.19 0.94 1.14 0.80 1.03 0.81 -0.15
t 3.00 3.20 3.14 3.07 3.87 2.88 3.35 2.44 2.55 2.13 -0.49
FF 0.63 0.82 0.55 0.52 0.76 0.45 0.62 0.24 0.46 0.45 -0.18
t-FF 3.21 2.49 2.72 2.68 3.31 2.31 2.45 1.24 1.74 1.64 -0.53
Note: This table reports averages of value weighted (VW) stock returns over 1992-2011 sorted into 10
groups by the predicted compensation variable and the deflated predicted compensation variable. In this ta-
ble, we use a industry/size peer group to construct predicted and deflated predicted compensation variables.
We use the methodology described in section 3.3.1 to construct these variables. We report t-statistics (t) be-
low averages. We also report four-factor alphas from regressing the VW return on the Fama-French-Carhart
factors (FF) and its t-statistics (t-FF).
Table 3.11: Portfolio Analysis
Pf 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 L–S
fitted CEO Pay
raw 0.98 0.96 1.01 0.88 0.68 1.01 0.99 0.96 0.87 0.79 -0.20
t 2.67 2.59 2.89 2.24 1.84 2.85 2.85 3.11 2.94 2.63 -0.75
FF 0.62 0.52 0.67 0.47 0.27 0.64 0.55 0.60 0.55 0.31 -0.39
t-FF 2.94 2.06 2.49 1.60 1.07 2.48 2.57 2.59 2.72 1.84 -1.27
fitted relatives CEO Pay
raw 0.86 0.99 1.02 0.89 1.08 1.09 1.01 0.92 0.75 1.03 0.16
t 2.96 3.19 3.21 2.83 3.33 3.34 3.17 2.80 2.10 2.75 0.58
FF 0.50 0.64 0.56 0.39 0.65 0.64 0.50 0.40 0.23 0.66 0.16
t-FF 3.37 3.41 2.38 2.35 2.71 2.78 2.45 2.02 0.93 2.45 0.56
Note: This table reports averages of value weighted (VW) stock returns over 1992-2011 sorted into 10
groups by the predicted compensation variable and the deflated predicted compensation variable. In this
table, we use normal Kernel-based peer group to construct predicted and deflated predicted compensation
variables. We use the methodology described in section 3.3.1 to construct these variables. We report
t-statistics (t) below averages. We also four-factor alphas from regressing the VW return on the Fama-
French-Carhart factors (FF) and its t-statistics (t-FF).
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Table 3.12: Portfolio Analysis
Pf 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 L–S
fitted CEO Pay
raw 0.90 1.13 1.03 1.04 0.58 0.92 1.12 0.99 0.75 0.83 -0.08
t 2.46 3.33 2.96 2.91 1.52 2.89 3.23 3.26 2.45 2.77 -0.29
FF 0.54 0.71 0.66 0.68 0.09 0.55 0.69 0.63 0.44 0.34 -0.28
t-FF 2.56 3.09 2.53 2.64 0.41 2.47 3.26 2.99 1.96 2.01 0.36
fitted relatives CEO Pay
raw 0.86 1.01 1.01 0.88 1.09 1.05 0.99 0.95 0.78 0.96 0.10
t 2.94 3.28 3.18 2.82 3.32 3.24 3.17 2.91 2.24 2.52 0.37
FF 0.49 0.66 0.56 0.38 0.65 0.59 0.49 0.43 0.24 0.59 0.10
t-FF 3.33 3.56 2.41 2.24 2.72 2.64 2.39 2.18 1.01 2.25 0.35
Note: This table reports averages of value weighted (VW) stock returns over 1992-2011 sorted into 10
groups by the predicted compensation variable and the deflated predicted compensation variable. In this
table, we use a cosine Kernel-based peer group to construct predicted and deflated predicted compensation
variables. We use the methodology described in section 3.3.1 to construct these variables. We report the
t-statistics (t) below averages. We also report four-factor alphas from regressing the VW return on the
Fama-French-Carhart factors (FF) and its t-statistics (t-FF).
Table 3.13: Portfolio Analysis
Pf 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 L–S
fitted CEO Pay
raw 1.00 0.88 1.03 1.02 0.77 1.13 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.82 -0.19
t 2.78 2.39 2.99 2.71 1.94 3.37 2.45 2.86 2.91 2.77 -0.72
FF 0.63 0.41 0.71 0.69 0.50 0.76 0.43 0.50 0.59 0.36 -0.36
t-FF 2.90 1.67 2.70 2.41 1.48 3.08 2.17 2.25 2.41 2.10 -1.13
fitted relatives CEO Pay
raw 0.86 1.06 1.02 0.88 1.07 1.11 0.98 0.91 0.78 1.02 0.16
t 2.95 3.18 3.20 2.84 3.31 3.40 3.10 2.79 2.14 2.74 0.58
FF 0.50 0.76 0.57 0.39 0.63 0.66 0.48 0.39 0.25 0.65 0.15
t-FF 3.35 2.77 2.39 2.34 2.63 2.90 2.33 2.02 0.99 2.45 0.54
Note: This table reports averages of value weighted (VW) stock returns over 1992-2011 sorted into 10
groups by the predicted compensation variable and the deflated predicted compensation variable. In this
table, we use a uniform Kernel-based peer group to construct predicted and deflated predicted compensation
variables. We use the methodology described in section 3.3.1 to construct these variables. We report the
t-statistics (t) below averages. We also report four-factor alphas from regressing the VW return on the
Fama-French-Carhart factors (FF) and its t-statistics (t-FF).
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This dissertation examines relative performance evaluation hypothesis which suggests
that tying an agent’s compensation relative to a peer group performance removes exoge-
nous shocks from the agent’s compensation. As such it offers a more informative mea-
sure of the agent’s effort. This is a theoretical prediction established in the agency theory.
Executive compensation is particularly suitable for RPE testing due to the fact that the
risk-sharing benefits of RPE in executive contracts are more likely to outstrip its costs to
the shareholders. Yet the use of RPE has not been limited to this component of the com-
pensation contract only. Many studies examine whether conditions on which the manager
is forced or encouraged to leave the firm are based on relative performance evaluation. To
that end, relative performance evaluation in executive contracts represents one segment of
a firm’s corporate governance policy.
This dissertation contributes and complements to the literature on relative perfor-
mance evaluation, executive compensation and corporate governance. In particular, it
enriches the academic literature along several dimensions. Chapter 1 offers a state-of-
the-art empirical literature overview on relative performance evaluation. Insights from
the empirical literature on RPE that span accounting, organizational, labor and person-
nel economics, corporate finance and organizational behavior offer an overview of factors
that affect inferences drawn on RPE in executive pay and turnover decisions. Inclusion of
such factors in empirical tests of RPE have important implication for the power of these
tests and should be taken into account in the future research on RPE. Existing evidence
on relative performance in the banking industry in the countries outside U.S. is scarce.
To that end, Chapter 2 provides evidence regarding the presence of RPE in executive pay
and its informative value in the sample of non-U.S., international banks from 2004 to
2013. The findings indicate that the RPE use in executive pay in the sample of non-U.S.
banks is not just an empty rhetoric – we find strong evidence of RPE in the subsample of
RPE disclosing banks. This evidence is robust across different RPE tests and peer group
specifications. In addition, we determine the main drivers of RPE in the banking industry
– firm size and growth options. Precisely, the larger banks seem to be more inclined to
entertain the use of RPE. On the contrary, the high growth option banks are less likely
to do so. Chapter 3 introduces a new method for peer group construction – a Kernel
based peer group approach. This method is based on traditional industry-size peer group
approach developed by Albuquerque (2009). However, in contract to the Albuquerque’s
method, the Kernel-based approach allows for individual peer group specification that
more closely corresponds to the target firm in terms of firm size. We test RPE use on
the large sample of U.S. firms and place the Kernel-based method in juxtaposition to the
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traditional industry-size and industry peer groups. The results suggest that our method
seems to be better able to filter common risk from the compensation contract than the tra-
ditional industry-size specification and therefore provides a more powerful tests of RPE.
In addition, we report that on average some noise was removed from the executive pay
contracts in our sample of U.S. firms from 1992-2011.
Given that the RPE evidence outside the U.S. is scarce, executive compensation con-
tracts of the non-U.S. large banks in the context of RPE are a subject worth further investi-
gation. A deeper investigation of this subject should offer an understanding on how legal,
cultural, and political factors, as well as the internal governance quality affect manage-
rial incentive designs in the financial institutions. Hence, an interesting topic for future
research would be considering how the use of RPE is affected by the equity market de-
velopment of home nations of the non-U.S. banks. It might be that a bank might not rely
on the equity returns to filter the systematic component of firm performance if it does
not have the confidence in the equity market informativeness. In addition, examining
whether the use of relative performance varies with a nation’s legal environment is also
an intriguing question for future research. Last but not least, the future research could
also examine how the quality of the corporate governance system affects the policies on
relative performance evaluation.
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A.1 Regression results
A.1.1 Kernel–based peers
The details regarding the construction of Kernel-based peers are reported in the sec-
tion 3.2.2.2 of the Chapter 3.
A.1.2 Iterative peer group construction
For additional robustness we follow a complementary way of creating peer groups in
applying the following iterative algorithm. This iterative approach was introduced by
Dikolli et al. (2013) and Black et al. (2015).
In a fist step, we measure the correlation between the performance measures of the
target firm j and other firms in the sample over a specific time period, t = 1, ...,T and for
i = 1, ...,N comparison firms.1
Corr(Per f jt, Per fit) (A.1)
Second, we start the iterative algorithm by regressing the performance of every firm in
the sample on the average performance of all the other firms in the sample (including the
target firm), (Perf Average):
Per fi = ai + bi · Per fAverage + ei where i = 1, ...,N and ei ∼ N(0, σ2) (A.2)
The third step consists of checking the statistical significance of the parameter estimate b.
In a fourth step, if the parameter estimate turns out to be insignificant, we reduce the
sample size to the new value Nnew:
Nnew = (k + 1) · N3 · k where k = 1, 2, 3...
is the index of the kth reduction of the original sample
(A.3)
1We throw away firms with less than 25 joint observations with the target firm and firms with a standard
deviation of zero, excluding NAs. We replace zero or negative total assets (proxy for firm size) with NAs.
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We perform the same regression as before on the reduced sample size:
Per fi = ai + bi · Per fAverage + ei where i = 1, j, ...,Nnew
and ei ∼ N(0, σ2)
(A.4)
In case the parameter estimates are significant we increase our sample by adding one firm
Nnew = Nnew +1 and repeat the same regression with a new number of firms in our sample,
Nnew. We repeat this step until the bi coefficient is insignificant. Once this condition is
achieved, we stop the iteration.
Based on the parameter estimates obtained in this process, following Dikolli et al.
(2013) and Black et al. (2015), we construct the performance weight for the firm i in our
sample:
w?i =
bi
σi∑N
i=1
bi
σi
(A.5)
Now we aggregate the peer group performance for the firm i:2
Peer Per f =
N∑
i=1
w?i · Per fi −
N∑
i=1
w?i · ai (A.6)
A.1.3 Full sample of banks
Panel A of Table A1 reports the results from regressing the logarithm of total compen-
sation on firm stock return, Kernel-based peers, growth options, and log of sales. The
parameter estimates on the Kernel-based peer group are negative and insignificant, which
is not consistent with the presence of RPE. The estimates hardly differ across several Ker-
nel specifications. They are -0.26 (p-value = 0.38) for the normal Kernel function, -0.16
(p-value = 0.54) for the cosine Kernel function, and -0.20 (p-value = 0.48) for the uni-
form Kernel function. In Panel A of Table A1 we have slightly adjusted the Kernel-based
approach by multiplying the difference of the firm size by the scaling factor introduced
in the Chapter 3. We test the presence of RPE by regressing the log of total CEO com-
pensation on firm stock return, peer performance, growth options, and log of sales. We
also include year, country, and industry dummies. The coefficient on the log of firm stock
return is again positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for every specification.
The negative coefficients on the Kernel-based peer portfolio keep persisting. They are
-0.22 (p-value = 0.39) for the normal Kernel function, -0.20 (p-value=0.38) for the cosine
Kernel function, and -0.27 (p-value=0.29) for the uniform Kernel function. The adjusted
2This peer group method allows for the creation of the Market-Adjusted Performance Indicator (MAPI)
developed by FehrAdvice & Partners AG. It is calculated in the following manner: The firm perfor-
mance of the target company (Perf target f irm) is regressed against the above established iterative peer
group performance: Perf target f irm = αtarget firm + βtarget firm · Peer Perf + target firm. The estimated co-
efficients obtained from this regression procedure are used for the MAPI calculation: MAPItarget firm =
Perf target f irm − βˆtarget firm · Peer Perf − αˆtarget firm.
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Kernel-based approach reports smaller p-values. The coefficients remain insignificant, re-
vealing no evidence of RPE in the full sample. Panel A of Table A2 dovetails these results.
The panel documents the results from regressing the logarithm of total compensation on
firm stock return, iterative peers, growth options, and log of sales. We also include year,
country, and industry dummies. The parameter estimate on peer return is again negative
and insignificant, lending no support for RPE hypothesis.
[Insert Table A1 about here]
[Insert Table A2 about here]
A.1.4 Weak tests of RPE (disclosure subsample)
Panels B of Table A1 and Table A2 document the same regression procedure on the sub-
sample of banks that explicitly disclose the use of peers in determining their level of CEO
compensation. Panel B of Table A1 reports results when the Kernel-based peers are em-
ployed, whereas Panel B of Table A2 documents results based on iterative peer group
approach. Under the Kernel-based peer group specification, external shocks are removed
from the compensation contract, which is consistent with RPE. The peer coefficients do
not differ much across the Kernel specifications. They are -0.99 (p-value = 0.03) for
the normal Kernel function, -0.81 (p-value = 0.05) for the ”cosine” Kernel function, and
-0.88 (p-value = 0.06) for the uniform Kernel function. The coefficient on firm stock per-
formance is positive and statistically significant and range from 0.70 to 0.77. Panel B of
Table A1 also reports the regression results with the adjusted Kernel-based peers (columns
labeled ”scaled”). All the Kernel-based peer coefficients keep a negative and statistically
significant sign, soundly rejecting the null hypothesis of no RPE. The coefficient of the
normal Kernel peer group is -0.82 (p-value = 0.03), of the cosine Kernel peer group -0.83
(p-value = 0.01), and of the uniform Kernel peer group -0.77 (p-value = 0.04). This ev-
idence is supported by the results presented in Panel B of Table A2. Under the iterative
peer group specification, the coefficient on peer return is -0.60 and statistically significant
(p-value=0.05).
[Insert Table A1 about here]
A.1.5 Strong-form tests of RPE (disclosure subsample)
We now use strong-form RPE tests in order to test the RPE hypothesis on the disclosing
subsample. We use the Kernel-based method in order to construct a systematic perfor-
mance variable and run the same regression model. Panel C of Table A1 reports the
results. In an additional robustness check, we employ the iterative peer group and report
the results in Panel C of Table A2. We document insignificant parameter estimates on
systematic firm performance. The coefficient of the normal Kernel peer group is 0.04 (p-
value = 0.85), of the cosine Kernel peer group 0.08 (p-value = 0.70), and of the uniform
Kernel peer group 0.09 (p-value = 0.65). Our results are robust to different specifications
of the weights in the Kernel-based approach, which is reported in Panel C of Table A1.
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The parameter estimates of the normal Kernel peer group is 0.07 (p-value = 0.75), of
the cosine Kernel peer group 0.01 (p-value = 0.96), and of the uniform Kernel peer group
0.09 (p-value = 0.66). The unsystematic firm performance is significant at the 1% level for
every Kernel-based specification. The results do not differ much when the iterative peer
group approach is used. We again report insignificant parameter estimate on systematic
firm performance. The coefficient is -0.26 (p-value=0.45).
[Insert Table A1 about here]
A.1.6 The drivers of RPE
In this section we estimate equation (2.5). For this purpose, as in the previous section, we
use the alternative peer group definitions based on the kernel and iterative approach. The
results are presented in Table A3. The parameter estimates on firm size remain statistically
significant and have the same sign. The firm size coefficient of the normal Kernel peer
group is 2.68 (p-value = 0.00), of the cosine Kernel peer group 2.70 (p-value = 0.00),
for the uniform Kernel peer group 2.69 (p-value = 0.00), and for the iterative peer groups
is 2.70 (p-value=0.00). The coefficient for growth options remains negative and in most
cases statistically significant, lending further support to our results.They are -19.64 (p-
value = 0.09) for the normal Kernel peer group, -19.28 (p-value = 0.10) for the cosine
Kernel peer group, for the uniform Kernel peer group -19.74 (p-value = 0.09), and -20.08
for the iterative peer group (p-value=0.08). The results are qualitatively similar when we
use the adjusted Kernel-based and iterative approach
[Insert Table A3 about here]
A.2 Clustered standard errors
Here we consider the same regression procedure (equation (2.1)) for the full sample of 42
banks but include clustered standard errors across industry codes. Table A4 reports the
regression results when peers are based on industry and industry/size. The coefficient on
industry peer is -0.06 (p-value = 0.87), and the coefficient on industry/size peers is -0.31
(p-value = 0.06). That is to say, we find qualitatively similar results to those presented
in Panel A of Table 2.4. In addition, in unreported results we find that the results for the
Kernel-based approaches are robust to the inclusion of clustered standard errors.
[Insert Table A4 about here]
A.3 Banks in our sample
[Insert Table A5 about here]
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.Table A1: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Panel A: Weak Form RPE Tests – Full Sample Panel B: Weak Form RPE Tests – Disclosure Subsample Panel C: Strong Form RPE Tests – Disclosure Subsample
unscaled scaled unscaled scaled unscaled scaled
Independent Variables Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni
Intercept 3.27* 3.28* 3.26* 3.36* 3.37* 3.43* -3.21 -3.21 -3.22 -2.82 -2.91 -2.63 -3.27 -3.26 -3.28 -2.86 -2.94 -2.67
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.40) (0.38) (0.44) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.40) (0.38) (0.43)
Firm stock return 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.70*** 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.74***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Peer return -0.26 -0.16 -0.20 -0.22 -0.20 -0.27 -0.99** -0.81* -0.88* -0.82** -0.83** -0.77**
(0.38) (0.54) (0.48) (0.39) (0.38) (0.29) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Unsystematic Firm Perf 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.70*** 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.74***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Systematic Firm Perf 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.09
(0.85) (0.70) (0.65) (0.75) (0.96) (0.66)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 76.39% 76.35% 76.36% 76.39% 76.39% 76.44% 65.20% 65.00% 64.81% 65.16% 65.63% 65.63% 65.20% 65.00% 64.81% 65.16% 65.63% 65.11%
Number of observations 318 318 318 318 318 318 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156
Note: The Table shows OLS regression results for the equation Compit = α0 + α1 · FirmPer fit + α2 · PeerPer fit + α3 · Cit + it (weak-form RPE test). We report
the results from regressing log of total CEO compensation on stock return and peer performance aggregated based on the Kernel approach and the adjusted Kernel
approach. Panel A reports results for the full sample, and Panel B reports results for the disclosure subsample. In addition, Panel C documents OLS regression
results for the equation Compit = δ0 + δ1 · UnsysFirmPer f ormanceit + δ2 · S ystFirmPer f ormanceit + δ3 · Cit + it on the subsample of RPE-disclosing banks
(strong-form RPE tests). We regress logarithm of CEO compensation on unsystematic firm performance, systematic firm performance, and control variables for
156 firm-year observations over the time span 2004-2013. For more details on the systematic and unsystematic variable construction see Section 2.2.2. We report
three versions of the Kernel based approach: 1) based on the pdf of the Standard Normal Distribution (Knor), 2) based the pdf of the Uniform Distribution (Kuni),
and 3) based the pdf of the ”Cosine Distribution” (Kcos). The columns denoted with scaled refer to the variants where we multiply the standardized differences
with a scaling factor, as described in . Significance levels are two-sided and are denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗). The corresponding p-values
are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
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Table A2: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Panel A: Weak-Form RPE Tests Panel B: Weak-Form RPE Tests Panel C: Strong-Form RPE Tests
– Full Sample – Disclosure Subsample – Disclosure Subsample
Independent Variables Iterative Peer Group Iterative Peer Group Iterative Peer Group
Intercept 3.07* -3.86 -4.92
(0.09) (0.27) (0.17)
Firm stock return 0.49*** 0.69***
(0.00) (0.00)
Peer return (Iterative) -0.07 -0.60*
(0.68) (0.05)
Systematic Firm Perf -0.26
(0.45)
Unsystematic Firm Perf 0.69***
(0.00)
Firm size (sales) 0.37*** 0.69*** 0.69***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth Options -0.49 0.88 0.88
(0.70) (0.76) (0.76)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 76.32% 64.52% 64.52%
Number of observations 318 156 156
Note: Panel A and B show OLS regression results for the equation Compit = α0 +α1 · FirmPer fit +α2 · PeerPer fit +α3 ·Cit + it. The regression results are based
on iterative peer group method. Panel A shows the results for the full sample, and Panel B reports the results for the disclosure subsample. Panel C documents
OLS regression results for the equation Compit = δ0 + δ1 ·UnsysFirmPer f ormanceit + δ2 · S ystFirmPer f ormanceit + δ3 ·Cit + it on the subsample of disclosing
banks. We regress logarithm of CEO compensation on the unsystematic firm performance, systematic firm performance, and control variables for 156 firm-year
observations over the time span 2004-2013. We use iterative peer group specification in order to construct a systematic performance variable. All regressions
include year, industry, and country dummies. For more details on systematic and unsystematic variable construction see Section 2.2.2. Significance levels are
two-sided and denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗). The corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
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Table A3: Logit regression of RPE use in executive compensation contracts
unscaled scaled
Independent Variables Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni Iterative
Intercept -25.30 -25.86 -25.18 -25.85 -26.14 -25.76 -24.91
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Compensation 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
Firm Perf -0.28 -0.29 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24 -0.20 -0.12
(0.74) (0.75) (0.82) (0.80) (0.79) (0.82) (0.89)
Peer return 1.18 0.95 0.86 0.76 0.72 0.63 0.36
(0.53) (0.55) (0.63) (0.62) (0.61) (0.65) (0.77)
Firm size (sales) 2.68*** 2.70*** 2.69*** 2.69*** 2.70*** 2.71*** 2.70***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth options -19.64* -19.28 -19.74* -10.26 -19.09* -19.42 -20.08*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 51.80% 51.80% 51.78% 51.79% 51.79% 51.79% 51.75%
Number of observation 318 318 318 318 318 318 318
Note: The table documents logit regression results for the equation yit = γ0 + γ1 ·Compit + γ2 · FirmPer fit + γ3 · PeerPer fit + γ4 ·Cit + it. The dependent variable
is RPE, an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the firm discloses peer group use in the compensation contracts. We regress RPE on firm performance, peer
returns, firm size, and growth options for 318 firm-year observations over the time span 2004-2013. We include year, country and industry dummies. We report
three versions of the Kernel based approached: 1) based on the pdf of the Standard Normal Distribution (Knor), 2) based the pdf of the Uniform Distribution
(Kuni), and 3) based the pdf of the ”Cosine Distribution” (Kcos). The panel ”scaled” refers to the variants where we multiply the standardized differences with a
scaling factor. The last column reports results based on the iterative peer group specification. We report the Cox and Snell’s R2. Significance levels are two-sided
and are denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗). The corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
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Table A4: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Independent Variables Industry Peer Group Industry/Size Peer Group
Intercept 3.18** 3.22***
(0.05) (0.05)
Firm stock return 0.47*** 0.56***
(0.00) (0.00)
Peer return (Industry) -0.06
(0.87)
Peer return (Industry/Size) -0.31*
(0.06)
Firm size (sales) 0.37*** 0.37***
(0.00) (0.00)
Growth options -0.59 -0.61
(0.60) (0.60)
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
Country dummies yes yes
Adjusted R2 78.48% 78.67%
Number of observations 318 318
Number of clusters 5 5
Note: The table shows OLS regression results for the equation Compit = α0 + α1 · FirmPer fit + α2 ·
PeerPer fit+α3 ·Cit+it. The first column presents the results from regressing log of total CEO compensation
on stock return, industry peer performance, and other variables. The second column documents regression
results based on industry and size quartiles, that is, Albuquerque (2009)’s approach. OLS estimation is
based on clustered standard errors. Firm size and growth options for the period 2004 to 2013 are also
reported. We include year, industry, and country dummies. The corresponding p-values are reported in
parentheses below each coefficient estimate. We report significance levels for 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10%
(∗).
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Table A5: List of international banks in the sample
Name of the Bank Country
SWEDBANK Sweden
CREDIT AGRICOLE France
CHINA MINSHENG BANKING China
BANCO DE SABADELL Spain
HUAXIA BANK China
DNB Norway
BNP PARIBAS France
COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA Australia
CHINA CONSTRUCTION BANK China
BANK OF CHINA China
CIMB GROUP HOLDINGS Malaysia
HSBC HOLDINGS UK
NORDEA BANK Sweden
BANCO SANTANDER Spain
SEB Sweden
SOCIETE GENERALE France
MALAYAN BANKING Malaysia
PUBLIC BANK Malaysia
FIRSTRAND South Africa
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP UK
BARCLAY UK
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP UK
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK Australia
CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK COMMERCE Canada
COMMERZBANK Germany
BANK OF MONTREAL Canada
BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA Canada
DEUTSCHE BANK Germany
WESTPAC BANKING Australia
TORONTO-DOMINION BANK Canada
ROYAL BANK OF CANADA Canada
OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING Singapore
BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL Spain
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK Singapore
DBS GROUP HOLDINGS Singapore
UBS Switzerland
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP N Switzerland
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP Australia
STANDARD BANK GROUP South Africa
BANK OF EAST ASIA Hong Kong
NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA Canada
SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN Sweden
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(a) The Standard Normal Distribution (b) The "Cosine Distribution"
(c) The Uniform Distribution
Figure B.1: The three types of kernel functions
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